A

LETTER

TO

THE HON. THOMAS ERSKINE.

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BRITISH
MUSEUM

A

LETTER

TO

THE HON. THOMAS ERSKINE;

CONTAINING

SOME STRICTURES

ON HIS

VIEW

OF THE

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

OF THE PRESENT

WAR WITH FRANCE.

SECOND EDITION.

By JOHN GIFFORD, Esq.

AUTHOR OF A LETTER TO THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE, &c. &c.

L'Homme est de glace aux Verités;
Il est de feu pour le Mensonge. VOLTAIRE.

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A

LETTER

TO

THE HON. THOMAS ERSKINE.

SIR,

AFTER the ample diſcuſſion which the origin of the war had undergone—after the unconfuted arguments, and the ſtrong and unanſwerable *proofs* which had been adduced by a learned and worthy Friend of mine,[1] as well as by myſelf,[2] in ſupport of its juſtice and neceſſity, I conceived the queſtion of *aggreſſion* to be finally decided; and was, therefore, not a little ſurprized to ſee the ſubject revived by you, after your party had obſerved, except in occaſional alluſions to the topic in the Houſe, a profound ſilence for more than two years—a ſilence which I was authorized to conſider as a tacit acknowledgement of their inability to maintain the poſitions they had ad-

[1] John Bowles, Eſq.

[2] In my Letter to the Earl of Lauderdale.

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vanced.—When your intention was firſt announced to the public, through the uſual medium of an advertiſement, I was naturally led to conclude, that you were furniſhed with ſome new arguments hitherto unemployed—that you had diſcovered ſome new proofs hitherto unexplored; which muſt immediately confound your adverſaries, and flaſh inſtant conviction on the public mind. Impreſſed with this idea, I was prepared to read my recantation, to acknowledge the force of your arguments, to admit the ſucceſs of your reſearches, and to do homage to the ſuperiority of your talents. On the peruſal of your publication, however, which, be it remarked, I had not leiſure to peruſe until it had been deemed expedient to imprint "*The Ninth Edition*" in the title-page,[3] the ſurprize which I had experienced on its annunciation became conſiderably increaſed; for I found,

[3] If the number of editions through which a work paſſes were to be received as the teſt of its merit, the triumph of democracy would be complete. For moſt of the democratic publications have certainly had a more rapid and extenſive ſale, than thoſe which have for their object, the defence of the laws, and the preſervation of ſocial order. The fact is, that an appeal to the paſſions of men, is, for obvious reaſons, more ſucceſsful than an addreſs to their reaſon. Voltaire's obſervation—"L'Homme eſt de *glace* aux *verités*; il eſt de *feu* pour le *menſonge*"—is founded in an accurate knowledge of human nature.

Beſides the *ſpirit of party*, ever active and indefatigable, is aſſiduous in promoting the circulation of the works of *Partiſans*. And the numerous editions through which it rapidly hurried the production of *the Client* (Thomas Paine) may ſerve as an apt illuſtration of the nine editions of *the Advocate*, in the courſe of one week.

that

that my utmoſt attention was inadequate to diſcover a ſingle argument, on the cauſes of the war, which had not been employed before, or one ſolitary proof in ſupport of the aſſertions you make.—I found, in ſhort, that, amidſt the moſt unequivocal profeſſions of moderation and candour, ſupported by a ſtyle generally correſponding with the ſame, you had, no doubt unwarily and unintentionally, ſuffered your profeſſional habits to acquire ſuch a preponderance in your mind, as to limit your attention *to one ſide* of the important queſtion which you had undertaken to diſcuſs; and from the prevalence of the ſame habits it ariſes, that, while you expreſsly diſclaim all idea of defending the French, all your arguments tend to juſtify their conduct towards this country; and, in fact, you plead the cauſe of our enemies, with the ſame zeal and energy which you diſplayed in the diſcharge of your profeſſional duty to Lord GEORGE GORDON and THOMAS PAINE.

I will not ſtop to inveſtigate the motives which could induce you to take up the pen, after your party had ſuffered ſo long an interval to elapſe ſince they laſt ventured into the field of controverſy; perhaps you was encouraged by the ſuppoſitions that thoſe victorious arguments and triumphant proofs which had effectually eſtabliſhed the ſuperiority of their opponents had been conſigned to oblivion; and that the ſtrong impreſſion which they had produced, had, by the natural

operation of time on the mind of man, aided and quickened by a variety of favourable and concurrent circumſtances, been ſo far worn off as to juſtify the hope, that its entire removal would be a taſk eaſy of accompliſhment. Be that as it may, ſince it is your pleaſure to walk over beaten ground, I can have no objection to accompany you in the track.

There is a vaſt *ſhow* of liberality in your declaration, that you "make no attack upon the *private character*" of Mr. PITT. Your forbearance on this head will, I conceive, be entitled to the ſame portion of praiſe as would be due to a man who ſhould gravely proclaim, that he meant not to queſtion the ſtrength of Samſon, the wiſdom of Solomon, or the eloquence of Demoſthenes. The meed of *prudence*, however, may ſafely be aſſigned to you; for, independently of the diſgrace that would attach to the defeat which muſt neceſſarily be the conſequence of ſuch an attack, the example might be dangerous, and ſome members of your party might have juſt reaſon to dread its effects.

But, Sir, do you mean to contend, that the private character of individuals has no influence on their public conduct?—Are you of opinion, that a man who is juſt, honourable, and upright in all the tranſactions of private life, will not ſuffer the ſame principles to regulate his proceedings in public life?—Say, Can the ſame dependence be placed on a gameſter and a debauchee, as on the

the friend of religion, morality, and virtue? Can he who, in the management of his own perſonal concerns, has proved himſelf a prodigal and a ſpendthrift, be reaſonably expected to diſplay, in the direction of the national revenue, an attention to economy and prudence?—The moment that excellence of private character ſhall ceaſe to have its weight in the ſcale of promotion, and talents *alone* be conſulted in the diſtribution of places of high truſt and importance, the deſtruction of the ſtate will be near and inevitable. Virtue is her beſt prop—Religion her ſureſt ſupport; remove theſe grand buttreſſes of ſocial order, the diſſolution of the body politic muſt enſue, and the whole ſyſtem crumble into ruins. Shall we, then, in diſcuſſing the pretenſions of rival candidates for place and power, loſe ſight of ſo eſſential a conſideration, and ſacrifice the intereſts of the public to a ſpurious liberality, which Virtue diſavows, and Religion rejects? Was ſuch a line of conduct obſerved by the Romans in their beſt days? Was ſuch the rule purſued by their beſt and moſt admired hiſtorians?—— But you aſſert "the freedom of hiſtory" where it anſwers your purpoſe, and oppoſe it where it would thwart your views. When I ſhall have been convinced, that an appointment to an official ſituation operates with the force and effect of a magic wand, by producing a total change in the propenſities of the heart, and the principles of the mind, I ſhall acknowledge the propriety of

that forbearance, in which, at preſent, I can only deſcry the ſymptoms of a ſelfiſh policy; and the indications of a wily prudence. It is not ſurely a time, when the current of Immorality runs ſtrong and impetuous, when Irreligion rears high her hideous head, and the exiſtence of a future puniſhment becomes a topic of public debate, for writers to relax in their efforts to ſupport and extend the influence of thoſe moral and ſpiritual checks and reſtraints which conſtitute the cement of ſociety, and ſtrengthen the baſis of man's preſent and future happineſs. At ſuch a time it becomes their peculiar duty to hold up to public indignation thoſe degenerate members of the community—however illuſtrious their rank, however ſplendid their abilities—who offer a pernicious example to the world by their open violation of the ties of Morality, and the duties of Religion. You, Sir, profeſs a reſpect for both: and, believe me, I give the moſt implicit credit to your profeſſions on this head. Indeed, I am little diſpoſed to withhold my aſſent from any of your declarations reſpecting *yourſelf*. Every man is the beſt judge of his own motives, and of his own principles: and I will do you the juſtice to ſay, that no one has taken more pains than you have to comply with the ſalutary admonition—Γνωθε σεαυτον;—no man, I am convinced, has ſtudied more cloſely the efficacy of *his own* powers—the importance of *his own* attainments—the extent of *his own* talents—and the ſplendor

of

of *his own* accompliſhments. It is a laudable ſtudy, and the effects of it muſt be highly beneficial to—*yourſelf*.

As I do not ſtand forward as the encomiaſt of Mr. Pitt, but as the champion of Truth, I ſhall take little notice of your animadverſions on the character and conduct of the Miniſter previous to the year 1792. You acknowledge, that, on his firſt entrance into public life, he was a ſincere and zealous advocate for a rational reform in the ſyſtem of repreſentation; and though you accuſe him of a dereliction of principles, ſince his acceſſion to power, few people will incline to admit the ſtrength of that evidence which is ſolely confined to his refuſal to join in the more extenſive and dangerous projects[4] of "The Friends of the People;" and to agitate a queſtion of ſuch high importance as that of a Parliamentary Reform, at a ſeaſon when Europe is ſhaken to its centre by the effects of that innovating ſpirit, in France, which originally profeſſed to have nothing more for its object, than a moderate and neceſſary reform.—His ſubſequent conduct will be diſcuſſed in the conſideration of the cauſes of the war, to which I ſhall proceed, after a ſhort comment on one inſtance of miſrepreſentation, in which I am perſonally involved.

[4] The eſſential difference between the reformers of 1780 and thoſe of the preſent day was explained, in a clear, forcible, and ſatisfactory manner, by the Duke of Portland and Earl Spencer, in reply to Lord Lauderdale, in a debate of the Houſe of Lords, at the beginning of the year 1795.

Adverting to the loyal aſſociations formed, at the cloſe of the year 1792, for the expreſs purpoſe of giving force and efficacy to the laws of the realm, you ſay that, in conſequence of their eſtabliſhment, "ſociety was rent aſunder," and "an "abſolute horror, even for liberty itſelf," became the prevailing ſpirit of the nation. This is a bold aſſertion. How a diſſolution of ſociety could be produced by a meaſure adopted with the ſole view of preſerving it from the attacks of its enemies, it is difficult to conceive. But as you do not condeſcend to adduce any evidence in ſupport of your aſſeveration, I ſhall content myſelf with a formal and unqualified contradiction, which, as a member of the firſt aſſociation, inſtituted by men with whom I have the pleaſure of living in the habits of friendſhip, I feel it my duty to give in this public manner. To check licentiouſneſs is, in my apprehenſion, the beſt means of ſecuring liberty; and that was the only check which the loyal aſſociations ever wiſhed to impoſe. You have the candour to exempt a part of the members from the imputations which muſt neceſſarily attach to them, if their objects had really been what you ſtate them to be; and, indeed, a portion of vanity, much greater than any which *you* can be ſuppoſed to poſſeſs, would have been requiſite, to inflict a cenſure upon nine-tenths of the nation, becauſe *the enlightened few* who compoſe the Oppoſition did not chooſe to open their eyes to the danger which threatened the political exiſtence of the

the country. The ſalutary conſequences produced by thoſe aſſociations have been acknowledged by the general voice of *the People*; (I uſe the term in the *Roman* ſenſe;) and were any additional teſtimony requiſite, the matter would be placed beyond the reach of doubt, by the extreme virulence which your party has univerſally diſplayed againſt their original promoters.[5]

Having followed you through theſe introductory remarks, I ſhall now examine the grounds of your aſſertions on the cauſes of the war. If I rightly comprehend your meaning, which, let me obſerve, is no eaſy matter, for your general poſitions are ſo obſcured by ſubſequent modifications, qualifications, and exceptions, that you ſometimes appear "to blow hot and cold" in the ſame breath, you maintain, that the war was produced, not by the conduct of France, but by the aggreſſion of the Combined Powers, (including England,) againſt that country. I deny

[5] The conduct of the Houſe of Commons, on the ſubject of the pamphlet aſcribed to Mr. Reeves, will form a curious theme for diſcuſſion to the hiſtorian of the preſent times. While I applaud and admire the zeal and energy diſplayed by the members, in defence of the conſtitution, and in ſupport of the rights of the popular branch of the Legiſlature, I cannot but expreſs my ſurprize that the Houſe ſhould have adopted a *mutilated ſentence* as the baſis of a criminal proſecution; retaining only that part of the ſentence which contained the objectionable matter, and rejecting the other part which tended to elucidate the poſition, and which was abſolutely neceſſary to explain the meaning of the author. In the courſe of that debate, too, there were ſome points advanced, from very high authority, which could neither be defended on the ground of hiſtory or of fact.

the fact *in toto*. So that, on this point, we are completely at iſſue.

As aſſertion oppoſed to aſſertion muſt neceſſarily leave the reader in doubt, and as you have not thought proper to adduce any *proof* in ſupport of your affirmation, though, by all the rules of evidence, the *onus probandi* lay upon you, I ſhall exhibit thoſe reaſons, and thoſe documents, on which my opinion is founded.

You affirm, that the treaty of Pilnitz was framed for the deſtruction of the French conſtitution, and the diſmemberment of the French Empire.——This aſſertion is directly in the teeth of fact. That treaty had no ſuch object in view. It was entered into at a time when the unhappy King of France, confined a cloſe priſoner in his capital, was debarred, by the arts of a profligate Faction, the full exerciſe of thoſe rights and privileges which had been ſecured to him, in the moſt ſolemn manner, by the new Conſtitution. The only wiſh of the Princes who ſigned it was, to ſee the perſon and lawful authority of Louis the Sixteenth freed from a ſituation which they juſtly conſidered, as the treaty expreſſes, " to be an object " of common intereſt to all the Sovereigns of " Europe." For this purpoſe, and for this alone, they avowed their readineſs to employ their forces, and to act with deciſion. To prove the ſincerity of their profeſſions, no ſooner was the

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King reſtored to a ſemblance of liberty—no ſooner had he accepted the new Conſtitution, than they announced that the declaration in queſtion was not to be acted upon: "thereby furniſhing "the moſt unequivocal proof, that their views "were entirely pacific towards France." That the intentions of the parties, who urged the treaty of Pilnitz, were really ſuch as they are here deſcribed to be, is clearly demonſtrated, by their reception of ambaſſadors from LOUIS, ſubſequent to his acceptance of the Conſtitution; and by the explanation which they entered into with the French Miniſtry at the commencement of the following year.

Whoever has paid attention to the ſituation of France, and to the manœuvres of the different parties by which that devoted kingdom was diſtracted at this period, muſt be convinced that the treaty of Pilnitz was not the cauſe of the war. The fact is, that at that time the French Government knew nothing of the contents of the treaty of Pilnitz, but by *report*. That report it was the intereſt of the republican party, which even then had been formed in France, under the foſtering care of CONDORCET and BRISSOT, to magnify ſo as to render it ſubſervient to their inſidious purpoſe, of making the People inſtrumental to the execution of their own treaſonable projects. It became, however, neceſſary to impart the grounds of their complaint to the contracting parties; and what was the conſequence of ſuch communica-

tion?—Why, that the Emperor and King of Pruſſia expreſsly denied that the treaty had any ſuch object or tendency as had been aſcribed to it. But notwithſtanding this denial, and notwithſtanding the prohibition to the Emigrants to aſſemble in Germany, the Faction perſevered in that line of conduct which they had previouſly determined to purſue. It is abſurd, then, to ſay, that the treaty of Pilnitz occaſioned the war. That treaty, by the confeſſion of the French themſelves, was but little known in France, even at the end of the year 1792,[6] nearly nine months after the commencement of the war,[7] which was

[6] See "Hiſtoire Philoſophique de la Revolution de France," Tome I.—The author of this work, ſpeaking of the diſpute between the rival clubs of the Cordeliers and the Jacobins, in the ſpring of 1792, ſays, "This great queſtion—Ought war to be declared againſt the Houſe of Auſtria?—was diſcuſſed in the Tribune of the mother-club. The Cordeliers were adverſe to the war, becauſe they thought it would tend to augment the credit of La Fayette. The Jacobins, on the contrary, *conſidered external hoſtilities as neceſſary to extend to the neighbouring States that effervescence which manifeſted itſelf in France.*—Beſides, the incalculable expences of the war would ſupply them with innumerable means for effecting that ſocial diſorganization, in the midſt of which they hoped to eſtabliſh their empire." Tom. I. p. 120.

[7] I have good reaſon to believe that the French Government never obtained a copy of the treaty of Pilnitz till the commencement of the year 1793; when one of their emiſſaries, then in England, and now reſident at *Altona*, ſurreptitiouſly procured one, through the medium of a member of Oppoſition; and it is highly probable that ſuch alterations and additions were made to it, as rendered it a fit inſtrument for promoting the purpoſe which the prevailing Faction of the day then had in view.

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ſolely occaſioned by the determination of the *Briſſotin* Faction to overthrow the Monarchy, and "to ſet fire to the four corners of Europe:"—a ſcheme, the accompliſhment of which, in their apprehenſion, would be facilitated by a declaration of war. It was for this purpoſe that DELESSART, a moderate, ſenſible, and upright man, who had hitherto conducted the negociation with the Emperor, was ſuddenly diſmiſſed, and DUMOURIEZ appointed to ſucceed him. The negociation immediately aſſumed a different complexion. The new Miniſter, bent on promoting the views of his party, conducted himſelf with pride and inſolence to the Imperial Court; which, on the contrary, diſplayed ſuch a degree of candour and moderation, that no unprejudiced man who has read the correſpondence, can accuſe it of a wiſh to commence hoſtilities againſt France.

This you muſt know to be the caſe, if you have read the correſpondence;[8]—if you have not read it,

[8] "The deductions drawn from the correſpondence of the "two Miniſters—(Meſſieurs DE MONTMORIN and DELESSART) "—are corroborated by the moſt authentic facts. Every body "now knows that, during the years 1790 and 1791, the foreign "Powers made no hoſtile preparations againſt France; there "were no magazines, no augmentation, no movement of troops; "and there was ſo little preparation of this kind, even in the "Spring of 1792, that the campaign could not be opened by the "Allies before the end of Auguſt, although the declaration of "war, on the part of France, was known ſix months before."—*Defenſe de Louis Seize*, par M. MALOUET.

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it, you are inexcuſable in attempting to diſcuſs a queſtion without taking ſuch previous ſteps as were indiſpenſably neceſſary to render you competent to the diſcuſſion;—and if you have read it, it was a duty incumbent upon you to ſhow what part of it ſanctioned, in your apprehenſion, thoſe concluſions which, I contend, are egregiouſly falſe; and which led you to juſtify the conduct of the French, and to condemn and calumniate their enemies.

War, however, was inſiſted upon by BRISSOT and VERGNIAUD, *as the only means of maintaining that Conſtitution* which they intended it ſhould overthrow. Their Faction prevailed; and the unfortunate Monarch, though averſe to the meaſure, as he expreſsly declared in the letter which he ſent to the Aſſembly, on the third of Auguſt following, gave his ſanction to the declaration of war, "in compliance with the unanimous opinion of *his Council*, and the *apparent* wiſhes of his People."

"The reſponſibility of this war, (ſays MALLET DU PAN) which has heaped more calamities on France than were produced by all the wars of the ſix preceding reigns, muſt fall upon the party of the Girondiſts, who provoked it—on

It is neceſſary to obſerve, that the fact of having "*provoked* "*the war*" was alledged, by the regicides, as an inſtance of criminality againſt the King and his confidential Miniſter.

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" the puſillanimous conduct of the Legiſlative " Aſſembly, who decreed it—on the Briſſotin " Miniſtry, *who forced the King to conſent to it.*

" That Monarch ſhed tears when he ſigned the " anathema thus iſſued againſt the nation; every " body muſt remember the deep horror diſplayed " in his countenance and in his voice, when he " went to announce to the Aſſembly *the reſolution* " *of his Council.* Before he complied with the " wiſhes of the extraordinary Miniſters by whom " he was ſurrounded, he made every one of them " ſign his opinion, which was *contrary to his own.* " This paper was preſerved by his Majeſty, and " if I am not miſtaken, it is now in the poſſeſ- " ſion of Mr. MORRIS.[9]

" LOUIS XVI. conſidered this war as the tomb " of his family, of the monarchy, of France, " and of himſelf. In order to defeat the perfi- " dious views of the Briſſotins in forcing the " declaration of war, the King deſired that the " rupture might not loſe any of the characteriſ- " tics of *an ordinary foreign war between Power* " *and Power*, and that the Allies would not think " of invading the legiſlative power of the " Nation.

" This was the ſubſtance of the inſtructions " which this Monarch, ſo little known, ſo ſtu-

[9] This gentleman was Miniſter from the United States of America to the Court of France, at the commencement of the Revolution.

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" pidly appreciated, ſo unworthily inſulted, *by* " *foreigners as raſh as they are ignorant*,[1] did me " the honour to entruſt to my care, in the month " of May, 1792; in order that I might tranſmit " them to the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia, " (who were then at Franckfort, at the corona- " tion of his Royal and Imperial Majeſty,) and " urge them to adopt them.

" If the Directory, who deſtroy the liberty of " the preſs, who violate the ſecrecy of all letters, " who prevent the communication of all know- " ledge, ſhould ſuffer this paper to be publiſhed " in France, the Nation will then learn to whom " it is indebted for all the calamities which it " has experienced, and will deplore the fate of " that Monarch who had a right to call himſelf " the only *friend of his People*.[2]"

This account is corroborated by the teſtimony of M. DELESSART, which is to be found in a letter written, from his priſon at Orleans, to his friend M. NECKAR.——Lamenting the delay which had taken place in the publication of his defence, he ſays—" I ſhall lament, as long " as I live, that it could not appear at the " preſent period—in conſequence of the mani- " feſtation of what has paſſed in foreign courts;

[1] *Noſce* TEIPSUM.

[2] Correſpondance Politique, pour ſervir à L'Hiſtoire du Republicaniſme Français.

" *in conſequence* of the DEMONSTRATION *that*
" *they were unwilling to make war againſt us;*
" in conſequence of THE UNANSWERABLE PROOF
" *that it is we who have provoked them to hoſtilities,*
" *who began them, and who have ſet Europe againſt*
" *us.*" The evidence of M. DELESSART, which is, of itſelf, deciſive, is further confirmed by BRISSOT himſelf, who, ſoon after the declaration of war, when exulting in the ſucceſs of his plan, exclaimed, " *We made him* (the King) *de-*
" *clare war, in order to put him to the teſt.*" And again—" *But for the war, the revolution of the*
" *tenth of Auguſt would never have taken place;*
" *but for the war, France would never have been a*
" *Republic.*"

Can any fact be more clearly and more firmly eſtabliſhed? And yet, Sir, with this evidence before you, for I ſubmitted the greater part of it to the Public two years ago, and no one has yet attempted to controvert or invalidate it, you can join in the vulgar cry, and ſeek to ſtrengthen the prejudice which faction has propagated againſt the enemies of France, by ſtigmatizing, as an aggreſſive confederacy, a league that was purely defenſive. The only foundation you condeſcend to exhibit of an opinion ſo contrary to fact, is the Note of the 12th of June, 1792, preſented to Lord GRENVILLE by M. CHAUVELIN, in the name of his inſulted Sovereign, who was, as I have ſhown, at that time ſurrounded by the very Miniſters that had planned his depoſition, and

whoſe official communications were, of courſe, dictated by that Council, in compliance with the unanimous opinion of which, he had, according to his own acknowledgement, been led to ſanction the declaration of war, in contradiction to the ſentiments of his own mind. On an opinion formed on ſuch a baſis, it would be a waſte of time to beſtow a comment. It will not ſtand the teſt of examination, and muſt inſtantly fall before the ſolid and "unanſwerable proofs" which I have brought againſt it.

I ſhall now proceed to conſider the validity of your arguments on the queſtion of aggreſſion, as it relates to *England.*

The firſt charge you prefer againſt the Britiſh Miniſters, on this head, is, their refuſal to interfere in the diſpute between the French, and the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia, produced by the cauſes which I have already detailed. With what propriety you, who reprobate all idea of interference with foreign powers, and even contradict, in that reſpect, the maxims eſtabliſhed by the beſt writers on the law of nations, can cenſure Miniſters for *not* interfering, I cannot conceive; but if Miniſters had interfered, they muſt either have reprobated the conduct of the French government, or have violated their duty; and it will ſcarcely be contended, that ſuch reprobation would, in the temper by which the faction which then predominated in France was actuated, have been attended with the ſalutary effect of re-eſta-

bliſhing

bliſhing that harmony which the prevalence of revolutionary principles had alone interrupted. To aſſert, that this refuſal indicated a diſpoſition hoſtile to France, is to aſſume a fact, contradicted by the teſtimony of the French rulers themſelves, as well as by your own acknowledgements. You admit, (p. 44,) that until the 15th of December, 1792, the Government of this country had "continued to expreſs *the moſt pacific diſpoſitions*," though in the ſame breath you tell us, that "we "ſhall find them *uniformly and ſcrupulouſly obſervant* "*of the moſt novel punctilios*, which could furniſh "the ſmalleſt pretence for *repelling peace*, but "overleaping every rule hitherto adopted by "regular governments in ſeeking a juſtification "for war." On theſe topics, unfortunately, even the French Executive Council of that day, with all their inveteracy againſt England, and with all their gratitude to you and your aſſociates—as expreſſed in the paper I am about to quote—differed from you eſſentially. In Brissot's report, from the Committee of General Defence to the National Convention, on the diſpoſition of the Britiſh Government towards France, delivered on the 12th of January, 1793, adverting to the refuſal of our Miniſters to interfere in the diſputes on the Continent, the reporter obſerves, "Inte-"reſt engaged the Miniſtry to obſerve an exact "neutrality in the war, which broke out between "France, Auſtria, and Pruſſia. From this con-"duct they reaped a double advantage: the na-"tion enriched herſelf in the midſt of thoſe

" combats of which ſhe was a ſimple ſpectator;
" and the preſent Adminiſtration was conſolidated
" by the flouriſhing ſtate of commerce, and the
" ſtability of peace. Actuated by theſe motives,
" the Cabinet of St. James repeatedly declared
" their firm intention to obſerve the moſt ſcru-
" pulous neutrality towards France; and, in fact,
" they did obſerve it until the *immortal day* of the
" tenth of Auguſt."—Again—" Such was the
" diſpoſition of the Britiſh Cabinet towards the
" end of *November*, that every difficulty appeared
" to be ſurmounted, and Lord GRENVILLE began
" to acknowledge the Government of France,
" which he had, at firſt, entitled the *Government*
" *of Paris*. Some ſcruples were, indeed, ſug-
" geſted as to the character of our agent, and the
" authority of the parties; *but the Britiſh Mi-*
" *niſters courted and gave explanations*. One only
" difficulty ſeemed to impede the projects of the
" *negotiators*. The Executive Council of France
" wiſhed to negotiate through the medium of
" a regular Ambaſſador, while the Britiſh Mini-
" ſtry obſerved that the negociation might be
" conducted by a ſecret agent; and they did not
" even firmly inſiſt on this point of etiquette, if
" we may judge by ſome expreſſions which fell
" from Lord Grenville, who aſſured our Ambaſ-
" ſador, that *the King of England would never be*
" *ſtopped by forms*, when the object of negotiation
" was to obtain declarations that might be ſatiſ-
" factory and advantageous to both parties.—
" PITT, on his part, at the beginning of *December*,

" teſtified

" teſtified *the ſtrongeſt deſire to avoid a war, and* " *to procure from the French Miniſtry the proof of a* " *ſimilar diſpoſition*; and he regretted, that the " interruption of the correſpondence between the " two Cabinets ſhould have produced any miſ- " underſtanding."

Here is a direct contradiction of your leading aſſertions with reſpect to the conduct of Miniſters; firſt, as to their efforts to foment the diſpute between the Emperor and France, and their pretended " incitement and encouragement to the " Princes of Europe, to invade " that country, and to diſſolve her eſtabliſhment," — which you aſſert as a fact, and as poſitively as if it were true; ſecondly, as to their own hoſtile views againſt France; and thirdly, as to their rigid obſervance of the moſt novel punctilios for the purpoſe of repelling peace. The very reverſe of this appears to have been the real ſtate of the caſe, even from the evidence of a vigilant enemy, who had carefully collected every poſſible ground of complaint, in order to render the war palatable to the people of France.

In the ſame perverſe ſpirit of miſrepreſentation or ignorance, and with equal boldneſs, you aſſert, that France, previous to the 28th of January, 1793, " was undoubtedly ſolicitous for peace." No man who has attended to the political ſyſtem of the republican Cabinet of Paris, at this period, can doubt that

that the French Government were anxious to lull us into *a falſe ſecurity*, in order that they might, without moleſtation, purſue the vaſt plans of aggrandizement which, by the diffuſion of their principles, as well as by the force of their arms, they hoped to accompliſh. But that they were diſpoſed to ſacrifice to peace any one of thoſe objects, without the complete dereliction of which the preſervation of peace was impracticable, is a poſition that even your ingenuity and ſophiſtry muſt prove inadequate to eſtabliſh.

If you had paid that attention to your ſubject which could alone enable you to diſcuſs it with propriety, you would have known, that ſo little did the rulers of France expect a continuance of peace, that, ſo early as the month of October, 1792, they cauſed a law to be paſſed by the Convention, for the equipment of a powerful fleet, in conſequence of the report of the Committee of General Defence—in which, a war with the maritime powers was repreſented as highly probable. It cannot be contended, that this expectation of war was founded on the hoſtile diſpoſitions of the Britiſh Court, becauſe I have already ſhown, that, even to the month of December, it had, by their own confeſſion, evinced the ſtrongeſt anxiety for the preſervation of peace. Beſides, we have the authority of BRISSOT for affirming that, at this very time, " the determination was made to " brave all Europe."

But,

But, by way of proving your general poſition, you aſſert, that before the 28th of January, 1793, France " had diſavowed conqueſt and aggran-" dizement," had " offered to reſpect the neu-" trality of Holland, and ſolemnly diſavowed " every act or intention to diſturb the Govern-" ment of Great Britain." However diſpoſed *you* may be to give implicit credit to all the declarations of theſe *virtuous* republicans, you muſt at leaſt permit *me* to demonſtrate the difference between their profeſſions and their practice. And this will neceſſarily lead me to a brief conſideration of the famous, or rather *infamous*, decree of the 19th of November, 1792, which you have moſt injudiciouſly adduced in ſupport of your charge againſt his Majeſty's Miniſters.

The ſincerity of the diſavowal of all intention to diſturb the government of foreign States, is proved, beyond the poſſibility of doubt, by the avowed " wiſh of all enlightened republicans, " *before the tenth of Auguſt*," to eſtabliſh liberty not only in France, but in " *all Europe*;" and by the means which they meant to adopt for the accompliſhment of their project—" by exciting " the governed againſt the governors, in exhibit-" ing to the people the advantages of ſuch inſur-" rections.[3]" Yet, notwithſtanding this honeſt avowal, you will probably agree with LE BRUN, whoſe aſſertion will better tend to promote the manifeſt object of your publication, that " it

[3] BRISSOT's Addreſs to his Conſtituents, p. 74.

" would be wronging the National Convention " to charge them *with the project of protecting in-* " *ſurrections.*" Indeed, Sir, the mode of reaſoning you have choſen to adopt is one which it might, perhaps, be allowable to employ in the Court of King's Bench, in ſupport of a client accuſed of high treaſon, but which, moſt certainly, very ill becomes a man who has the honour to repreſent the people of Great Britain.

The offer of reſpecting the neutrality of Holland, ought undoubtedly to have received the greateſt degree of attention, and the moſt implicit belief of its ſincerity, after the *diſintereſted* ſentiments avowed on that ſubject by the members of the French Government. Alluding to thoſe ſentiments, at a ſubſequent period, the *patriotic* and *enlightened* ROBESPIERRE juſtly lamented that their liberal deſigns upon *Holland* had not been put in execution. " If (ſaid he) we had invaded " *Holland*, the Government of England had been " undone, and the revolution of Europe ſecured." MAULDE-HOSDAN, who, before the revolution, filled the office of Miniſter Plenipotentiary, from France, at the Hague, thus delivered *his* ſentiments, on the ſubject of Holland, in a ſpeech to the Convention, (previous to M. CHAUVELIN's offer to reſpect her neutrality,) which received the unanimous approbation of that *auguſt* aſſembly. " England and Pruſſia know very well, that " France has the greateſt intereſt to ſubſtitute a " popular and repreſentative government, for the

" ariſto-

" ariſtocratical and degenerate one that actually " exiſts in Holland; *that with the forces of that* " *country, France would irrecoverably deſtroy the* " *trade of England;*" (M. MAULDE-HOSDAN might be a good *patriot*, but he was evidently no *prophet*;) " and, by means of her navy, ſoon " command the Baltic; that all which would be " wanting would be a renewal, in that part of " the north, of an alliance of ſituation then be- " come neceſſary; and that, an intimate union " between France and Holland being once form- " ed, *the ſupremacy of the Engliſh trade, both in the* " *Eaſt and Weſt Indies, would rapidly diſappear*; " while Pruſſia, on her ſide, would, ſooner or " later, irrecoverably loſe all her poſſeſſions in " Weſtphalia! But why has ſhe expoſed herſelf " to the danger of loſing them? *Her impolitic* " *alliance with Auſtria* is the Saturn of the fable " which devours every thing without producing " any thing.[4]"

The deſigns of France upon Holland are alſo acknowledged by PUBLICOLA CHAUSSARD, the National Commiſſary, ſent by the Executive Council, at the cloſe of the year 1792, to pro-

[4] His Pruſſian Majeſty ſeems to have taken the hint here ſuggeſted by this ſagacious republican; and, with equal ſagacity, to have preferred the *chance* of ſecuring his poſſeſſions in Weſtphalia by facilitating the conqueſt of the Netherlands, to the *certainty* of preſerving them by contributing his efforts to confine the French within their ancient limits.—Hiſtory will no doubt do *juſtice* to this *upright* Monarch.

mote a revolution in the Netherlands.—" The " enemies of France, and England in particular," (ſays this apoſtle of revolutionary freedom)— " cheriſh the ſyſtem of excluding her from rank- " ing as a maritime power. Thence proceeded " the error in which the public opinion was kept, " reſpecting our operations in Flanders, *and thoſe* " *which we had projected againſt Holland.*"—Theſe projects were certainly very conſiſtent with the offer of *neutrality!*

It now remains to ſhow what reaſon there was to give credit to the renunciation, by the French Government, of conqueſt and aggrandizement.

The *revolution of Europe* might, you may ſay, have been ſecured, without any acceſſion of territory to the French; theſe *philanthropic* and *philoſophic* reformers would have been content to emancipate the neighbouring States from the ſhackles of princely authority, to eſtabliſh among them the rights of man, and the liberal principles of liberty and equality,[5] and have remained ſatisfied, with the delightful contemplation of their own works, and with the quiet poſſeſſion of their

[5] I give you credit for, at leaſt, one diſcovery of your own, *viz.*—that " a ſpirit of liberty and *equality* pervaded even the " *vaſſalage* of the feodal *conquerors* of Europe."—This is perfectly novel, and leads one to deplore that you were not a member of the Conſtituent Aſſembly which deſtroyed, *en maſſe*, all feodal rights as a neceſſary meaſure, preparatory to the eſtabliſhment of liberty and equality.

own domains! The impreſſion of this belief would, indeed, ſquare very well with the object of your arguments; but, unfortunately for you, there are ſome declarations on record which are calculated to fix an impreſſion, of a different nature, on the minds of all rational men. BRISSOT, in his Addreſs to his Conſtituents, aſſerts, that he had formed *plans*, by the accompliſhment of which "Liberty might have found no other boun-" daries than thoſe of the world." How theſe plans were to affect the individual intereſt of *France*, may be aſcertained by his declaration that the French "ought to acknowledge no other " barrier than the Rhine." The ſame project is avowed by CHAUSSARD, the official agent of government, who was not only in full poſſeſſion of all their views, but was actually inveſted with all their powers.——"It was of conſequence to " France"—ſays CHAUSSARD, in his Memoirs,— "that ſhe ſhould repoſſeſs herſelf on one ſide of " the barrier of the Rhine, and, on the other, " command the Scheldt and the Meuſe, by en-" cloſing them within her boundaries; thus pro-" tecting and enlarging the ſources of the na-" tional wealth; in a word, that ſhe ſhould " reſume the ancient diviſion of her territory, " which heretofore extended northern Gaul to " theſe limits: that ſhe ſhould bring back into " the boſom of a large family, nations that, " during a long ſpace of time, had formed a " part of it.

"No doubt it was the intereſt of France, to "raiſe, and to ſecure *by conqueſt*, the trade of the "Belgic Provinces, ſo cramped by that of Hol-"land, and thence to alarm, to threaten the "United Provinces, to place our aſſignats on the "very deſks of their counting-houſes, *there to* "*ruin the Bank of England*;[6] and, in ſhort, to "complete the revolution of the money-ſyſtem. "It was the intereſt of France to monopolize, "as it were, thoſe vaſt implements of trade, "thoſe manufactures of national proſperity. It "was the intereſt of France to weaken her mor-"tal enemy, to cramp his efforts, *to aggrandize* "*herſelf* with his ſpoils; in brief, to mutilate "the Coloſſus of Auſtria, by rending from him "theſe fertile countries, for obtaining and ſecur-"ing the poſſeſſion of which, he has for ages been "laviſh of gold, of blood, and of intrigues.

"It was the intereſt of France, *to raiſe herſelf* "*to the rank of a firſt-rate power* in Europe: thus "covering with a ſhield the ſecond-rate powers, "and protecting them againſt the boundleſs "ambition of the northern empires."

[6] There are perſons, evidently in the intereſt, if not in the *pay*, of the French, buſily employed in *England, at this time*, in a daring attempt to accompliſh this very ſcheme, by ſeeking to make the populace believe, that the high price of proviſions is entirely owing to the circulation of Bank Notes, and to what they are pleaſed to call "The Iniquity of Banking."—A proceeding ſo unprincipled and flagitious in itſelf, and ſo dangerous in its conſequences to a commercial country, ſhould ſurely not be ſuffered to paſs unnoticed.

If theſe declarations of an authorized Envoy of the French Government, employed for the expreſs purpoſe of accompliſhing their deſigns in a neighbouring State, do not afford a complete proof of their views of *conqueſt and aggrandizement*, and conſequently of the inſincerity of their diſavowal of ſuch views, I am at a loſs to know what, in your apprehenſion, conſtitutes ſuch proof.

As you have thought proper to quote the decree of the nineteenth of November, I am compelled to make ſome obſervations on the ſubject, although I have, on a former occaſion, amply explained the intent, nature, and application of the ſame. To repeat arguments which have never been anſwered, is a taſk extremely irkſome to me; but if you and your party will perſiſt in urging objections which have been repeatedly confuted, no alternative is left to your opponents. To read nothing which tends to thwart your views, or to contradict your opinions, may be the beſt means of avoiding mortification, and of nurſing vanity; but if you were, on political points, to deviate, in this reſpect, from your legal practice, and condeſcend to examine the arguments *on both ſides* of the queſtion, you would ſave yourſelf, the public, and your adverſaries, no inconſiderable degree of trouble. You have, however, choſen your path, and I muſt follow you in it.

The

The purpoſe for which you notice the decree in queſtion, is to ſhew that the explanation offered by CHAUVELIN was ſuch as ought, at leaſt, to have ſo far ſatisfied Miniſters as to induce them to enter into a farther negociation. If then I can prove, that the explanation offered was not only unſatisfactory, in all reſpects, but that the profeſſions of the French Government were at direct variance with their practice, at this very time, and that their aſſertions were only framed for the expreſs purpoſe of deception, your argument, of courſe, muſt fall to the ground.

The explanations on which you rely are thoſe which were contained in the Note of the French Miniſter, delivered to Lord GRENVILLE by M. CHAUVELIN, in the month of January, 1793. The grand object of them was to enforce the three poſitions which I have already overturned. But in order to ſhew the flagitious conduct of the ſaid Executive Council in a ſtronger point of view, it will be neceſſary to ſubjoin ſome additional remarks.

In the interval between the 19th of November, when the decree was paſſed, and the time when the explanation of it was offered to the Britiſh Miniſter, another decree was enacted by the French Convention, (on the 15th of December, 1792,) which, far from removing any one ground of complaint preferred by our Court againſt the proviſions of the former law, contained explana-

tions, if poſſible, ſtill more incompatible with the independence of neighbouring States. And, to prevent the poſſibility of miſapprehenſion on the ſubject, the Executive Council ſent the decree to their Commiſſaries in the Netherlands, accompanied by ſpecific inſtructions, explanatory of its ſpirit and principles, and deſcribing the practical application of each particular article. Fortunately, one of the Commiſſaries committed theſe inſtructions to the preſs, and they prove, inconteſtibly, the truth of my aſſertions, and the falſehood of the explanations offered by the Council. As theſe documents were ſo amply diſcuſſed and ſo well underſtood at the time, I ſhall be very brief in my extracts.

In the *explanation* it is averred, that "*France* "*will reſpect other Governments.*" In their preliminary obſervations to their Commiſſaries, the Council remark, that "*Although the art of or-* "*ganizing ſocieties be ſtill in its infancy, the art of* "*organizing revolutions is farther advanced.*" And theſe inſtructions fix the means of *revolutionizing* Belgium.

Only eight days before the decree of the 19th of November was paſſed, the Convention beſtowed unanimous applauſe on the following ſpeech of one NARKERTON, a Dutch *patriot*, and even ordered honourable mention to be made of it in their Bulletin, or Journals of the Houſe.— "My countrymen, the Batavians, burn with a de-

"ſire

" fire to become Frenchmen, and the Stadtholder
" trembles. They expect liberty from you.—
" French Generals! come and break the chains
" of these unhappy republicans, still oppressed by
" tyrants."—Such was the *respect* paid, by the French legislature, to the Government of Holland; and the respect which they paid to that of England had been sufficiently demonstrated by the answer of the Abbé Gregoire, in his official capacity of President of the Convention, to the address of certain *British patriots*, who, in your opinion, were actuated by an " honest but irregular zeal," and by " a *just* indignation." The address congratulated the French on the violation of their solemn oaths, by the abolition of monarchy, and the answer expressed the hope of the President soon to congratulate the addressers " *on the establishment of a National Convention in England*," and, consequently, on the destruction of the British constitution.

In the *explanation* it is stated, that France " *will*
" *not impose laws upon any one.*" In the decree of the 15th of December it is declared, " *that she*
" *will treat as enemies the people who, refusing or*
" *renouncing liberty and equality, are desirous of*
" *preserving, recalling, or entering into an accom-*
" *modation with their Prince and privileged Casts.*"
And the Council observe, that, by this decree,
" The French nation considers as her enemies
" *even a whole people*, if they reject liberty and
" equality, and express a wish to treat with a
" Prince

" Prince and privileged Caſts." And they add, that this declaration is not a *vain threat*, but " the *direct conſequence* of all the *principles* on " which *that juſt and ſalutary law is* founded."

The *explanation* farther ſtates, " *we have ſaid,* " *and we deſire to repeat it, that the decree of the* " *19th of November could not have any application,* " *unleſs to the ſingle caſe in which the general will* " *of the nation, clearly and unequivocally expreſſed,* " *ſhould call the French nation to its aſſiſtance and* " *fraternity.*" The inſtructions of the Council, on the contrary, direct its application to a country, in which all the inhabitants reject the plans and principles of the French Republic; and their own Commiſſary in the Netherlands, in his account of his operations *in purſuance of their inſtructions*, expreſsly repreſents a majority of the proviſional adminiſtration of that country, which had been choſen by *the people*, as hoſtile to the decree of the Convention; and explains the means which, in conſequence of this event, he had taken, to accompliſh, what *you* ſeem anxious to accompliſh in *England*—" to raiſe up the *mi-* " *nority*, and to deſtroy the aſcendency of *an* " *antipatriotic majority.*"—The *explanation* diſclaims all views of annexing Belgium to France; but all the efforts of the official agents of the Council were avowedly directed to ſecure the ſovereignty of that country to the Republic.[1]

As

[1] Indeed, the very circumſtance which gave riſe to the

As you lay a particular ſtreſs on the diſavowal of the Executive Council, of all intention *to annex Belgium to France*, and make it a leading feature of your argument, to prove the pacific diſpoſition of the Republic, it becomes neceſſary to enter more at large upon the ſubject;—and as it is my invariable wiſh, in diſcuſſions of this nature, to produce conviction more by the ſtrength of my proofs than by the tenor of my opinions, I ſhall extract an account of the conduct of the French to the inhabitants of Belgium, from one of their own hiſtorians, a French *Citizen*, whoſe authority you will ſcarcely be diſpoſed to queſtion.

decree gives the lie direct to the aſſertion contained in the *explanation*. RHUL, a member of the Convention, prefaced his motion for the decree, on the 19th of November, by obſerving, that the bailiwick of Darmſtadt, belonging to the Duke of Deux-Ponts, (who, be it obſerved, had acknowledged the French Republic, and was at peace with France,) had diſplayed the tri-coloured cockade, and planted the tree of liberty, and that the Duke was advancing with a body of troops, with a view to ſeize and impriſon the Syndics. RHUL then moved, that the Aſſembly ſhould declare "Thoſe people who wiſh to fraternize "with us, are under the protection of the French Republic." The ſpirit of this motion was adopted, and the decree in queſtion was paſſed in conſequence of this event; and, that its application might not be miſtaken, it was *acted upon* without delay—a French army entered the territory of the unfortunate Duke of Deux-Ponts, who with difficulty eſcaped from his palace in the night, and fled for refuge to the oppoſite bank of the Rhine.

See "An Hiſtorical Eſſay on the Ambition and Conqueſts of "France," publiſhed by DEBRETT, in which this fact is placed, with many others, in a very proper point of view.

"The

" The French Generals, when they penetrated " into Belgium, after the battle of Gemmappes, " had publiſhed, with the conſent and approba- " tion of the National Convention, a procla- " mation, in which they announced to the Bel- " gians, that the armies of the Republic entered " their territories as friends and brothers; that " they gave them a *full and perfect liberty*; *that* " *they ſhould chooſe whatever form of government* " *they liked beſt, without the ſmalleſt reſtraint being* " *impoſed on their inclinations, in any manner what-* " *ever.*

" All the proclamations publiſhed by the Jaco- " bins,[8] (in Belgium,) exalted the ſocial virtues, " and talked of nothing but their love of the " human race. They declared, that the French, " in a ſtate of freedom, were the enemies of " Kings, but they proclaimed, at the ſame time, " the greateſt reſpect for the will of the people. " In vain did the French Emigrants, who had " retired in great numbers to that country, aſſure " the inhabitants that anarchy was the only ſyſtem " of the Jacobins, who concealed, under ſpecious " but falſe profeſſions, the perfidy of their deſigns; " and that, after ſubverting the conſtitution of " their own country, they would carry the flames " of diſcord into the neighbouring States. The " candour of theſe benevolent monitors was " ſuſpected; the Belgians conſidered them as

[8] All the members of the Government were Jacobins.

" too much intereſted in the oppoſite cauſe to
" give a true repreſentation of the events that
" were paſſing in France.

" The principles of diſintereſtedneſs pro-
" claimed by the National Convention, the ſo-
" lemn promiſe to make no conqueſts, and all
" the *pompous expreſſions*, conſecrated by the new
" civic religion, were repeated by DUMOURIER;
" the people were perſuaded that his conduct
" would correſpond with his profeſſions, and
" that, under the powerful protection of France,
" the Belgians, aſſembled in convention, would
" preſerve ſuch of their cuſtoms as they choſe
" to retain, and would make ſuch alterations as
" ſhould appear to be advantageous to them-
" ſelves, without being obliged to adopt the
" ſyſtem of government which prevailed in
" France.

" But CAMBON entertained views of a very
" different nature; and *the proclamations which*
" *had been publiſhed were nothing more than ſnares*
" *to entrap the Belgians.* Scarcely were the
" French in poſſeſſion of all the fortified towns,
" and of all the arms in Belgium, when this Le-
" giſlator, and Miniſter of Finance, openly
" proclaimed his deſign of ſeeking an odious and
" vain reſource in the ſpoliation of a friendly
" country.

" By a decree, which paſſed on the 15th of
" December, all exiſting authorities in Brabant

" and Flanders were ſuppreſſed; the eſtabliſh-
" ment of a proviſional government, on the
" model of the French government, was or-
" dained; all public property, moveable and im-
" moveable, as well as the property of the Clergy,
" of the Princes, and of the Lay-Communities,
" was ſequeſtered; the impoſts, *tythes*, and feu-
" dal rights, were ſuppreſſed; and the Generals
" were ordered to enforce the execution of this
" law, which, at leaſt, was ill timed, and exe-
" cuted without conſidering whether or not the
" Belgians were prepared for a change at once ſo
" general and ſo prompt. It is true, that the
" execution of *a part* of theſe regulations was
" to ceaſe ſo ſoon as the Belgians ſhould have a
" national repreſentation; *but a thouſand means
" were deviſed to prevent the meeting of this re-
" generating Congreſs.*

" Four Commiſſaries, members of the National
" Convention, CAMUS, GOSSUIN, DANTON,
" and LACROIX, were ordered to repair to Brux-
" elles, for the purpoſe of obviating any local
" difficulties which might obſtruct the execution
" of the decree; theſe men entruſted the *details* of
" this operation to the regulating Commiſſary,
" RONSIN, who employed ſoldiers and clerks,
" all of them Jacobins, to act as bailiffs; and
" they took care to ſteal one half of the move-
" able effects on which they were ordered to put
" the national ſeals.

" CAMBON, who governed the finances with an
" abſolute

" abſolute authority, was no otherwiſe qualified
" for this office, in times of extraordinary diffi-
" culty, than as he was deſtitute of every ſenti-
" ment of probity and honour. Without any
" experience in public affairs, without any know-
" ledge of mankind, he diſplayed a degree of
" obſtinacy and deſpotiſm in the removal of dif-
" ficulties that excited the aſtoniſhment of men
" of experience and ability. When it was repre-
" ſented to him that *the Belgians entertained poli-*
" *tical ideas totally different from thoſe of the*
" *French*, and that the time for deſtroying or
" ſubduing their *prejudices* was not come; that
" the effects of driving them to deſpair were to
" be dreaded; that they might ſecretly call in
" the Auſtrians to their aid, and, when they
" found themſelves ſupported, take up arms in
" every part of the country, maſſacre the garri-
" ſons, compoſed of weak and inexperienced
" battalions, and entirely ruin the army; when
" to theſe remonſtrances it was added, that in-
" ſtead of killing the hen that laid golden eggs,
" it would be better by loans, which would give
" the Belgians an eventual intereſt in our ſuc-
" ceſſes, to draw out a part of the treaſures that
" were buried in Belgium, or to procure the ſame
" reſource by propoſing to the opulent merchants
" at Antwerp, Bruxelles, and Ghent, to employ
" their capitals in contracting for the ſupply of
" the armies; CAMBON acknowledged the juſtice
" of theſe reflections, but pretended, that his

" plan

" plan went more directly to the object of ſup-
" plying the *deficit* in the finances;—this plan
" was to ſeize all the ſpecie in Belgium, and all
" the plate belonging to the churches, or to any
" public bodies. The French financier ingenu-
" ouſly avowed, that ſuch conduct was unjuſt;
" but, according to him, *ſtate policy ſanctioned*
" *every kind of injuſtice.* Beſides, obſerved
" CAMBON, when the Belgians, ſtripped of all
" their gold and ſilver, ſhall be as poor as the
" French, they will naturally be led to partake of
" their fate, like the *Liegeois*, who threw them-
" ſelves into the arms of France, *becauſe they*
" *were miſerable and in debt*, and will become
" members of the French Republic, *in the hope*
" *of making conqueſts in their turn upon their own*
" *frontiers, and of taking from others what they have*
" *loſt themſelves.*

" CAMBON alſo placed a great reliance on what
" he called THE PEOPLE; *and by that term he did*
" *not mean the aſſemblage of all the citizens of a*
" *country, but that croud of lazy, idle vagabonds,*
" *who infeſt all great towns, and who are eaſily*
" *rendered the blind inſtruments of thoſe who wiſh to*
" *diſturb the public peace.*[9] And, laſtly, he inſiſted,
that

9 Here is a candid and true definition of the word PEOPLE, in its modern *patriotic*, or *revolutionary*, ſenſe; and as employed by a diſtinguiſhed member of the French Government, at the very time when the negociation between that Government, and the Britiſh Miniſtry was carrying on. It affords a key to the principles of that deſperate Faction which overthrew Monarchy

" that nothing could be more fortunate for France
" ſince the revolution, THAN TO DISORGANIZE
" THE NEIGHBOURING NATIONS, AND TO
" THROW THEM INTO SUCH A STATE OF ANAR-
" CHY, THAT THEY SHOULD BE DISABLED FROM
" RAISING UP ANY OBSTACLE TO THE NEW
" ORDER OF THINGS WHICH IT WAS RESOLVED
" TO INTRODUCE IN FRANCE.

" Theſe principles, barbarous and antiſocial as
" they were in themſelves, were enforced with a
" degree of indecency which greatly aggravated
" their *Machiaveliſm*. A hungry horde of Jaco-
" bins, of both ſects, was diſpatched into Bel-
" gium, with the moſt ample powers, ſome in
" the capacity of Commiſſaries of the Executive
" Power;[1] others as delegates from the Commune

narchy in France, and may ſerve as the baſis of a gloſſary for all the popular manifeſtoes of the revolution. It ſhows that the pompous expreſſions ſo laviſhly uſed, of " Rights of the People," —" Liberties of the People,"—" Majeſty of the People,"— " Sovereignty of the People"—and " Friends of the People"— mean nothing more than the—" *Rights of the Mob.*"—" *The Liberties of the Mob,*"—" *The Majeſty of the Mob,*"—" *The Sovereignty of the Mob,*"—and " *The Friends of the Mob.*" In ſhort, it proves, what has often been aſſerted by public writers, that the Government of France, was, at this period at leaſt, a Mob Government.

It is of the utmoſt conſequence, in reading the accounts of the public tranſactions of theſe eventful times, to keep this definition conſtantly in the mind; and the friends to ſocial order in every country will do well to appreciate the patriotic profeſſions of the modern apoſtles of *liberty* by a ſtandard ſupplied by one of the firſt and moſt ſtrenuous *Friends of the People.*

[1] PUBLICOLA CHAUSSARD was one of theſe.

of

" of Paris, who pretended to exerciſe ſovereign
" power; and a third deſcription who, without
" having a particular miſſion, were entruſted, by
" the *mother-ſociety*, with the taſk of enlighten-
" ing the people, and forming the public mind,
" that is to ſay, of propagating the Jacobinical
" ſyſtem. Theſe Proconſuls, who, dreſſed in
" the moſt diſguſting manner, lived at a moſt
" ſcandalous expence, ſequeſtrated the gold and
" ſilver belonging to the churches and to perſons
" of property, whoſe moveables they either ap-
" propriated to their own uſe, or ſold at a very
" low rate, according to circumſtances; ſup-
" preſſed the impoſts, *in order to flatter the poor*;
" broke the magiſtrates; created popular aſſem-
" blies, *affiliated* with the Jacobins at Paris; and,
" in ſhort, exerciſed an arbitrary power, with the
" aſſiſtance of a part of the National Guards, who
" obeyed them in preference to their officers.

" The Belgians, taught from their infancy to
" pay a religious reſpect to the objects of their
" worſhip, ſaw, with a degree of ſurprize min-
" gled with the deepeſt indignation, the acts of
" irreverence committed by the French in
" churches, and on things which Religion had
" conſecrated in the moſt ſpecial manner; the
" Biſhops and Prieſts, deſpoiled of their property
" and threatened with the loſs of liberty, and
" probably of life, had fled. Perſons of opu-
" lence buried their gold and ſilver; the mer-
" chants put a ſtop to all their ſpeculations; the

" circulation of ſpecie was interrupted; miſtruſt
" pervaded every mind; and a variety of ſymp-
" toms announced a near exploſion.

" The Jacobins, however, without ſeeming to
" pay attention to the general diſpoſition of the
" public mind, had formed the plan of extorting,[1]
" from each particular canton, a declaration of
" its wiſh for *the union of Belgium with the French*
" *Republic.* The people were accordingly aſſem-
" bled in the churches, without any regular
" form. There the members of the French and
" Belgic clubs read the act of acceſſion, which,
" very often nobody underſtood; and *the perſons*
" *preſent ſigned it, ſome trembling, and others,*
" *bought over or ſeduced.* Theſe papers were then
" printed, and ſent to the National Aſſembly
" of France, as containing *the free and unanimous*
" *wiſh of the Belgians.* The Pariſians, deceived,
" by appearances, conſidered Belgium as an in-
" exhauſtible mine which was deſtined to give
" ſolidity to the aſſignats, when the unfortunate
" inhabitants of theſe provinces, which were for-
" merly ſo happy and ſo flouriſhing, called in
" the Imperialiſts by their wiſhes, and by ſecret
" manœuvres.

" The ſame conduct was obſerved by the Jaco-
" bins[2] at Mentz, and at the other conquered

[1] And yet theſe were the men who had aſſured Lord GRENVILLE that *France would reſpect the independence of the Belgians, even in their errors*; and whoſe *word*, you contend, the Miniſter ought to have *taken*.

" towns

" towns on the Rhine, in the country of Porentrui; in Savoy; and in the county of Nice.—" Important as these operations were, they made " but a feeble impression on the minds of the people " in France, where the general attention was, at " that time, absorbed, by the trial of LOUIS XVI. " then pending in the National Convention.[3]"

I have already observed, that PUBLICOLA CHAUSSARD was one of the Commissaries appointed by the Executive Council for carrying into effect this curious plan for " *consolidating the* " *liberties of the Belgians.*" That he was invested with unbounded powers, as stated by the historian, will appear from his official appointment given in the margin;[4] and he exercised those powers

[2] It is essential to recollect, that all the members of the French Government are included in this denomination.

[3] Histoire Philosophique de la Revolution de France—Par *Antoine Fantin-Desodoards, Citoyen Français.* Tom. I. p. 209. et suiv.

[4] " In the name of the French Republic.
" In virtue of the law of the 15th of August last, which entrusts " to the Executive Council all the functions of the Executive " power, and of the decree of the National Convention of the " 21st of September following, by which those public autho- " rities are confirmed which were in a state of activity at the last " epoch;— We, the citizens forming the Provisional Executive " Council of the republic, have made choice of citizen PUB- " LICOLA CHAUSSARD, and have appointed him a National " Commissary, and *invested him with all our powers*, in order " that he may repair to Bruxelles without delay, to enforce, as " well in that city as in the neighbouring district which will " be described to him, the execution of the decrees of the Na- " tional Convention of the 15th, 17th, and 22d of December, " in the present year, concerning the proclamation of the liber- " ty and sovereignty of the people of all the countries into " which the French republic has carried or may hereafter carry " her arms. " We

powers in a manner that was perfectly conformable to the wiſhes of his employers. After the moſt ſtrenuous efforts to prepare the minds of the people, by the employment of ambulatory patriots to harangue the populace, patriotic ballad-ſingers, and ſimilar inſtruments of revolt, for the favourite plan of annexing Belgium to France, the French Commiſſaries held a meeting at Bruxelles, where *they*, as might be ſuppoſed, unanimouſly reſolved, that an union of the two countries ought to be promoted by every practicable means, or, as one of them expreſſed himſelf, by the exerciſe "of a revolutionary power."—The opinion of CHAUSSARD—to whom we are indebted for the knowledge of theſe extraordinary facts—is too curious to be omitted. "OUGHT "BELGIUM TO BE ANNEXED TO FRANCE?— "Expreſſing only the opinion of an individual, "and embracing in my mind *the ſecret object* "*which it is our duty to accompliſh*, I VOTE FOR "THE ANNEXATION OF BELGIUM TO FRANCE,

"We pray and require all perſons to whom the ſaid Com-"miſſary may apply, to give him ſuch aid and aſſiſtance as he "may deem expedient and neceſſary for fulfilling the object of "his miſſion, *conformably to the will of the republic*. In witneſs "whereof we have hereunto ſet our hands and the ſeal of the "Republic.

"Done at Paris, the 31ſt of the month of December, 1792, "in the firſt year of the French Republic.

"The citizens forming the Proviſional Executive Council of "the Republic.

"ROLAND, GARAT, CLAVIERE, LE BRUN, PACHE, "MONGE. By the Proviſional Executive Council,

"GROUVELLE."

"being

" being influenced by an attention to the intereſts " of both nations; and this intereſt having been " proved to me, I vote for the employment of all " the means for obtaining it, thoſe of fraternity, " even thoſe of the *deſpotiſm of reaſon*, which is " only exerciſed for the happineſs of mankind. " Tyranny perpetuates itſelf by depriving the " people of the very wiſh to be free, and we " have ſworn to extirpate every ſpecies of tyranny. " *The will of the people is oppoſed to my plan*; THE " WILL OF A PEOPLE IN A STATE OF INFANCY OR " IMBECILITY WOULD BE NULL, BECAUSE IT " WOULD STIPULATE AGAINST THEMSELVES."[5] " After this meeting, CHAUSSARD, in a letter to the Commiſſaries at Douai, ſaid, " *We pledge* " *ourſelves* that the annexation of Belgium ſhall " be declared without difficulty."

One more remark will ſuffice to demonſtrate, to the conviction of every rational and independent mind, the *ſyſtematic plan of deception* practiſed by the French Government in their negociations with the Britiſh Miniſters. The decree of the 15th of December was paſſed on the very day on which the Executive Council ſent directions to CHAUVELIN to diſavow all hoſtile intentions on their part; and their inſtructions to their Commiſſaries in the Netherlands, the object of which I have *proved* to be the annexation of Belgium to

[5] Procés verbal de la conférence generale qui a eu lieu entre les commiſſaires envoyés dans les différens arrondiſſemens de la Belgique, réunis à Bruxelles, p. 78.

France, were ſigned by the Council on the very day—the 8th of January, 1793—on which Monſ. LE BRUN, one of the members who ſubſcribed them, wrote the Note to Lord GRENVILLE, containing thoſe *explanations*, which conſtitute the baſis of your crazy fabric, and in which the Council poſitively declared that France "*had before renounced, and again renounced, every conqueſt; and that her occupation of the Low Countries ſhould only continue during the war, and the time which may be neceſſary for the Belgians to conſolidate* THEIR LIBERTIES; *after which let them be happy, France would find her recompence in* THEIR FELICITY." Such a ſcene of profligacy has, I believe, ſeldom been exhibited on the diplomatic ſtage!

I have thus fairly ſtated the caſe of the French Government from their own teſtimony; and I think no Engliſhman, who attends to the ſtatement, and whoſe mind is untainted by faction, and unwarped by the ſpirit of party, will agree with you, that the vague and unſatisfactory explanation offered by the French ſhould have formed the baſis of a farther negociation. In fact, what remained as the ſubject of negociation? The different grounds of complaint, ariſing from the invaſion of the territories of our Ally, and from the dangerous proviſions of the decree of the 19th of November—a decree which all parties have allowed to be dangerous, and which *you* do not venture to juſtify—had been clearly ſpecified,

cified, and diſtinct anſwers given; but anſwers, as I have ſhown, ſo evaſive, and ſo replete with deception and fraud, that the Miniſter who had remained ſatisfied with them would have deſerved to loſe his place, if not his head. Nothing more therefore was to be done on our part; but if the French government had choſen to reconſider their anſwers, and to offer ſuch ſatisfaction as our Government would have been juſtified in accepting, ample time was allowed them for that purpoſe. Our Miniſters rather retarded than precipitated matters, and, indeed, kept open the negociation longer, in the opinion of many, than was conſiſtent with the dignity of the nation. Their forbearance, in this reſpect, which was certainly laudable, from its *motive*, has ſupplied you with an argument, in which you ſeem moſt triumphantly to exult, although one more weak, or more ſilly, was never called in to the ſupport of a bad cauſe. You tell us, that Monſ. CHAUVELIN was directed, on the 24th of January, to quit this kingdom, ſolely, " becauſe the French monarchy " had been finally terminated by the deſtruction " of the King;" and hence you ſagaciouſly infer, that the eſtabliſhment of a republic in France, was the bar to negociation, and the impediment to the continuance of peace.

The fact is, that our Miniſters, actuated by an earneſt deſire to avert, if poſſible, the calamities of war, had ſuffered M. CHAUVELIN to remain in England, even after the inſincerity of the French

French Government had been clearly eſtabliſhed, and their hoſtile intentions fully aſcertained. It was probably hoped, that they would ultimately be led to act more conſiſtently with the principles of juſtice, and the rights of independent nations; and therefore the BritiſhGovernment were willing to leave open every door to negociation, that the French might renew it whenever they pleaſed. The diſmiſſion of CHAUVELIN, though an act which properly marked their indignation at the murder of his Sovereign—an indignation which was nearly, though I am ſorry to ſay not quite, univerſal throughout the kingdom—made no difference in the diſpoſition of the Britiſh Cabinet, who, far from conſidering this meaſure as tending to accelerate the commencement of hoſtilities, ſent ſubſequent inſtructions to Lord AUCKLAND, then Ambaſſador at the Hague, to hold a conference with DUMOURIEZ on the frontiers of Holland; and the very day appointed for that conference, the object of which, on the part of England, was to facilitate any means that might be propoſed for the preſervation of peace, was choſen by the National Convention—as if they were determined, in every inſtance, to add inſult to injury—for the publication of their declaration of war!!!

Our Miniſters had ſufficiently proved, by their conduct *after the eſtabliſhment of a republic in France*, that they did not conceive the change of government in that country to be a ſufficient reaſon for breaking off all intercourſe with it; on the contrary, they

they had evinced the ſtrongeſt diſpoſition to preſerve the tranquillity that ſubſiſted between the two nations. They had, no doubt, in common with all honeſt and upright men, viewed with aſtoniſhment and indignation, the ſubverſion of a monarchy, which had ſubſiſted for fourteen centuries, and which the whole kingdom had recently *ſworn* to maintain; but which, nevertheleſs, had been ſuddenly deſtroyed, *by acclamation*, on the motion of a *ſtrolling player*; they had certainly contemplated, with horror, the multiplied crimes which accompanied and followed this dreadful convulſion; but ſtill they did not ſuffer theſe honourable feelings to involve the nation in a war; and, though they prudently deſiſted from giving their ſanction to ſuch atrocious proceedings, by formally acknowledging the authority of the French uſurpers, they ſtudiouſly avoided all kind of interference in the internal government of that degraded country, even when the law of nations, agreeably to the interpretation of the beſt juriſconſults, would have juſtified ſuch interference.[6]

You may perhaps be diſpoſed to aſk, what kind of ſatisfaction it was that our Miniſters required, and how that ſatisfaction was to be given? Theſe queſtions are eaſily anſwered. All that Lord GRENVILLE called upon France to do, was to evince a diſpoſition "*to renounce her views of*

[6] See VATTEL, B. 2. C. 4.

"*aggreſſion and aggrandizement, and to confine herſelf*
"*within her own territories, without inſulting other*
"*Governments, without diſturbing their tranquillity,*
"*without violating their rights.*" The mode of evincing the diſpoſition required was by a repeal of the offenſive decrees, a formal diſavowal by the legiſlature of the principles which they proclaimed, and an immediate evacuation of the territory of our Ally. This was a demand, which it was perfectly reaſonable, and even indiſpenſibly neceſſary, for one party to enforce; and which the other might have complied with without any forfeiture of dignity, or ſacrifice of independence; and, indeed, nothing but a previous determination to force this country into a war, and "to brave all Europe," for the accompliſhment of the moſt deſtructive plans of *conqueſt and aggrandizement*, could poſſibly have influenced a refuſal to comply with it.

Now, Sir, let me aſk, *what* were thoſe "*conceſ-*
"*ſions*," which you are pleaſed to ſay France "made
"before and after our refuſal to acknowledge her
"Ambaſſador?" Is it a *Briton* who condeſcends to give ſuch an appellation to the pitiful equivocations, the vile ſubterfuges, and the daring falſehoods, of the French Executive Council? Had ſuch extraordinary language been uſed, had ſuch degrading ſentiments been avowed, by any other than an "Honourable" Member of the Britiſh Senate, I ſhould have been inclined to interrogate him in the coarſe but honeſt language of De Foe
"—Art thou a true-born Engliſhman or baſe-born
"mongrel?"

" mongrel?" Your whole narrative of the proceedings, previous to the declaration of war by *France*, exhibits a groſs ignorance of facts, a ſhameful perverſion of circumſtances, and " a misſhapen heap" of falſe concluſions, which mark the advocate of party, but diſgrace the friend of truth.

I ſhall now take a curſory view of your remarks on public tranſactions ſubſequent to the war, after a brief notice of thoſe deſultory obſervations which are ſcattered over your work, like the thiſtles on your native hills, that exhibit a ſpectacle of diſguſtful barrenneſs, deforming the ſoil they are unable to fertilize.

I have already expoſed your perverſion of facts, your falſe concluſions, and even your ignorance, in my inveſtigation of the *explanation* of the Jacobin Miniſtry of France, offered in the name of their much-injured Monarch, and containing ſentiments diametrically oppoſite to thoſe which he avowed both before and after the period of its delivery. Farther to eſtabliſh your ignorance, however, beyond all poſſibility of doubt, even on thoſe common points on which ignorance remains wholly without excuſe, it will be ſufficient to refer to the 35th page of your pamphlet, where, having noticed the anſwer given by Lord GRENVILLE, *on the 8th of July*, 1792, to the application of the French Government for the mediation of Great Britain, you ſay, " *Soon after this* the unhappy " King of France was brought from Verſailles," where, unfortunately, he had never been, ſince the

month of October 1789, when his palace was attacked by a regicide mob, who, after murdering his *faithful* Guards, (not including the PRINCE DE POIX,) proceeded, with LA FAYETTE [7] at their head, to drag him, in ſavage triumph, to the capital.—With the ſame attention to facts you talk of the intreaties of LOUIS XVI., after the war had begun, to the Emperor JOSEPH, who died fourteen months before the declaration of war.[8]

In your zealous attempt to exculpate the French from the charge of aggreſſion, an attempt to which you was doubtleſs impelled by a laudable principle of *gratitude*, for the *eulogies* which their legiſlators had publicly beſtowed on you, for your defence of their friend and aſſociate, *Thomas Paine*, you exultingly proclaim, that they had not extended the limits of their empire before the treaty of Pilnitz was ſigned; nor had even invaded the Netherlands before the war was begun. Your firſt aſſertion is not ſtrictly correct, becauſe the French had taken poſſeſſion of Avignon and the

7 *Portrait de La Fayette.*

Voilà donc ce blondin, ce heros ridicule,
De l'aſtre de CROMWELL pale et froid crépuſcule,
Intriguant dans la guerre, et guerrier dans la paix,
Qui croit ſe faire un nom à force de forfaits;
Prend MARCEL pour Idole et FAVRAS pour victime,
Fait honte du Succés et fait pitié du Crime,
Arme les aſſaſſins, egorge pour la loi,
Veille pour les brigands et dort contre ſon Roi.

Tableau de Paris.

8 I ſhould not ſtoop to notice ſuch errors as theſe, if they did not tend to prove that you have taken no pains to make yourſelf maſter of the ſubject which you undertake to diſcuſs.

Comtat

Comtat Venaiſſin, ſeveral months before the treaty of Pilnitz was ſigned, though they were not formally annexed to France until the completion of the new conſtitution in 1791. As to their forbearance to invade a neighbouring State previous to a declaration of war, it conſtitutes ſuch a theme for praiſe as, I believe, none but yourſelf would have thought of ſelecting; though, as you had determined to commend the French, it muſt be confeſſed you would have had ſome difficulty in finding a better ſubject.

In deſcribing the effects on the ſtate of France, of what you chooſe to term "our unhappy in-"terference," that is, our reſiſtance of the right of univerſal legiſlation, and our oppoſition of force to force, after an unprovoked and long-premeditated declaration of war againſt us, you repreſent our conduct, not very conſiſtently, as having tended, at the ſame time, to conſolidate the republic,[9] by the promotion of internal union; and

[9] It was certainly the object of the Briſſotin faction, in provoking the war, *to conſolidate the republic*, by the diffuſion of republican principles, not only in France, but in the neighbouring States; admitting therefore the juſtice of your inference, your argument will undoubtedly prove, that the plan of thoſe perjured deſtroyers of a conſtitution which they had ſworn to maintain, has been ſo far attended with ſucceſs. MALLET DU PAN, indiſputably the beſt of all the writers on the revolution, thus explained the objects of the war, on the part of the French, in the year 1793.

"The revolution and the war are inſeparable; they have one "common ſtock; all the means of revolution are means of war.

"In provoking this terrible conflict, and in rendering it "general, the republicans had ſix correſponding objects.

"1. To

and to produce that ſyſtem of terror and proſcription which created a general miſtruſt. If the union you deſcribe had really prevailed, the ſyſtem of terror would have been wholly unneceſſary; but as the ſyſtem of terror did in fact exiſt, the pretended union is an offspring of your own imagination. Indeed to talk of the union of a country in which, according to the moſt moderate computation of the *Republican* Generals, SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND MEN have periſhed, in a *civil war*, in one diſtrict, is as prepoſterous as the imputation of the enormities which have been committed in France to the oppoſition which

" 1. To conſolidate the French revolution, and to make it a " *ſocial* revolution.

" 2. Not to leave a throne ſtanding, nor any government " whatever exiſting on any other baſes than thoſe of an unlimited, " armed, and deliberative democracy.

" 3. To ſubvert all diſtinctions, and to deſpoil all proprietors; " the nobility after the clergy; the colonies after the nobility; " the monied me with the colonies; commerce with the " monied men; and the ſtate-creditors with commerce.

" 4. To ruin men of property by exceſſive and arbitrary con- " tributions, until the moment ſhould arrive when they might " be expelled, by force, from their patrimonial eſtates.

" 5. To accompliſh this plan by veſting the ſovereignty, " power, the armed force, public offices, and the treaſury, in " *Sans-culottes* excluſively.

" 6. Laſtly, to incorporate all the countries that might be " conquered with France, by reducing to practice the French " operations, in order to nouriſh the war by rapine, and to " ſuſtain rapine by the war."—*Conſiderations ſur la Nature de la " Revolution de France*, p. 35, 36.

This is the very ſyſtem which the French republicans have invariably purſued, from the period of the declaration of war againſt Auſtria to the preſent time.

ſhe has provoked from the belligerent powers is falſe. But I ſhall not waſte my time, by ſtooping to a ſerious confutation of ſuch groſs abſurdities, which have been before advanced by your countryman and fellow-labourer in the field of politics, Lord LAUDERDALE, and have been before detected and expoſed by different writers. If you be really as ignorant as you appear to be on the ſubject, and wiſh for information, you may very eaſily obtain it, by a reference to the publications quoted in the margin.[1]

In the ſame perverſe ſpirit and with equal truth you aſcribe the emigration of the Royaliſts, and the ſeizure of their eſtates, to the ſame cauſe, and boldly aſſert, that, but for the war, the Emigrants "would "have remained within the boſom of France;" whereas it is notorious, that one of the ſpecific grounds of complaint alledged by the Briſſotin faction againſt the Emperor, was the aſſemblage of large bodies of Emigrants in his dominions; and that the decree for the confiſcation of their property was paſſed by the Legiſlative Aſſembly *before* the declaration of war. The contempt which the extreme puerility of your arguments[2] extorts is loſt in ſurprize at the weakneſs of their baſis.—

But

[1] "Obſervations on the Emigration of Dr. Joſeph Prieſtley, "&c." "A ſhort account of the late Revolution in Geneva, and "of the Conduct of France towards that Republic, from Octo- "ber 1792, to October 1794, by Francis d'Ivernois, Eſq." and "The Bloody Buoy."

[2] You affirm (p. 116,) that "nothing but the *practical enjoy-* "*ment of good government* can inſpire enthuſiaſm." Now, you and

But the foundation being deſtroyed, the ſuperſtructure falls of courſe, exhibiting, in its flimſy ruins, an object for the deriſion of ſenſe, the ſcorn of judgement, the deploration of vanity, and the lamentations of egotiſm.

Your general ideas on the cauſes of revolutions in a State, and the baſis of civil government, appear to me to be as crude and undigeſted as your particular application of them is falſe and unwarranted. Your grand principle, as far as I can underſtand it, is—that all lawful "government is a "voluntary emanation from the whole people;"[3] a principle which has been before advanced by that arch-propagator of wild conceits, that wholeſale fabricator of fantaſtical ſyſtems of polity, (accuſe me not of political blaſphemy!) *John Locke*, who had ſcarcely given birth to this ſhapeleſs abortion, when he cruſhed it at a ſtroke, by proving the *impoſſibility* of its exiſtence. He was compelled to acknowledge that "*the coming into ſociety upon ſuch* "*terms* would be—only *to go out again.*"[4]

All the brilliant fabrics, therefore, which you have erected on this ſandy baſis muſt diſſolve and "leave not a wreck behind." The examination of the important queſtion of the origin of government would neceſſarily lead me into a much wider

and other members of your party have invariably expatiated on the enthuſiaſm of the French, and as it is certain that they never diſplayed more enthuſiaſm than during the reign of ROBESPIERRE, it follows, of neceſſity, that, in your eſtimation, his ſyſtem of government was a good ſyſtem.

[3] P. 127, 128.

[4] Treatiſe of Civil Government, B. 2, C. 8, p. 185.

range of diſcuſſion than the limits of a mere tract would allow; beſide it is a ſubject which has been diſcuſſed by much abler pens than mine; and has recently attracted the attention of a writer who poſſeſſes every requiſite for ſuch an inveſtigation —a firm and vigorous mind, extenſive information, profound erudition, ſound judgement, acute penetration, and great diſcriminative powers.[3]

In your flimſy attempt to prove the beneficial effects of your viſionary ſyſtem, in the prevention of internal diſorders in a State, you aſk, with ſome degree of triumph, "When the people "themſelves actually chooſe the popular branch "of the legiſlature, upon what principle can re- "bellion exiſt?—How can a people be brought "to reſiſt a voluntary emanation from them- "ſelves?"—And you aſſert that "Even if ſuch a "body ſhould occaſionally betray its truſt, the "remedy is at hand, without a tumult or revolu- "tion."—Such queſtions and ſuch aſſertions might have paſſed current with the generality of mankind ten years ago, and have made no bad figure in the abſtract ſpeculations of the philoſo-

[3] The Reverend JOHN WHITAKER.—See his treatiſe on "The Real Origin of Government."—This gentleman, I underſtand, is now engaged in the compoſition of a political work on a ſubject of conſiderable importance. A mind like his, enlarged by ſcience and an unwearied application to liberal and uſeful purſuits, ſhould not remain inactive, at ſuch a momentous period as the preſent, when wild and fantaſtic notions are afloat, and all the principles of ſubordination—the very eſſence of ſociety—are expoſed to the imminent danger of fatal relaxation, if not of abſolute deſtruction:—on *ſuch* minds, at *ſuch* times, the community has an imperative claim which ought not to be reſiſted.

phers of that day; but it is really too great an inſult on the common ſenſe of the public to bring them forward in the ſeventh year of the French Revolution, which, in the hiſtory of its legiſlative bodies, affords a full anſwer to the one, and a complete confutation of the other.—The principle of univerſal ſuffrage, which you conſider as a panacea for all political diſeaſes, was carried much farther in France, even in the firſt Legiſlative Aſſembly, than you expreſs a wiſh to carry it in this country; and yet *Rebellion* did certainly exiſt; and *Tumults* and *Revolutions* prevail.—Indeed not a year, nor ſcarcely a month, paſſed away from 1789 to 1796, without ſome popular inſurrection of an alarming nature.—During that period no leſs than three *Revolutions* (ſo called by the French themſelves) occurred; viz.—on the tenth of Auguſt 1792;—the thirty-firſt of May 1793; and the twenty-ſeventh of July 1794; and ſuch were the good order and ſocial harmony which obtained, that more perſons were actually condemned and executed in France, during that period, than in all Europe together, during the preſent century.[4]—The eſtabliſhment of the preſent conſtitution in October, 1795, might juſtly be termed a fourth revolution, for an eſſential

[4] The mere liſt of the names of the perſons condemned filled no leſs than *Twelve Volumes* in the ſummer of 1795.—See "Les Brigands Demaſqués, ou Mémoires pour ſervir à "L'Hiſtoire du Temps Préſent, par *Auguſte Danican.*"

change

change in the ſyſtem of Government took place. Though it is ſomewhat extraordinary, that, at this period, when there was, as you ſay, a juſt and legitimate repreſentation of the people, which, according to your own doctrine, can only conſiſt of "a voluntary emanation from themſelves," the people actually *rebelled* againſt the legiſlative body and literally accuſed it "of having violated not "only the expreſs proviſions of the new conſti-"tution, but the fundamental principles of civil "liberty;" and, unfortunately for your aſſertion, they found, to their coſt, that although that body "had betrayed its truſt" no "remedy was at "hand," even *with tumult*. The *vox populi* was ſilenced by the thunder of the cannon, and the excellence of their "juſt and legitimate repre-"ſentation,"[1] was eſtabliſhed beyond the reach of oppoſition or even of murmur.

In the illuſtration of your principle you are not more fortunate than in your aſſertion of the principle itſelf. I ſhall not attempt to follow you through the whole of this, becauſe I honeſtly confeſs that I am at a loſs to comprehend how a great part of it applies to the queſtion. What I do underſtand of your metaphor I know to be falſe. You ſay, "When the ſap which *belongs* "*to the entire ſtructure of the vegetable kingdom*, "is obſtructed in its courſe to the remoteſt "branches of every plant that grows, it is

[1] I have expoſed your Ignorance on this point, more completely, in my preface to the Tranſlation of Danican's Memoirs.

" not merely theſe *defrauded* branches which " periſh; the trunk itſelf, that monopolizes the " nouriſhment of which it ought only to be the " conduit, is ſpeedily encruſted with canker, and " conſumed to its very root." To diſcover the fallacy of this doctrine, I need go no farther than my own garden, which, at preſent, contains many ſubjects of the vegetable kingdom—alias, trees, in which the ſap has been " obſtructed to the " remoteſt branches," without producing the fatal conſequences which you announce; I have *lopped off* (do not quarrel with the expreſſion becauſe it has already excited your *virtuous* indignation on another occaſion,) I have lopped off " the *defrauded* branches," but the glutton trunks, ſo far from dying with repletion, as you foretell, exhibit ſtrong ſymptoms of robuſt vigour, and ſend out freſh and healthy ſhoots.[5]

As you entertain ſuch falſe notions on the firſt principles of government, it is not ſurprizing that you ſhould miſtake the cauſes which promote its diſſolution. You ſtate the French Revolution to have been " provoked by acts of injuſtice and " oppreſſion," and paint it—as " the awful and " majeſtic courſe of freedom againſt *uſurped au-* " *thority*." The *forced* change of ſyſtem which has taken place in Holland and the Netherlands

[5] I give you ample credit for your knowledge of " *The Gera-* " *nium*," and do not queſtion your ſkill in the cultivation of " *The Tree of Liberty*," but cannot admit that you are equally well acquainted with the whole vegetable kingdom.

you

you aſcribe to a ſimilar cauſe, to the prevalence of "a reſtrictive ſyſtem of government." And this cauſe you exhibit not as partial but univerſal in its operation; and conſequently it can be limited neither to time nor place. Were this really the caſe, let me aſk how it happened, that the "acts "of injuſtice and oppreſſion," and "the uſurped "authority," which were unqueſtionably exerciſed by Louis XI, and by Louis XV. in France, and by the firſt William and the eighth Henry in England, did not produce a revolution in thoſe countries? And how it came, that the revolution in France happened under the moſt mild, benevolent, and virtuous Monarch, that ever ſate upon the French throne— a Prince, whoſe chief ſtudy was the correction of abuſes, and the promotion of his people's happineſs? The fact is, that the cauſes of this political phenomenon, which has convulſed all the kingdoms of Europe, were very different from what you repreſent them to have been. It originated in the profligate deſigns of a few factious individuals, who had the addreſs to render the virtuous propenſities of one part of the community, and the *bad paſſions* of the other, ſubſervient to the accompliſhment of their own baſe purpoſe. The revolutions in the Netherlands and in Holland, were produced by French intrigues and by French *arms*. The arguments that were made uſe of to allure and to miſlead the people, in each of the three countries, were ſuch as muſt make a conſiderable impreſſion wherever they are employ-

employed[6]. Hold out as lures to the populace, under the beſt poſſible conſtitution, the abolition of impoſts, an increaſe of wages, and a participation of the property of their ſuperiors, and the man who will aſſert, that crouds will not flock to the ſtandard of Rebellion, muſt know very little of the human mind. This, however, is a delicate ſubject to diſcuſs, and its diſcuſſion can anſwer no *good* purpoſe.[7] As for the "awful and majeſtic "courſe of freedom againſt uſurped authority," 'tis a well-rounded period, and would ſound very well in the mouth of a patriotic orator in the tribune of the Jacobin Club, in the roſtrum at Copenhagen Houſe, on the ſcaffold in Palace Yard, or at the bar of the Old Bailey; but is as little applicable to the ſtate of France ſince the year 1789, as to the ſociety of "Friends to the People," or to the *convicted* felons at Botany Bay. Your ideas of *uſurped authority*, however, as applied to a government which had ſtood the teſt of fourteen centuries, may ſerve as a clue to your plans of political reform.

Having cleared away the literary thiſtles from

[6] See PUBLICOLA CHAUSSARD, *Des Moyens de Revolution*, p. 48, *et ſuiv.*

[7] "Le public ne connait encore que la ſuperficie de la revolu-"tion d'aujourdhui, et on ne ſaurait trop deplorer l'imprudence "de ceux qui eſperent s'en garantir en elevant quelques murail-"les autour de ſon enceinte."—*Conſiderations ſur la Nature de la Revolution in France.*

"The public are yet only acquainted with the mere ſuperficies of the Revolution; and the imprudence of thoſe who hope to ſecure themſelves againſt its effects, by raiſing a few walls around the circle which it fills, cannot be too deeply deplored." *Conſiderations on the Nature of the* French *Revolution.*

the

the barren field of declamation, I come to your obſervations on the conduct of Miniſters ſince the war; and here let me premiſe, that the extreme anxiety of your party to fix the charge of aggreſſion on the Britiſh Government is entitled to the praiſe of policy, however feeble its pretenſions may be to the palm of patriotiſm—for unleſs you could ſucceed in this *laudable* effort, all your violent harangues on the *conſequences* of the war would be of little avail; becauſe, if the war were juſt and neceſſary, Miniſters could be no farther anſwerable for its conſequences than as cenſure for miſmanagement, during its progreſs, might attach to their conduct. Its juſtice and neceſſity, in my opinion, are eſtabliſhed beyond all doubt; and, on the ſcore of miſmanagement, you only adduce one ſolitary charge, relating to the unfortunate expedition to Quiberon, in the ſummer of 1795. In this caſe you are the mere echo of your party, who, judging, like yourſelf, ſolely from *events*, in their eagerneſs to inflict an odium on the Secretary at War, (whoſe high character, zeal, and abilities, are fit objects of reprobation to the advocates for the French,) preſumed to condemn a military operation which they were incompetent to appreciate. This expedition you ſtyle in one place "mercileſs and impolitic," and, in another, you repreſent it as "deteſtable," and as having "covered its authors with ever-"laſting ſhame." You farther obſerve, that "The Government of France had then aſſumed a

"regular

" regular form, and was in the exerciſe of a regu-
" lar legalized authority. *The devoted handful of*
" *unhappy fugitives from their country could do no-*
" *thing by the ſword.* The expedition, therefore,
" was to *rekindle* the torch of diſcord amidſt
" *twenty-five millions* of men, beginning to eſcape
" from its former fury, and *ſettled under an eſta-*
" *bliſhed government.*" I do not recollect ever to have read a more falſe and exaggerated ſtatement of any public occurrence, except in Lord LAUDERDALE'S " Letters to the Peers of Scotland," in which, in the ſame ſpirit, he talks of *voluntary loans*, which were enforced with the bayonet, and *patriotic volunteers*, who were led to the armies, like galley-ſlaves in handcuffs.—If the expedition had really been ſuch as you have here deſcribed it, it was your duty, as a Member of Parliament, to impeach the Miniſter who planned it; but this would not have ſuited the purpoſe of your party, for it would have given riſe to an *enquiry*, and the natural reſult of enquiry is the eſtabliſhment of *truth*. Any opinion of mine on the ſubject would be entitled to as little attention as your own; but the teſtimony of a French General, who ſerved the Republic for three years, in *La Vendée*, and who was perfectly acquainted with the ſentiments, reſources, and diſpoſition of the people, will, by the public at leaſt; be deemed deciſive.

General DANICAN, in his Memoirs, ſpeaking of this expedition, ſays, " Another opportunity
" *ſo favourable* as that which was loſt at Quiberon,

" will with difficulty be found.—*There the means* " *of ſucceſs preſented themſelves on all ſides*; abun- " dance of ammunition, arms, money, and " *troops*; the well-known devotion of the Britons; " revolts at Paris; a dreadful famine in the heart " of France; *a general contempt for the Govern-* " *ment*;—every thing ſeemed to unite for the " purpoſe of *enſuring ſucceſs to the Royaliſts*; and " if, at that epoch, they had obtained one ſignal " advantage, *all France would have declared in* " *their favour*." He afterwards obſerves, that " Three thouſand men," if they had purſued the plan of operations which he points out, " might " have changed the fate of France in a week[8]." So that the *expedition* itſelf appears, upon the evidence of a man, fully competent to decide on the queſtion, to have been founded in wiſdom; and the failure is ſolely to be aſcribed to the mode of carrying it into execution, which, of courſe, depended on the officers who conducted the enterprize.

But, ſay you, " What was this proceeding but " the very ſyſtem we had imputed to France, and " proclaimed with horror to the univerſe?" The jaundiced eye of party could alone deſcry any reſemblance in tranſactions ſo different in their nature. The French had holden out an invitation to rebel to all the nations of Europe, indiſcriminately, whether at peace or at war with them, and had to give effect to the meaſure, by an order of their legiſlature, cauſed ſuch invitations to be tranſ-

[8] " Les Brigands Demaſqués," p. 182, 183.

lated into all foreign languages. By the voluntary offer of her protection to insurgents, France thus endeavoured to produce insurrections where harmony prevailed, and to disorganize the existing institutions of Europe, for the purpose of establishing a general system of her own. Our Ministers, on the contrary, in exercising the legal rights of war against a power which had been guilty of an unprovoked aggression, and which had forcibly compelled us to engage in the contest, confined their operations to affording assistance to a body of men, who fought in defence of a long-established system which they had solemnly sworn to maintain, against a Government founded in perjury, violence, and murder; which had robbed them of their birthrights, despoiled them of their property, and passed upon them a sentence of perpetual banishment—a Government, to which they had never submitted, and to which they owed neither fidelity nor allegiance. The resemblance, therefore, exists only in your own imagination; the difference is fundamental and radical.

You stigmatize that system of hostilities which tends to divide a nation against itself; but you forget that this system is connected with the very basis of the French revolution which you so warmly admire, and has been invariably pursued by the Rulers of France from the year 1789 to the present moment. Yet not one word of censure has *their* conduct, in this respect, extorted from your *impartial* pen, the whole stock of whose gall seems to be reserved for your political opponents in England.

After

After your prepoſterous and vain attempt to prove that the Britiſh Miniſters were anxious to promote the war, which muſt inevitably thwart all their favourite plans of finance, you labour, with equal zeal, and with equal ſucceſs, to demonſtrate their averſion from peace, which would enable them to accompliſh thoſe plans, and to relieve themſelves from thoſe embarraſſments, and from that ſerious load of reſponſibility, which neceſſarily attach to a ſtate of warfare. In purſuit of this deſign, you are weak enough to renew thoſe arguments which have been repeatedly urged, with much greater force and ability, by the leaders of your party, in the Senate, and which have been as repeatedly confuted by their opponents; but on this, as on other points, you probably hoped that the confutation might be forgotten, and that your *partial* view of the queſtion might create a contrary impreſſion to that which a fair and *full* diſcuſſion of it had produced on the public mind. Anticipating the lapſe of years, you, perhaps, was reduced to exclaim, in the language of your book, "Time has now placed "in the ſhade the arguments by which wiſdom "triumphed: they are there only viewed by "learning and retirement[8], which enables cow-

"ardice

[8] The perſonification of *Retirement* is, I believe, a *new* thought, and perfectly poetical; but that is not ſurprizing, as "*Fiction*"—you know—"is the ſoul of poetry."—There is ſomething, it muſt be confeſſed, extremely ingenious in the idea of *Retirement viewing arguments*. But, were I to point out, with critical accuracy, all ſimilar beauties which your work

 contains,

" ardice and folly by *artifices formerly defeated*,
" the eaſier to impoſe upon a buſy or an unthink-
" ing world [9]." But fortunately this is not the caſe;

contains, my ſtrictures would be as copious as the abſtract of " The Crimes of the French Revolution," by Citizen PRUDHOMME, which I mean, when I have leiſure, to tranſlate, and to prefix to it a ſuitable dedication to your friend Mr. Fox, as the zealous admirer of " that ſtupendous monument of human " wiſdom and human happineſs."

[9] It was doubtleſs, under this impreſſion, that you devoted no leſs than three pages to a diſſertation, the object of which is to ſhow the *abſurdity* of ſuppoſing that the Chriſtian Religion was expoſed to any degree of danger from the French revolution, and the principles which its votaries proclaimed.—This is a ſubject of too ſerious and important a nature to be diſcuſſed with levity; I give implicit credit to your profeſſions of attachment to the religion of CHRIST, and have not a doubt that you privately practice what you openly profeſs; but I muſt contend, that you are wholly ignorant of the proceedings which have paſſed in France, not only on many political, but on all religious, topics: for you really reaſon like a man who had juſt awakened from a ſeven years' ſleep.

Had you paid that cloſe attention to the French revolution, which could alone enable you to judge of its principles and effects, you would have known, that, on the 14th of December, 1792, in a debate on the eſtabliſhment of public ſchools for the education of youth, M. DUPONT, a member of the National Convention, and who, if I miſtake not, is now a member of one of the Councils, began his ſpeech with the following exclamation—" What, thrones are overturned! " Sceptres broken! Kings expire! and *yet the altars of God* " *remain!*"—that he proceeded to propoſe the abolition of thoſe altars, and proclaimed himſelf *an atheiſt*, amidſt the reiterated plaudits of the Aſſembly, and of the perſons in the galleries:—you would have known, that the blaſphemous doctrine, that " *Death is an eternal ſleep*," was ſanctioned by the authority of the legiſlature:—you would have known, that, by the ſame power, the abolition of the Chriſtian æra was proclaimed,

caſe; all the arguments employed ſtand recorded in the debates of Parliament; and I may ſafely refer, not, indeed, "the buſy and unthinking "world," who ſwallow every doſe that folly or vanity adminiſters, but every man of plain ſenſe, and unbiaſſed judgment, to thoſe authentic documents, for an ample demonſtration of the fallacy of the poſitions which you have inconſiderately undertaken to defend.

It is a fact worthy of obſervation, that, in a tract, in which you profeſs to review the *cauſes* and *conſequences* of the momentous conteſt in which we have been compelled to engage, you do not once make mention of the *declaration of war*. You keep this circumſtance moſt ſtudiouſly from the

proclaimed, and the Saviour of the World impiouſly made to yield precedence to the republic of France!—you would have known, that, on the 7th of November, 1793, *the exiſtence of a God* and *the immortality of the ſoul*, were formally diſavowed in the Convention, and the reſurrection of the dead declared to have been only "*preached by Superſtition for the torment of* "*the living!*"—You would have known, that, two days after, in the ſame place, all the religions of the world were aſſerted to be *the daughters of Ignorance and Pride*; that it was decided to be "the duty of the Convention to aſſume the honourable "office of *diffuſing truth over the whole earth*;" and that, as a part of this duty, that Aſſembly *decreed*, "That its expreſs "renunciation of all religious worſhip ſhould"—like its invi-"tations to rebellion—"*be tranſlated into all foreign lan-*"*guages:*"—you would have known, that it was ſtated, and received, in the Convention, as "*an acknowledged truth, that* "*the adverſaries of religion have deſerved well of their country:*" —you would have known, that the temple of the Almighty had been profaned by the worſhip of a proſtitute, perſonating the *Goddeſs of Reaſon*, and that the cathedral of Paris had exhibited

the light, you ſcreen it from the eye of the reader, and would doubtleſs moſt willingly conſign it to everlaſting oblivion. It is indeed a fact which bears *primâ facie* evidence of the aggreſſion of the enemy, and which, when coupled with the preceding circumſtances which I have detailed, carries irreſiſtible conviction to the mind. The omiſſion of ſuch a fact exhibits a mark of prudence, but no ſymptom of candour.

The war had ſcarcely begun, when the oppoſition, whoſe conduct during the negociation had extorted public marks of gratitude from our enemies, haſtened to proclaim to the world their total diſapprobation of it, and to evince a ſettled determination to obſtruct its purſuit by all the means in their power. This naturally had the

hibited the monſtrous ſpectacle of a pagan ſacrifice, by a people who had recently aboliſhed Chriſtianity:—and laſtly, you would have known, that, on the 30th of November, 1793, the pupils of a new republican ſchool appeared at the bar of the Convention, when their leader declared—I ſhudder while I commit the horrid blaſphemy to paper—that "HE "AND HIS SCHOOL-FELLOWS DETESTED GOD! *that in-* "*ſtead of learning the Scriptures, they learned the Declaration* "*of Rights, and made the Conſtitution their Catechiſm*;" and that the Preſident of this Pandemonium expreſſed *the ſatisfaction of the Convention* at the declaration they had made; the young Demons were *admitted to the honours of the ſitting, and received the kiſs of fraternity, amidſt the loudeſt applauſe!!!*

When you are apprized of theſe *facts*, I think you will acknowledge, that the apprehenſions which you reprobate were not without foundation. Chriſtianity is, I know, eſtabliſhed on too firm and broad a baſis, is derived from a ſource too ſacred, to be eaſily ſhaken; but, ſorry I am to ſay, that the progreſs of Infidelity is rapid, and the zeal of her votaries indefatigable.

effect

effect of encouraging the French to perſevere in that aggreſſive ſyſtem, our reſiſtance of which had occaſioned the rupture. Their leaders were little acquainted with the nature of an Engliſh oppoſition; though *Kerſaint* ſeems to have entertained a pretty juſt idea of the *object* of its chief[1]; and as they had been perſuaded, by the addreſſes of the factious clubs in this country[2], that the people had

1 "Mr. Fox has but one object in view, that of hurling his "rival from the throne, and of retrieving at once ſo many "parliamentary defeats, not leſs injurious to his intereſt, than "inimical to his reputation."—In the ſame ſpeech *Kerſaint* ſays, "Mr. PITT would willingly avoid a war."—And again, "Mr. PITT, with a hope of not being reduced to the neceſſity "of a war, *offers to meditate among the belligerent powers.*"—KERSAINT, you ſee, did more juſtice to the Miniſter than you are diſpoſed to do.

2 Adverting to theſe ſocieties, you ſay that the French revolution "appeared to have given to the zeal of ſome BRITISH "REFORMERS a *tinge* of republicaniſm;" and you call the addreſſes of theſe men to the National Convention, on *the abolition of monarchy*, the effuſions of an *honeſt* "*but irregular* "*zeal.*" What this *tinge* of republicaniſm, and this *honeſt* zeal really were, will be beſt ſeen by the expreſſions of the addreſſes themſelves. The firſt addreſs to the Convention from the ſociety at Newington, dated October 31, concludes thus: "*In your undertaking to deliver from ſlavery and deſpo-* "*tiſm the brave nations which border your frontiers, how holy* "*is the humanity which prompts you to break their chains.*" Theſe men, even at that period, were aware of the real deſigns of the French, yet you ſtill remain blind to them.——The addreſs from the *Revolution Society* in London (moſt aptly denominated) dated November 5, ſays, "ABOVE ALL we "rejoice in the late revolution of the 10th of Auguſt," (effected by a band of thieves and aſſaſſins, whom Mr. DENIS O'BRIEN, your quondam foe, but now your political friend and aſſociate, has recently transformed into *heroes*) "ſo *neceſ-*

"*ſary*

had imbibed *their* ideas of liberty and equality, and

" *ſary* to *ſecure* to you the advantages which *the former had* " *taught you to expect.*" Theſe *revolutioniſts* appear to have watched the progreſs of French *liberty* with an attentive eye, and to have juſtly appreciated the views and deſigns of the original *reformers* in France. That a ſmall band of factious adventurers had, as I have already obſerved, planned the ſubverſion of the French monarchy ſo early as 1789, admits not of a doubt. A ſpeech delivered by *Citizen Dupont*, in the Convention, the ſame which I have before quoted for another purpoſe, contains this memorable paſſage.—He anticipates the time when diſciples will flock from all parts of Europe to ſtudy under the new philoſophers of France, whom he repreſents as teaching " this man, the ſyſtem of the univerſe, and developing the " progreſs of all human knowledge; that, *perfecting the ſocial* " *ſyſtem*, and *ſhowing*, *in our decree of the 17th June*, 1789, *the* " *ſeeds of the inſurrections of the 14th of July, and the 10th of* " *Auguſt, and of all thoſe inſurrections which are ſpreading with* " *ſuch rapidity throughout Europe*, ſo that theſe young ſtrangers, " on their return to their reſpective countries, may ſpread the " ſame lights, and may operate, for the happineſs of mankind, " *ſimilar revolutions throughout the world.*"—It is eſſential to recollect, that this ſpeech, which was received with vaſt applauſe, was delivered on the 14th of December, 1792, the very day preceding the famous decree, on which I have before commented; and therefore it affords the ſtrongeſt corroboration of the proofs I have adduced to ſhow the falſehood and inſincerity of thoſe profeſſions of reſpecting all other Governments, and of renouncing all acts of aggreſſion, on which you have laid ſo much ſtreſs.

The *Revolution Society* farther obſerve, " We feel an agree- " able ſenſation in beholding *that this right of inſurrection has* " *been ſucceſsfully exerciſed* in ſo large a country as that of the " French republic."

The ſociety of " The Friends of Liberty and Equality at " Belfaſt," ſay—" *For the glory of humanity, may your declara-* " *tion of rights be every where put in practice.*"

An addreſs from " Several Societies" of Engliſhmen, calling themſelves " *an oppreſſed part of mankind*," and boaſting of the rapid

and that a revolution in England was near at hand, ſo

rapid increaſe of their numbers, and their determination to follow the example of the French, ſay—"*You are already free,* "*but Britons are preparing to be ſo. A triple-alliance, not of* "*crowned heads, but of the people of America, France, and Great* "*Britain, will give liberty to Europe, and peace to the world.*" This patriotic effuſion of *honeſt zeal* was ſigned by MAURICE MARGAROT, and your client, THOMAS HARDY.

In the addreſs of an Engliſh ſociety eſtabliſhed at Paris, or in CONDORCET's remarks on it, for it is not poſſible to decide, from the paper itſelf by which it is written, is the following paſſage—"*The opening of the ſeſſion of Parliament which ap-* "*proaches will infallibly become the occaſion of the reforms which* "*are the moſt urgent; ſuch as thoſe which regard the national re-* "*preſentation*—FROM THENCE TO THE ENTIRE ESTABLISH-"MENT OF A REPUBLIC, the tranſition will be the leſs tedious, "becauſe the *foundations* of liberty have long exiſted in Eng-"land."

The "*Conſtitutional Society of London*" preſented their addreſs on the 28th of November, by the hands of their deputies, Meſſ. *Joel Barlow* and *John Froſt*, one of whom, it does not appear *which*, prefaced its delivery with a ſpeech, in which he obſerved, "*After the example given by France, revolutions will become* "*eaſy: Reaſon is about to make a rapid progreſs, and,* IT WOULD "NOT BE EXTRAORDINARY; IF, IN A MUCH LESS SPACE "OF TIME THAN CAN BE IMAGINED, THE FRENCH SHOULD "SEND ADDRESSES OF CONGRATULATION TO A NATI-"ONAL CONVENTION OF ENGLAND!"

The addreſs itſelf, after aptly congratulating the Convention on the cowardly aſſaſſinations of the 10th of Auguſt, and the multiplied acts of perjury and rebellion which enſued, and declaring the conviction of the ſociety that they ſpoke "*the ſenti-* "*ments of the majority of the Engliſh nation,*" concluded thus—"*Other nations will ſoon follow your ſteps in this career of im-* "*provement, and, riſing from their lethargy,* WILL ARM THEM-"SELVES FOR THE PURPOSE OF CLAIMING THE RIGHTS "OF MAN, *with that all-powerful voice that man cannot reſiſt!*"

It was in his anſwer to this addreſs that the Preſident of the

ſo would they be led to ſuppoſe from the ſpeeches of

Convention obſerved, the *moment, no doubt, was approaching, in which the French would bring congratulations to the National Convention of Great Britain.* The Deputies were admitted to the honour of the ſitting, and the Speech, Addreſs, and Anſwer, were ordered to be diſtributed throughout France, and *to be tranſlated into all languages.*

In his anſwer to the ſpeech of another deputation (on the 28th of November) from the Engliſh and Iriſh reſident in Paris, the Preſident ſaid—"*Royalty in Europe is either deſtroyed,* "*or on the point of periſhing*—and *the declaration of rights*, placed "by the ſide of *thrones*, is a devouring fire *which will conſume* "*them!*"

I have taken the trouble to extract theſe paſſages, in order to ſhow what were the *real* deſigns of the ſeditious clubs eſtabliſhed at this period in England, and of the French Government itſelf, which undoubtedly wiſhed to render them ſubſervient to its own views of promoting a revolution in this country—the ſucceſs of which thoſe men had taught it to believe was infallible—and alſo to aſcertain your ſenſe of *an honeſt but irregular zeal*, of *a tinge of republicaniſm*, and of *Britiſh reformers.* To make any comment on ſuch extracts would, in my apprehenſion, be to offer an inſult to the common ſenſe of the public. They are ſufficiently plain to ſpeak for themſelves, and the mind that required elucidation would be incapable of profiting by it.

I could mention a man, who had once the honour to command a Britiſh regiment, and who ſtill, if I miſtake not, bears rank in the Britiſh ſervice, that, even long after hoſtilities had begun between the two countries, afforded all the information and aſſiſtance in his power to the French: he inſtructed them in the mode of maintaining their cavalry during the winter; *voluntarily* put in requiſition the wood, on a farm which he had purchaſed, for the purpoſe of making pikes for the army; ſubmitted to the degradation of acting as a ſpy for the Jacobins; and, is even ſaid to have ſuggeſted the horrid idea of maſſacreing all the Engliſh priſoners, and of poiſoning the arms that were to be employed againſt his countrymen!

One *Jones*, a Member of the London Correſponding Society, preſented

of oppoſition', that they ſhould find effectual ſupport

preſented two pieces of cannon to the Convention, accompanied by an addreſs, in which he expreſſed a deſire that they ſhould be returned, at the end of the war, *in order to aſſiſt in promoting new revolutions.*

But that you could be ſo bold or ſo weak as to call theſe atrocious proceedings, which had for their *avowed* object—if I am able to comprehend the import of language, and the force of expreſſions—nothing leſs than the ſubverſion of the conſtitution, a *contemptible pretext* for adopting meaſures of precaution, would be to me a matter of ſurprize, if any effuſions of *party ſpirit*, however diſgraceful, could create ſurprize.

Exulting in the iſſue of the State Trials, you aſſert, what no man will be diſpoſed to contradict, that "not a man has "been *convicted* of any treaſon againſt the State;" and that no conſpiracy againſt the Government has been *detected.* But if you mean to contend, that the exiſtence of a treaſonable conſpiracy was not eſtabliſhed, by the proceedings on the State Trials, to the conviction of a great majority of the nation, as well as to that of many of the Jurymen, I beg leave to enter my proteſt againſt any ſuch affirmation. Numbers, *I know*, were firmly convinced of the exiſtence of a conſpiracy for overthrowing the conſtitution, although they might not be of opinion that ſufficient evidence had been adduced to bring home the fact to the parties accuſed, and to juſtify a verdict of guilty. On this ſubject, therefore, you have no ground of triumph, and the miſerable argument, you have attempted to build upon what I muſt conſider as a pitiful evaſion, can be of no avail.

While you beſtow the extraordinary appellation of "*uſurped* "*authority*" upon the ancient monarchy of France, which had ſubſiſted for fourteen centuries, you give the epithet *ſacred* to the law of treaſon enacted in the twenty-fifth year of the reign of our third EDWARD. It is eaſy to perceive, that the ſame *leading principle* influences your deciſion in both caſes—but the nature of that principle I ſhall not here attempt to define. I can, however, eaſily excuſe even an exceſs of attachment to a ſtatute which had for its object the application of a remedy to ſerious evils, which had, at that period, riſen to an alarming

ſupport from that party, and that at all events the Miniſters

height;—and I can as eaſily conceive that ſuch attachment might be ſtill encreaſed by the facility which that ſtatute afforded you for ſecuring the eſcape of men, of whoſe guilt, *to a certain extent*, none but their friends or accomplices can, I think, entertain a doubt. But while the ſtatute of the twenty-fifth of EDWARD III. gave a proper check to the inconveniences ariſing from conſtructive treaſon, it did not ſupply the neceſſary means for the prevention of treaſon, and was therefore inadequate to the end for which it was framed. Indeed, the legiſlators of that day ſeemed to be aware of this inadequacy, and therefore invited, as it were, in the ſtatute itſelf, the attention of future legiſlators, to the ſupply of ſuch further proviſions as the circumſtances of the times might render neceſſary. The late Parliament, in the law which it paſſed on the ſubject of treaſon, a law which has been as ſeverely as unjuſtly reprobated (from the influence of the principle I have alluded to above) by yourſelf and your party, did nothing more than accept this invitation of thoſe very men whoſe proviſions you deſcribe as *ſacred*.——This ſubject is fully and ably diſcuſſed in "An Hiſtorical Eſſay on the Principles of political Aſſoci- "ations in a State," by the Rev. JOHN BRAND:—a publication, from which you, as a *conſtitutional lawyer*, a politician, and one of "*The Friends of the People*," may derive much valuable, and, let me add, much *neceſſary* information.

You reprobate the conduct of the Houſe of Commons, upon the buſineſs of the State Trials, in *erecting* themſelves "into a "Grand Jury to find capital bills of indictment for the Crown "againſt *the People*,"—(here you prove, that the *Britiſh Reformers* affix to the word *People* * preciſely the ſame ſenſe as the *French Jacobins*)—"and to prejudge *their* cauſes by publiſhing "the accuſing evidence under the cruſhing weight of their "authority." And yet, when the pamphlet aſcribed to Mr. REEVES was the ſubject of diſcuſſion in the Houſe, you made no

* *We are to underſtand, then, that the Society of* "*Friends of the* People," *of which you are a member, are to be conſidered only as the Friends of Meſſ. Hardy, Thelwall, Holcroft, and Co. againſt whom ſuch indictments were found.*

Miniſters would ſoon be compelled to ſubſcribe to any

no ſcruple to act in a ſimilar capacity, not only to *prejudge the cauſe*, but even to *anticipate the verdict of the Jury*. "So fully "is my mind made up on the ſubject, that I will not heſitate, "even on the inſtant, to declare, that were I a juror, ſworn to "try the author, I would, without going out of court, pro- "nounce him guilty." (Nov. 23, 1795.)——"I have no heſi- "tation in anticipating what the verdict of a Jury will be upon "this caſe when before them." (Nov. 26, 1795.) *Parliamentary Reports.*—The hint, however, was not taken, and the Jury, notwithſtanding your anticipation, pronounced a verdict of acquittal. As to your *conſiſtency*, that is a point which I leave you to ſettle with *yourſelf*, and with the public.—*I* can eaſily account for it.

3 It is notorious, that the leading members of oppoſition were conſidered by the French not only as friends to the republic, but as the advocates of revolutionary principles; and this idea was induſtriouſly propagated among the people of France, as a ſtimulus to their acquieſcence, firſt in the declaration, and afterwards in the continuance, of the war. Of the prevalence and effect of this idea, innumerable inſtances might be cited.—In the autumn of 1793, a play was brought out at Paris, at the *Theatre de la Cité*, and received with unbounded applauſe, entitled "*The Opening* "*of the Parliament of England.*" Among the *Dramatis Perſonæ* are the KING, QUEEN, PRINCE OF WALES, Meſſ. PITT, FOX, SHERIDAN, and GREY. This laſt gentleman is directed by the author to be dreſſed in a red coat, with cropped hair, and boots—*(Grey doit être en habit rouge, cheveux à la Jacobine, des bottes)*. The plot, as might be ſuppoſed, conſiſts in the depoſition and murder of the King, and the eſtabliſhment of a republic.

"*Act II.—Scene V.*

"GREY, SHERIDAN, FOX, STANHOPE, &c.

"GREY. Beneficent Liberty has long quitted this iſle; we no "longer enjoy nature's firſt gift; but we were at leaſt in poſ- "ſeſſion of *peace*, plenty, the arts, and all the benefits which are "compatible with a ſtate of ſlavery. Why then are theſe "taken from us? I hear the martial trumpet ſound; ſoldiers, "ſailors, even workmen, are dragged to the field of combat.

"What

any terms that they in their wiſdom might chooſe to

" What is the reaſon of this immenſe preparation? What out-
" rage have we to revenge, or what danger to dread? I put this
" queſtion to you, PITT; anſwer me. Have you calculated the
" terrible effects of this unjuſt war? Our manufactories, our
" fields deſerted, commerce expiring, credit ſhaken, thouſands of
" men ſacrificed, diſgrace and infamy henceforth attached to
" the very name we bear!—Such is your criminal work, ſuch is
" the fruit of your ridiculous pride. Senate, the people are
" tired of their ſhameful ſervitude, they accuſe you of being their
" oppreſſors.———Legiſlators, it is no longer in your power to
" ſave the country; adopt, therefore, the only meaſure which
" Juſtice and Prudence avow. Declare to the ſovereign people
" that the exerciſe of the ſupreme power has reverted to them,
" and let the Commons aſſemble throughout the three kingdoms;
" this ſalutary ſtep will reſtore you to the eſteem of your fellow-
" citizens. *France has been the firſt to ſet a great example to the*
" *world, why do you heſitate to follow it? Let us aboliſh deſpotiſm,*
" *and conſecrate auguſt liberty on its ruins.*

" SHERIDAN. I ſecond the motion.

" FOX. I ſupport it.

" STANHOPE. It is the only means by which we can ſave the
" country, — — — — — — — — — — —

" FOX. Know, ſenators, that *Pitt* himſelf ſowed the ſeeds of
" the French revolution; he alternately laviſhed our treaſures on
" both parties, in order to balance their means and their ſtrength.
" He every where applauded the efforts of France; now he
" encreaſes the number of her enemies, and excites their
" rage.———

" *Scene VI.—The Houſe of Lords.*

" (*The People ſtanding round* FOX.)

" GREY. Your baſe oppreſſors have deſerted their poſts; they
" are gone to plan your deſtruction. Look at this place, which
" Pride and Hypocriſy have too long polluted; you ſhould now
" occupy, and purify it.—(*The People take poſſeſſion of the Lords'*
" *ſeats, and the throne.*)—People, your deareſt intereſts are at
" ſtake; diſcuſs, deliberate with us, and let us unite to ſave the
" State.

to impoſe. The firſt motion brought forward by Mr.

" State. The moment is come for you to reſume your rights; quit, " at laſt, a ſtate of ſlavery, and let us proclaim Liberty!

" PEOPLE. *Vive la Liberté!*"

[An alarm is here given that the French have landed, and that the troops are preparing to march againſt them.]

" GREY. Let us all to arms, my friends; rouſe yourſelves, " and exerciſe your ſupreme power againſt your enemies; then " let us march to meet the French, not to fight, but to embrace " them. Let us ſwear an eternal friendſhip to them on the " tombs of our tyrants. Come, citizens, follow us; your " friends will lead you on to victory. War, war with deſpots, " and *Vive la Liberté!*

" PEOPLE. War with tyrants! *Vive la Liberté!*"

[*Exeunt omnes.*

" The honourable functions of Public Accuſer *," are then conferred on Mr. Fox, who is made to paſs ſentence on his Sovereign. This being ſettled, Mr. GREY thus addreſſes the People— " Citizens, it is not enough to have deſtroyed the tyrant, you muſt " alſo deſtroy tyranny; you muſt aboliſh royalty, or renounce the " happineſs of being free. People, your will made Kings, it is " your buſineſs to annihilate them. — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — —

" Let us then found, after the example of our neighbours, an " imperiſhable republic, on the baſis of equality. Pure demo- " cracy, a republic, or no liberty!

" PEOPLE. A republic! a republic!

" GREY. You have conſecrated the republic; let us now " ſwear

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* Candour extorts the obſervation, that the French themſelves did not attach any idea of diſgrace to this important function; nor meant to aſcribe any *appropriate* qualities to the perſon on whom they beſtowed it.

" I have been told by a gentleman who was at ſchool with Fouquier- " Tinville, and has had frequent occaſions of obſerving him at different pe- " riods ſince, that he always appeared to him to be *a man of mild manners*, and " by no means likely to become the inſtrument of theſe atrocities; but *a* " *ſtrong addiction to gaming having involved him in embarraſſments*, he was " induced to accept the office of Public Accuſer to the Tribunal, and was pro- " greſſively led on, from adminiſtering to the iniquity of his employers, to " find a gratification in it himſelf." *Reſidence in France*, vol. II. p. 206.

Mr. GREY in February, 1793, had for its object to fix the charge of aggreſſion on the Britiſh Government; but the Houſe, very properly, repelled the idea, with that virtuous indignation which became a Britiſh Senate, jealous of the honour and dignity of their country. Mr. GREY's propoſition to addreſs the King to put an immediate ſtop to hoſtilities, was rejected by a large and deciſive majority. In fact, it could be conſidered as little leſs than an inſult to the common ſenſe of the members, after the treacherous conduct of the French, who, as I have ſhown, endeavoured to impoſe upon our Miniſters, by profeſſions to which their practice, at the very time, gave the lie direct; after the ſtrenuous efforts

" ſwear that it ſhall be one and indiviſible. This done, we will " go to meet the French; we are worthy of them, becauſe we " have imitated their conduct. They were our enemies, while " we were governed by tyrants; but now a holy friendſhip will " unite us for ever; and may our example accelerate the happy " moment, when all the people of the earth will form but one " family!"

I ſhall not be ſuſpected of imputing to the gentlemen whoſe names are here introduced the ſentiments which the author has been pleaſed to aſcribe to them. My only object in giving theſe extracts is to ſhow what an impreſſion was made by their ſpeeches in Parliament on the minds of the people of France—ſpeeches which, as far as they were rendered inſtrumental in that country to a continuance of the war, were certainly prejudicial to the intereſts of England.

The impreſſion thus created was ſo ſtrong, that, when the Engliſh reſident in France were all impriſoned, in conſequence of a decree of the Convention, they were frequently aſked why they did not obtain letters from the leaders of oppoſition, which would certainly procure them their liberty.—This queſtion was repeatedly put to a friend of mine.

made

made by our Miniſters to preſerve tranquillity, by ſtating, clearly and ſpecifically, the grounds upon which it might be preſerved, and "*giving* "*and even courting explanations*" of a pacific tendency; after it had been proved, that the French would not ſuffer us to remain at peace, unleſs we conſented to ſacrifice the honour and ſafety of the State, to call upon the Houſe to declare that our enemies had acted right, and the Britiſh Government wrong, was, in my apprehenſion, an inſult of the groſſeſt nature.—Such a propoſition, brought forward at ſuch a time, and under ſuch circumſtances, fortunately ſtands without an example in the annals of our legiſlature.

After praiſing Mr. GREY for an act, which was properly reprobated by ninety-nine perſons in every hundred, throughout the kingdom, (for you are compelled to admit that the war was entered upon with the perfect approbation of the people, though you have the *modeſty* to conſider all who differed in opinion on the ſubject from you and the ſmall circle of your friends as *fools*, or ſomething worſe,) you proceed to comment on a paſſage in his Majeſty's ſpeech on the twenty-firſt of February, in the following year, relating to the grounds of the war. One might naturally be led to ſuppoſe, that the paper which gave you ſuch offence, muſt, at leaſt, ſtate that the war had, as you frequently inſinuate, (though you dare not openly aver it,) been undertaken for the purpoſe of impeding the progreſs of freedom in France, and of compelling the French to adopt the ſyſtem of government which prevails at *Conſtantinople*,

or the polity of the court of *Seringapatam*. Little, indeed, could one imagine, that the ſtaunch friend of Chriſtianity, and the determined enemy of popular exceſs, would feel ſuch deep indignation at an avowed determination "*to oppoſe that* "*wild and deſtructive ſyſtem of rapine, anarchy,* "*impiety, and irreligion*; *the effects of which, as they* "*had been manifeſted in France, furniſhed a dreadful* "*but uſeful leſſon to poſterity*."—But, we are told, forſooth! that this declaration "wholly and ab- "ſolutely precluded the return of peace!" The juſtice of this inference can only be admitted on the ſuppoſition that you, who drew it, were aſſured, that the French were reſolved never to abandon that ſyſtem. You go ſtill farther, and gravely aſſert—you are lawyer enough, though, to know that *aſſertion is not proof*—that this declaration directly refuted the unfounded aſſertion —recollect that I have ſupported *this* aſſertion by authentic *proofs*, which I dare you to controvert or invalidate—"that the war had proceeded from "France;"—and ſhowed that peace could, under no conceſſions of France, have been preſerved.—How did it ſhow this?—Becauſe "the war was "to be waged to ſubdue *principles* and opinions; "to *change the Government*, and not to puniſh overt "acts of inſult, or to enforce reſtitution."

Theſe are bold *aſſertions* of your own, wholly unwarranted by the declarations of Government! But the whole paſſage exhibits a ſpecimen of logic peculiar to yourſelf, and too curious to be omitted here. "If the return of peace,"—you ſay,—"was at the opening of the ſeſſion declared

"to

" to be inadmiſſible, whilſt the principles of her " Government continued, it follows, that the " original preſervation of peace muſt have been " equally inadmiſſible, *whatever conceſſions might* " *have been made by France to preſerve it*, ſince " the ſelf-ſame ſyſtem exiſted at the commence- " ment of the war, which was now pronounced " to be an inſuperable obſtacle to negociation." —Really, Sir, you muſt hold the people of England in ſovereign contempt, if you imagine they can be the dupes of ſuch miſerable ſophiſtry as this!

" The war was to be waged," as it had been, to reſiſt hoſtilities commenced againſt us by the enemy, and an aggreſſion wholly unprovoked on our part. It is, I know, a favourite topic with the philoſophical politicians of the preſent day, that to wage war againſt principles is to commit an act of injuſtice of the moſt atrocious nature. To fight againſt mere *abſtract* principles would indeed be an act of inſanity; but to reſiſt principles when attempted to be reduced to practice, in a manner that threatens our own ſafety and independence, is juſtifiable not only by the law of nations, but by the all-powerful plea of ſelf-preſervation. VATTEL, ſpeaking on this ſubject, ſays—" If, then, there be any nation of a *reſtleſs* " and *miſchievous* diſpoſition, always ready to " *injure others*, to traverſe their deſigns, and TO " RAISE DOMESTIC TROUBLES; it is not to be " doubted, that all have a right to join, in order " to repreſs, chaſtiſe, and put it ever after out of

" its power to injure them[4]." That France was a nation preciſely of this deſcription, no man will be bold enough to deny. The principles proclaimed by her amounted to little leſs than the aſſertion of a right of univerſal legiſlation, and a determination to overthrow all the exiſting Governments of Europe. " *Royalty in Europe*," —ſaid the French—" is on the point of periſhing; " and the declaration of rights, placed by the " ſide of *thrones*, is a devouring fire which will " conſume them." They took no pains to conceal the nature and extent of their principles; on the contrary, they took care to tranſlate all their offenſive decrees, which, as well as their attempts to change, *by force*, the government of neighbouring States, they ſtated to be the *neceſſary reſult of their principles*, into all foreign languages. The acts of aggreſſion committed upon our Allies, and the formal diſavowal of the obligation of all juſt treaties, were the conſequence of their *principles*. It was not therefore ſufficient that we ſhould repel ſuch aggreſſion, that we ſhould drive them out of the territories of our Ally, which they might re-enter whenever they choſe, we had a right to expect that they ſhould offer us a ſecurity againſt the renewal of thoſe acts by diſclaiming the principles on which they were founded. This was the *conceſſion* by which the war might have been prevented. Lord GRENVILLE, as I have before obſerved, had expreſsly ſtated, as the condition of continued

[4] VATTEL, Book 2, Chap. 4.

friendſhip,

friendſhip, that France muſt ſhow a diſpoſition " to renounce her views of aggreſſion and ag- " grandizement, and to confine herſelf within " her own territories, without inſulting other " Governments, without diſturbing their tran- " quillity, without violating their rights." She evinced no ſuch diſpoſition; on the contrary, ſhe proceeded immediately to reduce to practice the principles here complained of. But it is ridiculous to ſay, that if ſhe really had made the conceſſion thus ſpecifically demanded, the preſervation of peace would have been inadmiſſible.

You evidently confound the principles avowed by the Government of France, with the ſyſtem of Government itſelf, and hence you are led to infer, that to inſiſt on a renunciation of thoſe principles was to demand a change in the Government, or, in other words, the deſtruction of the republic. This was an object which moſt certainly Miniſters never had in view, as *the condition of peace*. They ſoon, indeed, had too much reaſon to think that peace, with any Adminiſtration, profeſſing the principles which the French Miniſtry of that day profeſſed, and on which they *acted*, would be impracticable; and that the beſt *means* of producing a dereliction of thoſe principles, and, conſequently, of eſtabliſhing the tranquillity and ſafety of Europe on a permanent baſis, would be the reſtoration of monarchy; but this they conſidered as a *means* of obtaining their object, not as the *object* itſelf.

You repreſent this mode of waging war againſt principles as " a new and fatal principle of hoſti- " lity."—

" lity."—The aſſertion is not very correct, becauſe VATTEL, as we have ſeen, had expreſsly eſtabliſhed the principle; but if the practical application of it be new, whom have we to thank for it?—Thoſe immaculate republicans who appear, in your opinion to be infallible, but who, in fact, are the firſt people, at leaſt in modern times, that have rendered the aſſertion of ſuch a principle of hoſtility neceſſary and unavoidable. Indeed, they were themſelves fully aware that their principles muſt be objects of reſiſtance to all exiſting Governments; and they evidently intended that they ſhould be ſo; hence the Preſident of the Convention, after the decree of the 16th had been paſſed in November 1792, alluding to the war which France had declared againſt the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia, obſerved—" PRIN-" CIPLES ARE WAGING WAR AGAINST TY-" RANNY, which will fall under the blows of " *philoſophy*." This was perfectly true; the diſorganizing principles proclaimed by the French Government had declared, as they themſelves repeatedly confeſſed, eternal war againſt *royalty*, that is, againſt every political inſtitution or form of Government which differed from their own. Of courſe, the regular Governments were compelled, in their own defence, to wage war againſt thoſe principles. It was with them, not an object of choice but a matter of neceſſity. The principles were avowedly the active aggreſſors; they were the cauſe of hoſtility. Mr. Fox, indeed, whom you praiſe moſt extravagantly, apparently for no other reaſon than becauſe his ſentiments correſponded

ſponded with your own, was pleaſed to repreſent a conteſt purſued on theſe grounds as having *no defined nor definable object*. But he might as well tell me, that if a man threatened to take away my life, the judicial means I ſhould adopt for ſecuring myſelf againſt the effects of ſuch threats, would have no *definable object*; and that, before I could have any lawful ground of action, I muſt wait until he had put his threats in execution.—The object, in both caſes, is to obtain reparation for a paſt act of aggreſſion, and ſecurity againſt any future act of a ſimilar nature.

But though the Britiſh Miniſters never meant to preſcribe a change of the French Government as a condition of peace, I can have no wiſh to evade the grand queſtion itſelf, but am free to maintain that, if they could not effect by any other means the deſtruction of thoſe diſorganizing principles, which were avowed and enforced by the perſons exerciſing the powers of Government in France,[5] they had an undoubted right, according to the maxim avowed by VATTEL, (whoſe authority Mr. Fox himſelf has conſecrated) to exert every effort for the overthrow of the republic. This maxim indeed is evidently founded on the all-paramount principle of ſelf-preſervation, and only gives to States that right and that power which are veſted in every individual by the laws of nature, confirmed by the laws of ſociety. If a

[5] It was declared by DANTON, in the Convention, that "the "National Convention of France ſhould be a Committee of "Inſurrection againſt all the Kings of Europe."

fire

fire ſhould break out in the houſe of my neighbour, will it be contended that I ſhould have no right to quench the flames, nor to remove nor deſtroy any combuſtible matter which might tend to nouriſh them, in order to *prevent* the probable deſtruction of my own reſidence? In ſhort, to deny the right here aſſerted, and which VATTEL properly denominates the *right of Security*,[6] would be to maintain the monſtrous propoſition, that a Government can exiſt with ſafety without the means of defence.

The next motion brought forward by oppoſition (in Jan. 1795,) who ſeemed determined to ſuffer no one ſeſſion to eſcape without giving to the French ſome grounds of encouragement, had for its object a premature recognition of the republic, which muſt effectually have deſtroyed all hope of dividing her force, by the aſſiſtance of that party in France which had invariably reſiſted the new Government. The motion was, of courſe, oppoſed by the Miniſter; but while he ſought to avert the diſaſtrous effects which it was calculated to produce, he prudently reſolved that the ground of his reſiſtance ſhould not be open to the miſrepreſentations of his enemies, nor urged as a proof of his diſinclination to peace. He therefore, inſtead of putting a direct negative on the motion, propoſed an amendment to the following purport, which was adopted by the Houſe:

6 Vattel, ubi ſupra.—See alſo "Objections to the Continu-
"ation of the War examined and refuted," by JOHN BOWLES, Eſq. p. 67, 68.

"That

" That under the preſent circumſtances, this " Houſe feels itſelf called upon to declare its de- " termination firmly and ſteadily to ſupport his " Majeſty in the vigorous proſecution of the " preſent juſt and neceſſary war, as affording, at " this time, the only reaſonable expectation of " permanent ſecurity and peace to this country; " and that, for the attainment of thoſe objects, " this Houſe relies with equal confidence on his " Majeſty's intention to employ vigorouſly the " force and reſources of the country, *in ſupport* " *of its eſſential intereſts*; *and on the deſire uniformly* " *manifeſted by his Majeſty*, to effect a pacification " on juſt and honourable grounds with any Go- " vernment in France, *under whatever form*, which " ſhall appear capable of maintaining the accuſ- " tomed relations of peace and amity with other " countries[7]."

This poſitive declaration clearly eſtabliſhes theſe facts—that the exiſtence of a republic in France had never been conſidered by the Britiſh Govern- ment as a bar to peace; that Miniſters had ever been deſirous to conclude a peace on juſt and honourable grounds; and that the exiſtence of *any form* of Government in France would not be regarded as an impediment to the termination of the war. In order to prevent the inference which any impartial perſon muſt naturally be led to draw from the peruſal of the amendment, you,

[7] WOODFALL's Parliamentary Regiſter.

 diſingenuouſly,

diſingenuouſly, change the conſtruction of the ſentences, and wholly omit the words here marked in Italics; evidently becauſe this ſolemn parliamentary avowal of the *uniform manifeſtation of his Majeſty's deſire to conclude a ſafe and permanent peace* exhibits a complete contradiction of your unfounded aſſertions on the ſubject. Your interpretation of the Miniſter's conduct, in this inſtance, confuted as it is by his own poſitive teſtimony, and by indubitable facts, is too puerile and inſignificant to merit a ſerious comment; while the RANT you purſue, in conſequence of this falſe conſtruction, is too ridiculous to excite any thing more than a ſmile. It might *tell* very well by way of appeal to the paſſions of a jury, or the judgment of a mob; but as an addreſs to the good ſenſe of the Britiſh public, it will not, believe me, anſwer your purpoſe.——Two other motions were made in the courſe of the two enſuing months, by Mr. GREY and Mr. Fox, which, as they were of a ſimilar import, of courſe experienced a ſimilar fate.

During theſe tranſactions in England, it might naturally be ſuppoſed, that the perſons exerciſing the powers of Government in France had expreſſed a diſpoſition to retract thoſe aggreſſive principles which had occaſioned the war, or at leaſt, had avowed ſome ſentiments of a *pacific tendency* which had the effect of convincing the gentlemen in oppoſition that theſe principles were no longer, as Mr. GREY obſerved, " incompati-

" ble

" ble with the ſafety of other States," and which encouraged them to inſiſt ſo ſtrenuouſly on the immediate recognition of the French republic. How far this was the caſe, a few *facts* will ſuffice to ſhow.

In the month of April, 1793, a decree paſſed the Convention, by which the puniſhment of death was to be inflicted on any perſon who ſhould propoſe peace with any country, unleſs that country acknowledged the French republic, one and indiviſible, founded on the *principles of liberty and equality*. It cannot eſcape obſervation, that the object of eſtabliſhing this *ſine quâ non* of peace was to extort a general acknowledgment of theſe democratical principles as the legitimate foundation of government, and, of neceſſity, a confeſſion, that all Governments, but that of France, were founded, as the French had repeatedly inſiſted, on uſurpation and injuſtice.

In the ſitting of the Convention on the 20th of January, 1794, CAMBON, the French *Chancellor of the Exchequer*, ſaid—" Let us judge with im-
" partiality the *principles* on which the Britiſh
" Government reſts. I ſee a KING! Good God!
" a King! *what a monſter in nature!* A King,
" who by the very ſtatutes is entruſted with ſuch
" a plenitude of power, as muſt devour all the
" little powers which popular credulity flatters
" itſelf that it is ſtill inveſted with."

COUTHON in the ſame ſitting, propoſed an oath, which was inſtantly taken by the Conven-

tion, " *that they would deſtroy all tyrants,*" alias, *Kings*. Among other means of accompliſhing this purpoſe it was moved, " That all Kings " ſhould be beheaded in effigy, and that the ' *Laſt* " *Judgment of Kings*' ſhould be repreſented at " every theatre [8]." It was alſo reſolved—" to " congratulate

[8] *Le Jugemen dernier des Rois*, a *Prophecy*, in one act, is the production of Citizen SYLVAIN MARECHAL, and was firſt performed at Paris, at the *Theatre de la Republique*, where, of *courſe*, it was received with *the greateſt applauſe*; I ſay of *courſe*, becauſe if any free Frenchman had been ſo free as to expreſs any diſapprobation on the occaſion, there can be little doubt that he would have been inſtantly transferred to one of the many thouſand Baſtilles which cover the face of this free republic, and from thence conſigned to the care of *Sancta Mater Guillotina*, as that voracious monſter has been impiouſly denominated. The property of this piece was expreſsly ſecured to the author, in a ſpecial manner, by a decree of the Convention.

The ſtage was made to repreſent the interior of an iſland, in the center of which was a *Mountain* throwing out flames during the whole time of performance. In the front was a cottage, bearing this inſcription—

" Il vaut mieux avoir pour voiſin
" Un volcan qu'un Roi.
" Liberté — — — Egalité."

A man had better have a volcano for his neighbour than a King.—Liberty—Equality.

The nature and tendency of the ſentiments contained in a piece which was ſanctioned with the approbation of men who could publicly proclaim in the ſenate ſuch principles as thoſe advanced by CAMBON, COUTHON, and BARRERE, may be eaſily conceived.

The plot is ſimply this—An *European Convention* is ſuppoſed to have been holden at Paris, which is modeſtly ſtated to be *the*

metropolis

" congratulate the *Mountain* on account of the " energy diſplayed in the trial of the tyrant, and " to order a *feu de joye* to be fired the very hour " when the tyrant died."

In the month of February, 1794, BARRERE, in the name of the Committee of Public Welfare, thus addreſſed the Convention, on the ſubject of peace—" You deſire peace;—ſo do the confede- " rated Kings, but mark at what price. A diplo- " matic

metropolis of Europe, conſiſting of *Sans-Culottes* repreſentatives of all the different people which Europe contains. Here the eſtabliſhment of an *univerſal republic* is decided; and all the Monarchs are baniſhed to the iſland, where they are conſumed by the flames iſſuing from the *Mountain*.

If any member of the Loyal Aſſociations had preſumed to write a piece in which all the Kings of Europe were deſtroyed by the *Mountain*,* it would certainly have been repreſented, by the advocates for the French in this country, as an indecorous attack upon the Government of an independent State; as a groſs *calumny* upon the Miniſters of that Government; and as a ſcandalous miſrepreſentation of their views and deſigns. But as this piece was written by a French Citizen, and was not only honoured with the decided approbation of the legiſlature, but was, in conſequence of a formal decree enacted for the purpoſe, repreſented in every theatre in France, no man will be bold enough to deny, that it contains the ſentiments and principles of the French Government, with whoſe profeſſions on other occaſions it perfectly correſponds, and affords the moſt irrefragable proof of their fixed determination to eſtabliſh an univerſal republic in Europe on the ruins of monarchy.

Among

* *Every body knows, that this was the appellation aſſumed by the prevailing party of that day; and is ſtill applied to the Jacobin members of the two Councils.*

" matic agent in a neutral State ſaid the other " day—' The Confederate Powers are willing " proviſionally to acknowledge the republic ;'—(a " burſt of laughter enſued ;) well, *let us pro-* " *viſionally deſtroy all tyrannical Governments.*— " (Loud applauſes.)—The tyrants offer you peace, " becauſe they have neither money nor troops.— " IF THE BRITISH PEOPLE WISH FOR PEACE, " WHY DO THEY NOT DETACH THEMSELVES " FROM THEIR INFERNAL GOVERNMENT [9]?— " Arms

Among other ſentiments of a ſimilar nature, are the following, uttered by a " French Sans-Culotte," who is the hero of the piece :

" Did there ever exiſt a nation which had morals and a King " at the ſame time?—Future generations! will ye pardon your " good anceſtors for their exceſs of degradation, ſtupidity, " and ſelf-denial?" (In ſubmitting to live under a monarchical Government.) " Nature, haſten to complete the work of the " Sans-Culottes ; blow, with your fiery breath, upon that re- " fuſe of ſociety, and make them return to that ſtate of nihility " which they never ſhould have quitted.

" Inflict alſo the ſame puniſhment on the firſt of us who ſhall " pronounce the word *King*, unaccompanied by thoſe impre- " cations which the idea attached to that infamous word natu- " rally preſents to every republican mind.

" For my own part, I pledge myſelf inſtantaneouſly to eraſe " from the book of free men whoever ſhall, in my preſence, " pollute the air with any expreſſion that can tend to give a fa- " vourable idea of a King, or of any other *monſtruoſity* of the " kind. Comrades, let us all ſwear to do the ſame.

" *The Sans-Culottes.* We ſwear it!—*Vive la Liberté!—Vive* " *la Republique!*"

9 And yet theſe are the men who, as you ſay, repelled with " indignation the charge of encouraging ſedition againſt Go- " vernments,"

" Arms and gunpowder muſt alone procure " peace!"

It is, I conceive, ſcarcely poſſible to ſpeak more plainly; or to betray a diſpoſition more hoſtile to peace, or more incompatible with the ſafety of other States. Let any *true Engliſhman* compare the conduct of the two Governments, at this period, and decide, whether your inference or mine is founded on juſtice and truth. I would willingly leave the matter at iſſue between us to the plain good ſenſe of my countrymen—I deſire no other arbiter—I look to no other judge. And though I have not, like you, the preſumption to *anticipate* their verdict, I have that confidence in the goodneſs of my cauſe, and the ſtrength of my proofs, that I ſhall await their ſentence without fear or apprehenſion.

It will be no difficult matter to prove, from the principles of negotiation laid down by the French republicans themſelves, that *they* would not have entered into a treaty with any other nation in a ſituation, and under circumſtances, ſimilar to thoſe in which France, at this period, was placed. In the *explanation* of the Executive Council to our Miniſters, quoted by yourſelf, it is poſitively ſtated, that, " *The knowledge of the general will is the only* " *baſis of the tranſactions of nations with each other*; " *and we can only treat with any Government what-*

" vernments," and whoſe profeſſions on that head you maintain to have been deſerving of credit!!!

" *ever*

" *ever on this principle, that ſuch a Government is* " *deemed the organ of the general will of the nation* " *governed.*" It will ſcarcely be contended, that the citizens of the Executive Council, all of whom, with a *ſingle* exception, have ſince periſhed by their own hands, or by the axe of the guillotine, were " *the organ of the general will*" of France. Nor will it, I apprehend, be urged, that ROBESPIERRE's Committee of Public Safety, or rather of Public Deſtruction, with the Director CARNOT at its head, was the *organ of the general will.* France, torn by contending factions, had exhibited, from the ſummer of 1789 to the cloſe of 1794, a conſtant ſeries of revolutions and commotions; *ſix hundred thouſand* of her inhabitants had periſhed on the plains of La Vendée; *eighteen hundred and twenty* of her towns and villages had been reduced to aſhes; and her numerous places of confinement had encloſed no leſs than *ſix hundred thouſand ſtate priſoners*[1]*!*—Where, then, in what body of men, was the organ of the general will to be diſcovered? It was no where to be found. France, therefore, agreeably to her own principles, was not in a ſituation to be treated with by any foreign power.

No ſooner, however, had the new conſtitution of 1795 been eſtabliſhed, the principles of which it is foreign from my preſent purpoſe to diſcuſs, obſerving only, that it was uſhered in by an act of

[1] See " Les Bandits Demaſqués."

tyranny,

tyranny, at which every true friend to freedom muſt revolt, though *you* do not think it worthy one ſingle expreſſion of cenſure,—than the Miniſters haſtened to announce to the world, that the period was arrived, when his Majeſty would meet any diſpoſition to negotiate on the part of the enemy, *with an earneſt deſire to give it the fulleſt and ſpeedieſt effect*, and to conclude a treaty of general peace whenever it could be effected on juſt and ſuitable terms for his Majeſty and his Allies.

I ſhould have thought that a declaration ſo explicit and clear would have proved ſatisfactory to every friend of his country. It certainly held out an *invitation* to the French to enter into a negotiation, and proclaimed a ſincere deſire, on the part of the Britiſh Government, to bring it to a ſpeedy and ſucceſsful termination. It did prove ſatisfactory to a vaſt majority of the Parliament, and to the great maſs of the nation; but not ſo, it ſeems, to the perpetual cavillers of oppoſition. This meaſure is reprobated by you with almoſt as much ſeverity as any of the preceding meaſures of Adminiſtration. Whatever comes from that quarter incurs your diſpleaſure, and nothing appears to pleaſe you but the conduct of our enemies—

> " That head, or ſtomach, is not ſure the beſt,
> " Which nauſeates all, and nothing can digeſt."

No *Engliſhman* could poſſibly have conjectured

the *ground* of your diſpleaſure, in this inſtance, though a French republican probably might.—You are enraged with Miniſters becauſe they only expreſſed a readineſs to *meet* any diſpoſition to negotiate; and becauſe, forſooth, they did not declare their readineſs to throw themſelves at the feet of the Directory, and *ſupplicate* a peace. A man who had one ſpark of Britiſh ſpirit in his ſoul would have ſcorned to urge ſo baſe, ſo inglorious, ſo ignominious an objection! But, we are told, "that the Britiſh Government had de-"clared the incapacity of the French Govern-"ment"—I have proved the exiſtence of that incapacity from their own general principles—and, ſtrange to tell!—"that this obſtacle ſtill "continued."—Why? becauſe the King in his meſſage, had declared it to be *removed*. Really, Sir, this is too groſs an inſult on the underſtanding of your readers to paſs current even with the verieſt blockhead at Beaufort Buildings or Palace Yard! It is neither marked by the point of ridicule nor the force of fact; and it wants alike the recommendation of ſenſe, the plea of decency, and the grace of decorum.

The mode of reaſoning by which you vainly attempt to ſupport this concluſion, is not leſs extraordinary than the concluſion itſelf.

You ſay, that "The Britiſh Government, *by* "*the various acts of its Crown and Parliament*, "had interpoſed a poſitive and *public* obſtacle to "negotiation," by declaring the incapacity of the French

French Government; but that the declaration in queſtion " was a mere *private* communication of " the King of Great Britain to his own Parlia- " ment," and that, *therefore*, the obſtacle to a negotiation ſtill continued. But was not the declaration of the capacity of France to negotiate made with the ſame degree of publicity, and preciſely in the ſame manner, as the declaration of her incapacity had been made before? or, to ſpeak more correctly, was it not made in a more formal, more ſpecific, and more public manner, ſince the removal of the impediment was announced by a meſſage from the Throne, whereas the exiſtence of the obſtacle was only ſtated, indirectly, in the courſe of debate? If the one may be called a *private* communication from the King to his Parliament, the other muſt come under the ſame deſcription. If France could not be ſuppoſed to know any thing of the latter, how could ſhe be ſuppoſed to be acquainted with the former? Both communications were made through the ſame channel — that is, through the medium of Parliament, and therefore both were equally *private* or equally *public*, and France, conſequently, had a right to act upon both or upon neither. If the interpoſition of the obſtacle was public, its removal was public alſo; and if the removal was *private*, the interpoſition was private alſo. Either the enemy could not be ſuppoſed to know that any impediment to negotiate had exiſted, or ſhe muſt be ſuppoſed to know

that it had been removed. I do not ſee the poſſibility of an alternative. And yet, upon the validity of an objection ſo captious, ſo futile, you conſent to ſtake the whole credit of your work; and boldly leave the matter to the deciſion of "every man whoſe reaſon is not diſordered, "and whoſe heart is not corrupted."—I am not aware that my reaſon is diſordered, and I truſt, that my heart is as pure as your own; and yet to me, I proteſt, it appears that your objection is as *baſeleſs* as "the fabric of a viſion."—On this, however, as on other points, the public muſt decide between us.

The addreſs on the meſſage was oppoſed by Mr. SHERIDAN, who wiſhed to ſubſtitute an amendment of his own, in order to make his Majeſty *lament* that he had not diſgraced himſelf by liſtening to the ſuggeſtions of oppoſition, in preference to the opinion of Parliament, and the voice of the nation. And this ſupplied you with a ſeaſonable opportunity of adminiſtering a copious doſe of flattery to that gentleman, whoſe public ſpirit, genius, eloquence, and wit[2], form the theme of your

[2] You are particularly laviſh of your commendations on the *wit* of Mr. SHERIDAN (one of the *chiefs* of your party) which, you tell us, "affords the happieſt illuſtration of *Pope*'s deſcrip-"tion of this rare and *uſeful* qualification."—That poet, if my memory fail me not, ſays—

"A wit's a *feather*, and a chief's a rod;
"An *honeſt man*'s the nobleſt work of God."

But, alas! wit with you has the precedency; and poor HONESTY does

your admiration, though you are totally ſilent on his private virtues, and on all thoſe moral qualities of the mind, which, in the eſtimation of ſome *antiquated* writers, have been deemed eſſential requiſites in the formation of a *patriot*.

Here, Sir, let me aſk, on what maxim of equity or juſtice it is that, in the aſſertion of your general principles on the ſubject of peace, France is invariably exempted from their influence and operation? Upon what principle of public law, upon what plea of precedent or example, can you juſtify the impoſition of the whole *onus pacificandi* upon the nation aggrieved? In all the ſpeeches of your party, in all the publications of your partiſans, it has been invariably inſiſted that England, engaged in a war of ſelf-defence, of ſelf-preſervation, ſhould make overtures for peace; but it never once has been ſuggeſted by any of them, that France, though the aggreſſor in the conteſt, though ſhe literally compelled us to go to war, by declaring war againſt us, ought ever to evince a diſpoſition for peace. Every topic which ingenuity could deviſe, or eloquence enforce, for the purpoſe of ſtimulating us to the adoption of this line of conduct, has been exhauſted; but though all the arguments urged might have been employed againſt our enemies,

does not come in for a ſingle particle of praiſe, from the firſt page of your pamphlet to the laſt, though all the members of oppoſition are aptly panegyrized.

with

with tenfold force, they never have been applied to them. This is a proceeding ſo oppoſite to the wiſe practice of our anceſtors, ſo little conſonant with the maxims of ſound policy, ſo wholly repugnant to the principles of true patriotiſm, that it can only be imputed to a *motive* moſt diſgraceful to thoſe who could ſuffer themſelves to be actuated by it. It is not ſufficient that our Miniſters have to maintain a conteſt unparalleled in the importance of its object, and the extent of its danger, but they muſt alſo have to encounter an oppoſition equally unparalleled in the nature and tendency of their exertions.

After ſome few weeks had elapſed, during which the French exhibited no more ſymptoms of a pacific diſpoſition than they had before diſplayed, our Miniſters, determined to prove to the whole world that *they* were willing to give effect to the ſentiments which they had profeſſed, as far as lay in their power, ſent orders to Mr. WICKHAM, the Britiſh Envoy at *Baſil*, to deliver a note to M. BARTHELEMI, the republican Miniſter, the object of which was to enquire whether or not the French Government were diſpoſed to put an end to the war, by opening a negotiation for the concluſion of a peace on juſt and ſuitable terms? Whether, for this purpoſe, they would ſend a Miniſter to a general Congreſs? Whether they would ſpecify ſuch general baſes of a pacification as France intended to propoſe? And laſtly, if this mode of proceeding were objected

to

to by the French Miniſtry, Whether or not they would point out any other mode calculated to promote the ſame end—a *General Peace?*

It certainly was neceſſary to aſcertain, in the firſt inſtance, whether thoſe perſons who had hitherto talked of nothing leſs than the extermination of Kings, the abolition of monarchy, and the revolution of Europe, had changed their ſentiments with the form of their Government, and would really *condeſcend* to make peace with regular eſtabliſhments that had not acquieſced in their aſſertion of univerſal ſovereignty. Before it was known whether they would treat or not, and there was every reaſon, from their paſt conduct, to infer that they would *not* treat, it was needleſs to appoint a Miniſter Plenipotentiary for conducting the negotiation which they might refuſe to open. The queſtions put were plain, ſimple, and ſpecific. The anſwer given by the Directory began by expreſſing ſome doubts as to the ſincerity of our Miniſters, founded on the abſurd and ridiculous plea of Mr. WICKHAM not being entruſted with power to negotiate. Waving, however, all objections, the Directory proceeded to declare, that they would ſtate ſpecifically and openly the terms upon which they would conſent to open a negociation. Theſe terms were, that the Combined Powers ſhould acknowledge the right of the French Republic to retain poſſeſſion of all the countries which her arms had conquered, and which it had pleaſed her to annex, by conſtitutional

ſtitutional decrees, to her own territory; and this acknowledgement was urged as an *indiſpenſible preliminary* to a negotiation! Any farther proceedings were of courſe rendered unneceſſary, by this peremtory declaration, which made the concluſion of a treaty upon juſt and ſuitable terms abſolutely impracticable, and ſet up a plea ſo monſtrous in itſelf, and ſo fatal in its conſequences, as to become a matter of ſerious apprehenſion to every power in Europe. This plea aſſerted nothing leſs than the right of preſcribing laws to the world, and of oppoſing the proviſions of the conſtitutional code of France to all the rules, regulations, and conventions which had hitherto been acknowledged by every civilized power. The magnitude of the conceſſion [3], though of itſelf an inſuperable bar to negotiation, was ſtill leſs objectionable than the aſſertion of this arbitrary and deſtructive principle. The ſubject, however, has been ſo amply and ably diſcuſſed, in one of the moſt eloquent produc-

[3] The French territory would, in that caſe, include 1. Old France as it was before the war; 2. The French colonies in the Weſt Indies ſtill occupied by France; 3. The iſles of France and Mauritius; 4. Martinico and Tobago; 5. The whole iſland of St. Domingo; 6. Pondicherry, Chandenagore, Caricul, Mahé, and the other French eſtabliſhments in the Eaſt Indies; 7. Avignon and the Comtat Venaiſſin; 8. The Principality of Montheliard, and the Biſhoprick of Porentrui; 9. Savoy, Nice, and Monaco; 10. Auſtrian Flanders and Brabant, and all the Emperor's dominions on this ſide the Rhine; 11. Maeſtricht, Venlo, the Iſle of Walkeren, &c. and Dutch Flanders; 12. The Biſhoprick of Liege.

tions

tion[4] which has iſſued from the preſs ſince the commencement of the war, that I ſhall purſue it no farther.

The inſolent charge of *inſincerity*, preferred by the Directory, would have been too contemptible to notice, had not the members of your party deigned to repeat the language of our enemies, and even to give to their frivolous objection an extent and interpretation which they themſelves had never aſſigned to it. You affect to ſupport its validity by a plea, the fallacy of which I have already demonſtrated; *viz.* the ignorance of France as to the change of ſentiment which had taken place in the Britiſh Councils, on the ſubject of the capacity of her Government to make and maintain treaties. Do you mean to contend that, in point of fact, this circumſtance was not known to the French Miniſters? You know that it was, for you know, at leaſt you ought to know, that the King's Meſſage, and the Parliamentary Debates on the ſubject, had been tranſlated into French, and had appeared in the Pariſian Journals. Beſides, if it had not been known by any

[4] "Remarks upon the Conduct of Perſons poſſeſſed of the "Powers of Government in France, and of the Official Note "of M. Barthelemi, dated Baſil, March 26, 1796."—This pamphlet, having nothing to recommend it, but ſtrong ſenſe, ſound judgment, able reaſoning, deep obſervation, extenſive knowledge, and elegant diction, could not be expected to vie with your tract in rapidity of circulation and extent of popularity.

other means, was not a propoſal to France to treat tantamount to a formal acknowledgment of her capacity to make and maintain treaties? Moſt certainly it was. There are ſo much pitiful quibble and paltry chicane in your declamation, I cannot call it argument, on this topic, that it can ſcarcely be deemed worthy of ſerious confutation. It reſembles more the captious croſs-examination of a doubtful witneſs at the Old Bailey, than the dignified diſcuſſion of a political point by a Britiſh Senator.—After all that can be ſaid on the ſubject, this will appear demonſtrable to every man of common ſenſe, that all the objections ſtarted by your party were not ſtarted by the French themſelves, and that what were ſtarted by them did not prevent them from giving that ſpecific and poſitive anſwer which it was the object of the queſtions to obtain. The matter, therefore, ultimately reſolves itſelf into this point—Were the terms propoſed by France as the *preliminary* to a negociation, ſuch as could be ſubmitted to by England, conſiſtently with her own political ſafety and commercial independence? No man has yet appeared bold enough to anſwer in the affirmative. The imputation of inſincerity has been repelled with juſt indignation by thoſe againſt whom it was alledged, and the attempt to negociate produced at leaſt this good effect—it *aſcertained* the averſion of our enemy from the concluſion of a peace.

But the extraordinary attempt made by the members of oppoſition to corroborate and *extend* the

the objections ſtarted and *waved* by the French, was calculated to anſwer another purpoſe. In the courſe of the different debates on the ſubject of peace, the oppoſition endeavoured to ſtimulate Miniſters to make ſome propoſitions to the enemy, by ſtating the inevitable conſequence of a refuſal on their part to accede to juſt and equitable terms to be the union of all parties and deſcriptions of men in ſupport of the war. One of the moſt reſpectable members of oppoſition, in point of character and property, (Mr. T. W. Coke,) had expreſsly ſaid, "The experiment of "trying to obtain it (peace) could do no harm, "and might do much good. If it ſhould fail, "*the conſequence would be uniting the heart and* "*hand of every Engliſhman for a vigorous proſecu-* "*tion of the war.*" And the general language of the party was this—"If France refuſe to treat, "or if ſhe inſiſt upon unjuſt and inadmiſſible con- "ditions, you will be ſo far from loſing any point "by the overture, that you will have all England "unanimous, you will convert whatever oppoſes "you at preſent, you *will have even ourſelves for* "*your aſſociates and confederates.* Whatever bears "the name and diſtinctive character of Engliſh- "men will aid and ſecond you in the conduct and "ſupport of a war, which, by the refuſal or in- "temperance of France, will then have indeed "become what you have hitherto only pretended, "a war of juſtice and neceſſity, a war of honour "and utility, a war for the liberty and indepen- "dence of Europe."

After this ſolemn pledge to Parliament and to the nation, the only alternative left to the oppoſition was boldly to ſtand forward and maintain, that the terms ſtipulated by France were ſuch as the Miniſters ought to have acceded to; or to fulfil their engagement, and give their vigorous ſupport to the war. This, I contend, was the only mode of proceeding that could be purſued without a palpable breach of honour and a flagrant violation of duty. But inſtead of acting with candour, manlineſs, and deciſion, they had recourſe to the diſgraceful quibbles and chicanery which I have deſcribed. They ſtooped to confirm the objection which the enemy had waved, ſtarted others which had never occurred to them; and the ambitious and encroaching ſpirit of the French, which, on former occaſions, when the danger reſulting from it was infinitely leſs, had rouzed the jealouſy and excited the patriotic indignation of Mr. Fox, was now ſuffered to paſs without cenſure or remark, and the pledge ſo ſolemnly given ſtill remains to be redeemed.—The public and poſterity will appreciate ſuch conduct![5]

[5] To enter into a *critical* analyſis of your work would be a taſk too tedious and unpleaſant for me to undertake. But when ſuch paſſages as the following occur, which is not unfrequently the caſe, I cannot always withſtand the temptation of aſking for an *explanation*. "The object of Mr. WICKHAM's propoſition, and the "extent of his authority, were to pump Mr. BARTHELEMI: A "*new title* in the code of diplomacy:—Quere—*What title?*—This, Sir, might do very well in a ſpeech, but not in a pamphlet.

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The refuſal of the Directory to open a negotiation on admiſſible terms was not viewed by the people of France in the ſame favourable light in which the oppoſition in England had choſen, for obvious purpoſes, to conſider it. The irrevocable annexion of Belgium to the territory of the republic was openly queſtioned, and the party who, adopting the views of the Government, inſiſted on the propriety of extending her frontier to the Rhine, was publicly ſtigmatized, as "the faction of the new limits;" while a vaſt majority of the nation were decidedly hoſtile to the diſaſtrous project of rendering the neceſſity of ſuch extenſion a pretext for the continuance of the war. In order to counteract theſe impreſſions, the Directory ſtudiouſly propagated a report, through the medium of their official Journals, that fair and equitable propoſitions of peace had been made to the Combined Powers, and rejected by them. This ſerved to keep the public mind in a ſtate of ſuſpenſe, and enabled the Government, in the interim, to purſue their own plans without moleſtation.

Such was the ſtate of things, when the Britiſh Miniſters determined to remove, if poſſible, every ground for cavil, and even to humour the pride and arrogance of the French, ſo as to leave them nothing, in point of form, that could furniſh them with a *pretext* for an objection, made application, through the Daniſh Ambaſſador at Paris, for a paſſport for a perſon of confidence

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to be ſent to France for diſcuſſing the means of promoting a general peace.—This application was treated in the moſt inſulting manner by the Directory, and it was ſome time before the paſſport could be obtained.

On the arrival of Lord MALMESBURY at Paris, 'tis well known, he propoſed to eſtabliſh, in compliance with eſtabliſhed forms, a general principle, as the baſis of a negotiation. The principle he ſuggeſted was that which the French denominate *the principle of retroceſſions*. It muſt be obſerved, that in the Memorial containing this propoſition, his Lordſhip apprized the French Miniſter that he would be "called upon to conſent to ſuch arrangements as would *ſatisfy the juſt demands of the King's Allies, and preſerve the political balance of Europe.*" The French Government muſt have been aware, that this arrangement could apply to no other object than the reſtitution of Belgium. They evidently were aware of it, and, therefore, they ſhuffled and equivocated [6], and heſitated ſo long before they would give an explicit anſwer to the propoſition

[6] This ſhuffling and equivocation of the Directory, which excited the contempt or indignation of all Engliſhmen at the time, has been renewed by you, in your comments on the negotiation; but in the courſe of your remarks you have not made a ſingle attempt at elucidation of fact or novelty of argument; and the perſpicuity, correctneſs, and elegance, which you ſo juſtly admire in Lord MALMESBURY'S Letter, form a perfect contraſt to the characteriſtic features of your own production.

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of the Britiſh Miniſter, that the Memorial was delivered on the 24th of October, and the acknowledgment of the principle of negotiation withholden until the 27th of November. Nor would it have been given even then, as it has ſince appeared, had not the public voice convinced the Directory, that ſome caution at leaſt was neceſſary in the execution of their plan for breaking off the negotiation. As, however, the principle of mutual conceſſion was formally acknowledged, there was reaſon to hope that the French Government were ſeriouſly diſpoſed to put an end to the calamities of war, by receding from thoſe exorbitant pretenſions which had operated as an impediment to a negotiation, but ſome few months before, and which *they knew* muſt prove an inſuperable bar to the concluſion of a treaty.

Such certainly was the impreſſion, created on the public mind, both in England and France, by their conduct at this period. The deluſion, however, was ſoon diſpelled; the ſame inadmiſſible claims which had been advanced before, in reply to the Note preſented by Mr. WICKHAM, were renewed; and the French conſtitution was again repreſented as paramount to the public law of Europe, and as an inſurmountable obſtacle to the ſeperation of the Netherlands from the territory of France. With the ſame contempt of all rules and modes of proceeding invariably eſtabliſhed in ſimilar caſes, an *Ultimatum* was peremptorily demanded at an early ſtage of the negotiation,

tiation, and its refuſal, though ſanctioned by uniform practice, and accompanied by an offer of fair diſcuſſion and full explanation, conſidered as a ſufficient ground for an abrupt termination of the important buſineſs of pacification, and as a valid pretext for the immediate diſmiſſion of the Britiſh Miniſter from the territory of the republic.

The relative conduct of the two contracting, or rather *negociating*, parties, forms an apt characteriſtic of the principles of the two Governments. *England*, intent on the faithful obſervance of treaties, and on the preſervation of that political balance, on the maintenance whereof the ſafety, and indeed the exiſtence, of many of the European States immediately depend, and which therefore has been an object of extreme ſolicitude to the moſt enlightened ſtateſmen of all ages, cheerfully conſented to make a ſacrifice of *all* the important poſſeſſions which ſhe had taken from France in the courſe of the war, in different parts of the globe, for the attainment of this one grand object. *France*, on the contrary, bent on the final accompliſhment of thoſe deſtructive projects of conqueſt and aggrandizement, which had impelled her to the unprovoked declaration of war, peremptorily refuſed to make a ſingle ſacrifice to the peace and ſecurity of Europe; and, when compelled to acknowledge that ſome compenſation would be juſtly due to our Ally for the enormous loſs which by a compliance with her exorbitant

exorbitant terms he must necessarily sustain, she still contrived—with a revolutionary Machiavelism peculiar to herself—to make such compensation subservient to her own schemes of universal demolition; for she proposed to indemnify the Emperor by robbing other Princes of their territories, and by a total dissolution of the Germanic constitution, which, as chief of the empire, that Prince was bound, by oath, to defend, but which France herself had secretly determined to subvert and overthrow.

You labour hard to embarrass, by forensic sophistry, a plain question, which every man is competent to decide upon. The rupture of the negotiation was the simple effect of the determination of the enemy to assert a general principle incompatible with the security of other powers, and not to forego the practical application of that principle to the conquests which she had made during the war. In other words, to maintain the right of the French republic to annex irrevocably to her own territories the possessions of any foreign Potentate which her arms might subdue; and to retain possession of Belgium, the acquisition of which would prove destructive of the balance of power, and consequently of the safety of Europe. Instead of quibbling, therefore, on those important points, it behoved you to prove, that the principle thus asserted, and the possessions thus retained, were not incompatible with the safety of Europe in general, or of England in particular.

The firſt, however, you diſavow, and the laſt you expreſsly declare yourſelf unqualified to diſcuſs.

But notwithſtanding this avowed diſqualification, you ſtill enter upon a partial view of the ſubject, and advance every argument which your own mind can ſuggeſt, or with which the more fertile invention of the Directory can ſupply you, in order to prove the exiſtence of a neceſſity on the part of France to retain poſſeſſion of Belgium, and conſequently to juſtify its annexation to the republic. You ſay, that the ſenſe of the danger to which France was expoſed at an early part of the war from the invaſions of the Allies, "now oppoſes the retroceſſion" of that country—in other words, that the determination of the French to retain Belgium ariſes from the conviction that its poſſeſſion is neceſſary to ſecure them from the danger of foreign invaſion.—But this is not the true motive, in the firſt place; and, in the ſecond place, the pretext urged is fallacious and unfounded. For it is known to have been the decided opinion of Louvois, Turenne, Villars, Vauban, and other competent judges, that France was completely protected, for every purpoſe of *defence*, by what Vauban called her *iron-frontier*; that is, her *double* line of ſtrong fortreſſes which are extended the whole length of her northern frontier *. Nay, Vauban went ſtill farther, and maintained that the poſſeſſion of Brabant, far from operating

* This opinion was adopted and proclaimed by the republican government of France in the autumn of 1794.

as a ſecurity to France, would even diminiſh her means of protection. The reaſon which he aſſigns for this opinion is, that, poſſeſſed of Brabant, France would neglect her real bulwark, and her fortreſſes would become ſecondary, inſtead of remaining primary, objects of her attention and care.

De Lacroix, indeed, aſſigned a moſt curious reaſon in ſupport of his propoſition, *viz.* that as Belgium had been the ſource of all wars for two centuries paſt, the ceſſion of it to France would enſure the tranquillity of Europe for two centuries to come!—So that the dangerous ſpirit of aggrandizement by which this aſpiring nation had confeſſedly been actuated for two hundred years, and the reſiſtance of which had been ever deemed a juſt ground of war by the European powers, is now urged as a motive for acquieſcing in the complete gratification of her ambition, (at a time when ſhe is become more dangerous than ever to the neighbouring States,) by the ceſſion of a territory, the immenſe importance of which is ſufficiently eſtabliſhed by her unvaried eagerneſs to obtain it.

Another reaſon to induce the French to perſiſt in her reſolution of keeping this valuable country has been advanced by Dupont de Nemours, a member of one of the Councils.——"Belgium," —ſays this ſtrenuous advocate of the new limits— "can ſupply France, from the maſs of her eccle- "ſiaſtical property, with the means of diſcharging "a conſiderable part of her debts; and can put "her in a ſituation to ſubſiſt, after the war, on

" ſuch contributions as a ſtate of peace will ad-
" mit of.

" Without Belgium, it is evident that the Go-
" vernment will not be able to conciliate the rights
" and intereſts of the public creditors and of in-
" dividual proprietors. The one would not re-
" ceive what is due to them, or the others would
" be obliged to pay a great deal more than they
" either could or ought to pay. Even ſhould they
" be diſpoſed to bear the loſs between them, they
" would probably be reduced to a ſtate of inca-
" pacity inſupportable to both.

" We cannot ſay, even to a ſlave, *die*; much
" leſs can we ſay ſo to a powerful and valiant na-
" tion, who, notwithſtanding her paſt errors and
" efforts, is ſtill poſſeſſed of reſources which, em-
" ployed againſt her enemies, may produce an in-
" calculable effect."

That the plunder of Belgium would be of in-finite ſervice to France*, in the exhauſted ſtate of her finances, I am perfectly willing to concede; but that ſhe ought to be allowed to indemnify herſelf for the expences of a war, provoked and declared by herſelf, out of the ſpoils of thoſe powers whom ſhe had unjuſtly attacked, and by the gratification of that ſpirit of conqueſt and

* By a parity of reaſoning we ſhould have an undoubted right to retain all the poſſeſſions which we have taken from the French, as there can be no doubt that they would furniſh us with the means of defraying a part of the expences incurred by the war. And the argument is much ſtronger on our ſide, becauſe we were *forced* into the war, and therefore have a *right* to indemnity.

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aggrandizement which led her to attack them, is a doctrine, to the ſupport of which, your arguments evidently tend, but which, I believe, no Engliſhman will be found ſo degenerate as openly to eſpouſe.

But the grand motive which ſtimulates the rulers of France to inſiſt ſo ſtrongly on this point, is the ſame which influenced the invaſion of the Netherlands in the winter of 1792. The rulers of that day, and their confidential agents, openly avowed their object, in the poſſeſſion of Belgium, to be the *deſtruction of the naval power and commerce of England*; which they hoped to effect by the means I have before deſcribed. It is, indeed, moſt certain, that the poſſeſſion of a country ſo truly valuable from the fertility of its ſoil, the extent of its population, and its advantageous ſituation for trade, manufactures, and commerce, as well as from its vicinity to the United Provinces, over which it would give the French an influence and authority as deciſive as if they were lords of the ſoil, would ſupply them with ample means for gratifying that ſpirit of hatred and revenge, which ever has, and which ever will prevail, in France againſt Great Britain.

To acquieſce in the exorbitant pretenſions of the French, would be to encourage plunder, to acknowledge the ſavage "*Loi du plus fort*," to ſanction revolutionary principles, and to abandon thoſe important intereſts which are ſo eſſentially connected with our commercial and political independence. But, excluſive of thoſe weighty conſiderations

ſiderations which muſt ſtrongly impreſs the mind of every man who has a ſincere regard for the welfare of his country, there is another motive for reſiſting the claims of our enemy, on which you do not condeſcend even to beſtow a ſingle thought. I mean our treaty with the Emperor by which we have ſolemnly engaged to ſecure to him the poſſeſſion of his dominions as they ſtood before the war. We therefore are bound, by every tie which Engliſhmen have hitherto hallowed and revered, not to give our aſſent to any diſmemberment of his territories, unleſs the incontroulable events of war ſhould ultimately compel *him* to conſent to ſuch a ſacrifice. *Then*, and then *only*, unleſs our honour is to be offered as a tribute to the ambition of the French, will it be for us to conſider how far our acquieſcence in the ceſſion will, under all the circumſtances of the caſe, be proper and expedient. But deſperate indeed muſt be the ſituation which would juſtify an acquieſcence that would place in the hands of France the moſt powerful means of *offence* againſt England.

It ſhould not be forgotten, that the conditions of this treaty with the Emperor never incurred the cenſure of your party; and that we have certainly derived from it the moſt ſerious advantages, in the diverſion of that immenſe force of our enemy, which would otherwiſe, long before this, have been directed excluſively againſt this country; for, however anxious the Emperor might be to perſevere in a conteſt, in which his deareſt intereſts

tereſts are involved, it would have been impoſſible for him to continue the war without the pecuniary aſſiſtance which he received from England. Intereſt therefore preſcribes what honour commands*.

But, ſorry am I to ſay, that this conſideration appears to have no weight with you, and that you ſeem to conſider the violation of a treaty as a matter of indifference. Elſe why repeat, with affected energy, and in letters of extraordinary ſize, no leſs than three times in little more than a page, that "the Britiſh nation is at this mo-"ment at war for Belgium?" This pitiful attempt *ad captandum vulgus*; this contemptible endeavour to "ſplit the ears of the groundlings," in order to render the war unpopular, by repreſenting it as a mere conteſt for a tract of country not belonging to ourſelves, and of the value of which you affect to be ignorant, deſerves the ſevereſt reprobation. It is a low unworthy artifice, evidently calculated to miſlead and inflame the minds of thoſe who are unable to detect it. Belgium, conſidered in the abſtract, merely as a territorial

* In the negotiation between England and France in 1761, when the French miniſter propoſed, as one of the conditions of peace, that England ſhould forſake her Ally, the King of Pruſſia, Mr. PITT replied in the true ſpirit of a Britiſh Miniſter, "I return you, Sir, as totally inadmiſſible, the memo-"rial relative to the King of Pruſſia, *as implying an attempt* "*upon the honour of Great Britain, and the fidelity with which* "*his Majeſty will always fulfil his engagements with his Allies.*" What a different language do you and your party wiſh to preſcribe to the Miniſter of this day?—a language alike diſgraceful to himſelf, and diſhonourable to his country!

poſſeſſion,

poſſeſſion, without any reference to the commercial and political advantages which its poſſeſſors muſt acquire, or to the influence which it muſt have on the ſtate of Europe, might poſſibly be regarded as an inſufficient ground of war; but what ſtateſman, what politician, what ſenator, what man of common ſenſe, can poſſibly conſider it in ſo abſurd a point of view? If it were only a tract of land one league in extent, and producing a revenue not worth acceptance; if it were even like Gibraltar, a barren rock—ſtill, if the ceſſion of it to our enemy would deſtroy the political balance of Europe, and materially affect our own intereſts and ſafety, it would conſtitute a lawful and juſtifiable reaſon for continuing the war, and all our efforts ſhould be directed to enforce its reſtitution.

If you had paid the ſmalleſt degree of attention to this important ſubject, you could not have failed to notice the extreme anxiety which our moſt able ſtateſmen have at all times entertained with reſpect to the dangers ariſing to Great Britain from the relative ſituation of the northern coaſt of France, and the opportunity which it affords of annoying our commerce, and facilitating the means of invaſion. Hence the demolition of the port of Dunkirk was made an expreſs ſtipulation in the treaty of Utrecht; and this ſtipulation was renewed in all ſubſequent treaties, until the peace of 1783; and ſo much importance was attached to this object by Mr. PITT, (father of the preſent Premier,) that in the negotiation

which

which took place in 1763 between the two powers, that enlightened Miniſter abſolutely rendered it the *ſine quâ non* of peace. In the inſtructions delivered to Mr. STANLEY, as the *ultimatum* of the Britiſh Cabinet, it was poſitively ſtated—"Dunkirk ſhall be reduced to the condition in "which it ought to have been placed after the trea-"ty of Utrecht, *without which no peace can be con-"cluded.*" Since, then, men, whoſe deep knowledge of the true intereſts of their country no one will preſume to queſtion, could regard the demolition of a ſingle port as a matter of ſuch high conſequence, what importance muſt they neceſſarily have attached to the acquiſition, by France, of ſuch an extent of territory and of coaſt as ſhe would acquire by the ceſſion of Belgium?

You are compelled to acknowledge, that, "the "aſcendancy of France hereafter, in the ſcale of "Europe, *whatever may be the ultimate terms of "general tranquillity*, muſt be always *ſo very pow-"erful*, from the fertility and extent of her terri-"tory, her immenſe population, and *the active "genius of her people*, that her relation to Eng-"land can never be indifferent*."—If ſuch then would be the aſcendancy of that aſpiring nation, even in the event of a treaty which ſhould limit her to the poſſeſſion of her ancient territory, it follows of courſe, of neceſſity, from your own acknowledgement, that the ceſſion of the con-

* Page 124.

quered countries to France would effectually complete the deſtruction of the balance of power.

You cenſure Miniſters for being influenced by the conſideration of *conſequences* in reſiſting the retention of Belgium by the French, and for diſregarding conſequences when urged by your party in oppoſition to the war: but your cenſure in both caſes is unfounded in juſtice. In the firſt inſtance they have, as I have ſhown, the opinions of the moſt enlightened ſtateſmen in juſtification of their conduct; and, in the ſecond, your ſtatement is unfair, for they had no alternative; they were forced into the war—and therefore, had the conſequences you deſcribe been as obvious as they were uncertain, they would have been obliged to incur them. But you always argue upon falſe *premiſes*, and aſſuming the fact that Miniſters *began* the war, which is contrary to truth, proceed to draw ſuch concluſions as anſwer your purpoſe, and then triumph in the ſtrength and extent of your own reaſon and ſagacity. Both theſe qualities you, no doubt, think eminently diſplayed in the miraculous diſcovery that war is an evil and peace a bleſſing! Though it might, I ſhould think, have occurred to a man of *common ſenſe*, that there are ſituations in which wiſdom preſcribes the neceſſity of incurring a temporary evil, and of foregoing a temporary bleſſing, in order to avert a laſting evil, and to ſecure a permanent bleſſing. But thoſe writers who deal in *aſſertions* find it convenient to advance general poſitions, which exempts them at once

once from the neceſſity of proof, and the trouble of diſcrimination.

From the *facts* I have adduced, which contradict all your *aſſertions*, it evidently reſults, that our Miniſters adopted every means that was compatible with the honour and ſafety of the nation for averting hoſtilities; that during the period which elapſed between the declaration of war, and the eſtabliſhment of a new conſtitution in France, the ſtate of the Government in that country was ſuch as to preclude, according to the principles laid down by the French themſelves, the poſſibility of negotiation, even had the enemy evinced a pacific diſpoſition; that no ſooner did the dawn of returning order appear in France, than they haſtened to proclaim the removal of thoſe difficulties which had operated as a bar to negotiation; that, ſhortly after, though the enemy had diſplayed no wiſh to meet the kind of invitation which their recent declaration had holden out, they adopted means for aſcertaining the real diſpoſition of the French on the ſubject of peace; and laſtly that, notwithſtanding the exorbitant pretenſions advanced by the enemy, they again courted an accommodation, and even ſubmitted to a meaſure, which many of the beſt friends of the country were diſpoſed to conſider as a degradation of her dignity, and ſent an Ambaſſador to Paris. From the ſame facts it alſo reſults, that during the whole period of the war, from its declaration at the beginning of 1793, to the preſent day, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

HAS NEVER MADE A SINGLE ADVANCE TOWARDS AN ACCOMMODATION; HAS NEVER BROUGHT FORWARD ONE PROPOSITION FOR THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES; AND HAS NEVER EVEN EXHIBITED THE SMALLEST SYMPTOM OF A PACIFIC DISPOSITION. To *whom* then does the following exclamation of yours apply?—"What muſt be the reſponſibility of "the raſh and precipitate *authors of war*, and "the *uniformly backward* negotiators of its ter-"mination?"—I leave it to a BRITISH public to decide.

How would the true Britiſh ſpirit of our brave anceſtors, who fought and who conquered in the blood-ſtained fields of *Crecy* and of *Azincourt*—how would the proud ſouls of the gallant followers of our HENRYS and our EDWARDS—how would the indignant minds of SYDNEY and of HAMPDEN, the objects of *your* admiration, and the *nobler* and the *purer* ſpirit of the all-accompliſhed FALKLAND—Freedom's firmeſt friend—Rebellion's deadlieſt foe!—the conſtant theme of *mine*—have ſpurned the admonitions you ſuggeſt, and the conduct you preſcribe? With what an eye would *they* have regarded a Britiſh Repreſentative who ſhould have preſumed to arraign his country, and plead the cauſe of her enemy? Yes, Sir, I aver, that *you plead the cauſe of France!* Indeed, you was fully aware that your language and your ſentiments would ſubject you to a ſimilar imputation, and you therefore deemed it prudent to *anticipate* the charge; but the very words of your denial ſupply the proof

of

of your guilt. You ſay, you do not defend the French, *becauſe* you only *uſe their own arguments!* In the name of common ſenſe let me aſk, If I had engaged you, in your profeſſional character, to defend a cauſe for me, in the Court of King's Bench, what arguments could I wiſh you to employ but ſuch as I ſhould uſe myſelf?—But your affirmation, as extended from your own publication to the arguments of your party, is by no means correct; for it is moſt certain, that ſome of the objections ſtarted by them were never urged by the French, until they had appeared in the Engliſh prints, in the pay of oppoſition, whence they were *tranſlated* into the Pariſian Journals. Of this deſcription was the objection ſuggeſted to Mr. WICKHAM's Note, on the plea of *inſincerity*, grounded on the forbearance of our Miniſters formally to acknowledge the French republic. This objection had never occurred to the French Government, and was never uſed by any of their partiſans, until their advocates in England had ſupplied them with it.

I have before had occaſion to obſerve, that, in diſcuſſing the momentous queſtion of the war, your attention has been confined *to one ſide* of it; and this is the caſe, too, with all your arguments on the neceſſity of peace. It has ever, till now, been the cuſtom with politicians—a cuſtom preſcribed by common ſenſe, and ſanctioned by ſound policy—in weighing a point of this nature to eſtimate the *relative ſtrength* of the contending parties, to aſcertain the extent of their *reſpective* reſources, and *thence* to deduce the ability of *each*

to

to continue the conteſt. Such is the rule of conduct which all rational ſtateſmen muſt neceſſarily obſerve. But you, by ſome ſtrange perverſion of intellect, are led only to examine the ſtate of this country *in abſtract*, as it were, and from a partial and unfair conſideration of that object alone, venture to maintain the neceſſity of running headlong, like a mad lover, "into the em-"braces of Peace," without beſtowing a thought on the conſequences of ſuch ſtrange precipitation. Although the population of France has been exhauſted beyond all example*, and its very ſources dried up—although her credit has been ruined, her manufactures deſtroyed, her trade annihilated, and her navy reduced to little more than a third of its uſual complement—although the Directory themſelves have proclaimed their inability to pay the troops, and have recently confeſſed that they can only hope to maintain their armies by the plunder of foreign States; yet theſe are circumſtances, in your apprehenſion, unworthy of notice; and our own ſituation, which exhibits a very different picture, is not to be ſubjected to a compariſon with that of the enemy, but to a compariſon, forſooth, with itſelf as it ſtood previous to the war! So that becauſe a war, however juſt, neceſſary, or unavoidable, has been productive of expence and calamities, as every war neceſſarily muſt be, it muſt, for that reaſon,

* It has ſuffered, according to the moſt moderate computation, a diminution of three millions.

be terminated, and any ſacrifice be made which an ambitious and implacable enemy may chooſe to exact. The writer, whoſe arguments have an evident tendency to produce an effect ſo directly ſubverſive of every known rule of action, in public or in private life, muſt, I think, write not for the *people*, but for the *populace*; and muſt, when employed in the compoſition of his work, be tempted to exclaim—

"J'ecris en inſenſé mais j'ecris pour des fous."

In ſhort, this is preciſely the mode of reaſoning which the rulers of France wiſh to be adopted by every regular Government, becauſe it would enable them ultimately to accompliſh all their ſchemes of conqueſt and aggrandizement, and to effect the revolution of Europe. They have only to proclaim their reſolution to embark the capital and the whole population of their country in the conteſt, and not to make peace until theſe ſhall be exhauſted, or a compliance with their terms, however exorbitant, obtained; and, if your principle be once admitted, their ſucceſs becomes infallible, and all Europe muſt be ſubjected to their yoke. Such a termination to the firſt, would inevitably operate as an inducement to the commencement of a ſecond conteſt; the prevalence of the ſame principle with their opponents would diminiſh the means of reſiſtance; and the eſtabliſhment of an univerſal republic, on the ruins not of monarchy alone, but of civil liberty and property, would ceaſe to appear chimerical.

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The mind can ſcarcely ſtoop to combat, with ſerious argument, a poſition ſo prepoſterous, and the imagination can ſupply but one plauſible conjecture as to your motive for advancing it. You may, perhaps, have accuſtomed yourſelf to look forward, with delight, to the happy period, when the French, profiting by the hints which your party have frequently ſuggeſted, ſhall improve on the arrogance of their paſt pretenſions, and declare, as a *ſine quâ non* of peace, their determination to preſcribe to our inſulted Sovereign an Adminiſtration of *their own*. Then your pretenſions might be urged with ſome degree of validity; you might ſafely ſay, that you had never queſtioned the juſtice and policy of the French revolution—that you had invariably maintained, that the Engliſh had been the aggreſſors in the war, and that you had not once ſuggeſted the idea that the French were unwilling to terminate, or unable to continue it. Your plea would, no doubt, be admitted; and the high office of Attorney General, or Lord Chancellor, be conferred on you by the mandate of Citizen CARNOT or REWBELL, and with no other oppoſition than that of the King and people of England.

You have drawn a flattering picture—the offſpring of your own fertile imagination—of the ſtate of the nation, ſuch as your wiſdom ſuppoſes it would have been, if we had tamely ſubmitted to all the injuries and inſults of the Jacobin Miniſters of France, and avoided a war by the baſe ſacrifice of our honour. But this picture is as falſe as 'tis

flatter-

flatttering; for if we had connived at the numerous acts of aggreſſion committed by our enemy, the inevitable conſequence of ſuch puſillanimous conduct would have been a revolution in this country, effected by the means already deviſed and ſettled between the factious clubs in England and the Government of France—a revolution founded on the ſame principles as the French revolution, and *neceſſarily* productive of the total ruin of our trade—the deſtruction of our credit—the violation of all property public and private, inherited or acquired—and the abſolute and entire ſubverſion of our conſtitution.

Such, *I* contend, would have been the effects of that degrading and pernicious ſyſtem which you would have adopted, had the helm of the ſtate been confided to your hands. And I think I have already ſhown ſufficient grounds for my opinion, in the documents I have exhibited declaratory of the relative diſpoſitions of the uſurpers of France and the diſaffected in England at that critical period—documents which might eaſily be enlarged and multiplied. Admitting, then, our ſituation to be as gloomy and diſaſtrous as you repreſent it—which I never can admit but for the ſake of argument—ſtill the difficulties we have to encounter are inſignificant, in point of magnitude and extent, when compared with the horrors we have averted; and all the ſacrifices which we have made, or may yet be compelled to make, are but as duſt in the balance, when oppoſed to the preſervation of our laws and

conſtitution, our civil and religious eſtabliſhments, our commercial and political independence.

On one point only our opinions appear to accord—on the neceſſity of eſtabliſhing a peace, whenever it can be eſtabliſhed, on a *permanent* baſis *. But a peace, like a building, to acquire permanency, muſt be deliberately executed, not haſtily patched up;—muſt be founded on a rock, not erected on the ſand. Can ſuch a peace be obtained by the obſervance of that line of conduct which you and your party purſue? Is that deſirable object likely to be ſecured by exaggerating to the world our difficulties and diſtreſs; by proclaiming to the enemy that our finances are deranged; that "the deſtruction of Great Bri-"tain is nearly accompliſhed †;" that the continuance of the war muſt "break our credit and "*diſſolve our government* ‡;" and muſt make us paſs "through bankruptcy *into the jaws of revo-"lution* ‖?" Muſt theſe declarations appear to the eye of common ſenſe as invitations to peace or incitements to war? In what light would ſuch conduct be conſidered in the common tranſactions of private life? If I were anxious to purchaſe any particular article, what ſhould I think of *the friend* who would apprize the vendor of my anxiety, and aſſure him that I was determined to have it, *coute qui coute*—nay, that I abſolutely *muſt* have it, for that it was neceſſary to my *exiſtence?* Should I be authorized to conſider that *friend* as deſirous to

* Page 125. † Page 124. ‡ Page 113. ‖ Page 125.

ſerve

ſerve the purchaſer, or as ſolicitous to promote the intereſts of the vendor?—Let any man of plain ſenſe give a plain anſwer to this plain queſtion; and that anſwer will enable him to appreciate the conduct of your party. The two caſes are ſtrictly analogous, and however ſophiſtry may labour to puzzle, or artifice ſeek to obſcure, I defy the ingenuity of man to eſtabliſh a difference between them. I am, therefore, warranted in maintaining, that from the firſt dawn of a rupture with France to the preſent day, the conduct of oppoſition has had an invariable tendency to inſpirit our enemies, and to encourage them to perſevere in their hoſtile deſigns upon this country in particular, and upon the ſafety of Europe in general.

You admit the difficulty of concluding a peace, but you preſcribe, as the means of removing all obſtacles to its concluſion, and indeed as a panacea for all the diſeaſes of the body politic, *a change of Miniſters* *. On this *delicate* topic, the declarations

* Here again you exempt the French from the operation of a general principle; for though the neceſſity of a change of Miniſters be ſupported on the plea that the ſame men who have carried on a war can never make a peace, you do not ſeem to think it at all neceſſary that M. De Lacroix and his aſſociates ſhould be diſmiſſed from the Government of France. Yet give me leave to aſk what reaſon have we to believe that the principles of Carnot are changed, ſince the period when he propoſed that all the garriſons which he did not ſurrender, at the firſt ſummons, ſhould be put to the ſword? What proof have we that Barras does not ſtill harbour the ſame ſentiments as influenced his conduct when he ſuperintended the maſſacres preſcribed

tions of your party have ſo frequently varied, that it has been no eaſy matter to collect, from their own confeſſions, their ſentiments on the ſubject. Lord LAUDERDALE, with more political honeſty than his aſſociates in general have diſplayed, candidly avowed two years ago, that the acquiſition of place and power was the object of the party. But he was, unfortunately, doomed to witneſs a *contrary* declaration in the Upper Houſe from the Earl of GUILDFORD, which he did not deem it prudent to notice; and the manner in which the charge was repelled, in the Lower Houſe, by Mr. Fox, ſtill left the matter in doubt. The laſt gentleman, however, has of late given a different complexion to the buſineſs; for he has inſiſted on the neceſſity of diſmiſſing the preſent Miniſters, and yet has avowed his diſinclination to come into office himſelf. But if the exiſting Adminiſtration were to *go out*, and the Oppoſition were determined not to *come in*, it reſults, of neceſſity,

ſcribed by ROBESPIERRE's committee? Or that REWBELL has abandoned that ſpirit of *proſelytiſm*, that earneſt deſire to promote inſurrections in foreign States, which he openly avowed when he commanded the army of Miſſionaries at *Mentz*? You give theſe men credit for a change of principles, and yet you deem it impoſſible that a change of circumſtances can have produced any change of ſentiment, in the minds of the Britiſh Miniſters! You ſay, too, that the ſame ſyſtem which, according to you, produced the war, though no longer avowed, ſtill operates with our cabinet, while this is preciſely the caſe with the revolutionary ſyſtem of your Gallic Clients, ſo that, even on your own principles, the two governments are perfectly qualified to treat with each other!

that

that the kingdom would be left without a Government, and the nation be plunged into that ſtate of anarchy which uſually precedes a revolution. Now as I cannot ſuſpect Mr. Fox of having it in contemplation to produce ſuch ſerious diſaſters, I muſt conſider his conduct on this occaſion as a mere maidenly coyneſs: though "Thus to "coy it, with one who knows *him* too," is puerile; and that he only affects to ſhun, while he actually courts, the embraces of power. But on what terms will this gentleman and his aſſociates condeſcend to take upon themſelves the burden of the ſtate?—Mr. Fox has told us on what terms—On an expreſs retractation, by the Parliament and by the nation, of the principles on which the war was begun, and which have been acted upon during its continuance *!

Is there a man of honour in the kingdom whoſe mind does not revolt at ſuch a monſtrous propoſition? Mr. Fox outſtrips the arrogance of our enemy, when he demands the ſacrifice of our principles as the price of his ſervices. Force, indeed, may compel a State to abandon the object of its purſuit, however laudable it may be; but there exiſts no human power that can oblige it to declare *that* to be unjuſt and unneceſſary, which it had formally and ſolemnly proclaimed, by the voice of its legiſlature, to be ſanctioned by juſtice and enforced by neceſſity. The retractation thus imperiouſly preſcribed is nothing leſs

* See WOODFALL's Parliamentary Reports for 1795.

than

than a total dereliction of every principle that eſtabliſhes confidence among men, and dignifies the proceedings of independent powers; and ſhould Mr. Fox perſevere in a declaration ſo inſulting to the country, a great majority of the nation will doubtleſs join in the wiſh that he may paſs the remainder of his life in the ſervice of oppoſition.

But, waving this objection, let me aſk from what known principle of reaſon you infer, that men whom our enemies are anxious to raiſe into power, whoſe efforts have invariably tended to eſtabliſh the juſtice of *their* principles, will be more likely to make ſuch a peace as will be conſiſtent with the honour, the proſperity, and the ſafety of *this country*, than thoſe miniſters who have conſtantly reſiſted the dangerous principles and exorbitant pretenſions of our foes? In the caſe of an arbitration between individuals, would either of the parties ſelect for his arbiter a man who had regularly eſpouſed the cauſe of his adverſary, and had juſtified all his proceedings on the very point in diſpute? If he did act ſo prepoſterouſly, the world would undoubtedly be juſtified in queſtioning the ſanity of his intellects. And why the ſame principles ſhould not govern nations as influence individuals, in ſimilar proceedings, I am wholly unable to comprehend.

Admitting, however, by way of argument, that all the perſons which compoſe the preſent adminiſtration, together with a vaſt majority of the nation, were willing to ſubmit to a retractation of principles, and that their opponents were as likely

as

as themſelves to make an honourable peace, are there no other grounds of objection to an adminiſtration compoſed as ſuch an adminiſtration neceſſarily muſt be? This, Sir, is no time to temporize, to ſpeak *half-truths*, and to ſacrifice the eſſential intereſts of the country to a falſe and dangerous liberality. *Fiat Juſtitia, ruat cælum.*—Let Truth boldly aſſert her ſway in her utmoſt plenitude of power and integrity of Empire! Let the duties of morality be ſupported with at leaſt as much energy as the cauſe of faction, or "the holy right of inſurrection."

I have already aſſerted the privilege of inveſtigating the private characters of public men, ſo far as they may reaſonably be ſuppoſed to have an influence on their public conduct; and I have ſtated the reaſons on which that privilege is grounded*. If I be deceived either in the aſſertion of the privilege itſelf, or in the inferences which it may lead me to draw, I am open to conviction; but that conviction muſt be produced by reaſon, not by declamation; by proof, not by aſſertion. It is a point, in my opinion, highly important to the well-being of ſociety, and therefore I wiſh to ſee it fairly and fully diſcuſſed. But whoever undertakes the

* It was, doubtleſs, for theſe, or for ſimilar reaſons, that a modern critic was induced to make the following declaration, to the wiſdom and juſtice of which I heartily ſubſcribe—"WE PLACE "NO CONFIDENCE IN AN IMMORAL MAN, WHO DEFENDS THE "CAUSE OF LIBERTY." *Monthly Review, New Series*, Vol. IX. p. 141.

diſcuſſion ſhould recollect that it is not a queſtion of *party*, that it involves conſiderations of much greater moment than the defeat of one ſet of men or the triumph of another, and that it embraces objects the intereſt of which is not merely confined to the preſent age, but extends to all future generations!

Convinced as I am of the exiſtence and neceſſity of ſuch a privilege, I ſhall proceed to aſk you, without farther ceremony, whether, among the members or ſupporters of your party, there exiſts a man who, having ſquandered away, in ſcenes of diſſipation and debauchery, a patrimony, not very honeſtly acquired, and divided his youthful hours between the turf and the gaming-table*, is now reduced to the degrading neceſſity of ſubſiſting on the eleemoſinary contributions of his friends, and, as if reſolved to be conſiſtent in profligacy alone, ſubmits to paſs the remnant of his life in the arms of venal beauty? Whether there exiſts, in the ſame contracted circle, any individual, whoſe life exhibits a conſtant violation of every moral and ſocial duty; who, early rejected by the im-

"* I have often thought that the habit of watching with ſelfiſh avidity for thoſe turns of fortune which enrich one individual by the miſery of another, muſt imperceptibly tend to harden the heart. How can the gameſter, accuſtomed both to ſuffer and inflict ruin with indifference, preſerve that benevolent frame of mind, which, in the ordinary and leſs cenſurable purſuits of common life, is but too prone to become impaired, and to leave humanity more a duty than a feeling?"

Reſidence in France, vol. ii. p. 207.

partial

partial voice of a judicious parent, and enriched by no patrimonial inheritance, has neglected to devote the liberal endowments of nature to the acquisition of an honeſt maintenance; yet ſcruples not to riot in every ſpecies of luxury, without the means to ſupport or even the taſte to enjoy it; who purchaſes eſtates when he cannot pay his debts; who, in his houſes, his equipages, his horſes, and his ſervants, diſplays the ſplendour of extreme wealth, while the public prints proclaim his inability to ſatisfy the trifling demands of an honeſt tradeſman; and who has even been known to reſiſt the lawful claims of the widow and the orphan, while he has appropriated the property of others to the unconſtitutional purpoſe of electioneering corruption?—Whether there alſo exiſts any perſon who conſiders his ſeat in Parliament as a mere ſecurity againſt a jail, and whoſe diſhoneſt practices expoſe him to the imputation of fraud and impoſture?—or any other whoſe low habits and vicious purſuits render him an unfit inmate for any place of reſort more reſpectable than a pot-houſe or a tavern*, and who is indebted for a ſubſiſtence to the wages of proſtitution?—If, Sir, your party be diſgraced by aſſociates of this deſcription, let me aſk whether they be fit perſons to be entruſted with any office of importance in the State?—Suppoſe one of the few men of property which the party contains, the Duke of Bedford, or Northumberland, for inſtance, was in want of a ſteward, and you, or Mr. Fox, or Mr.

" * Here's a tun of midnight-work to come,
" Og from a *treaſon-tavern* reeling home." DRYDEN.

SHERIDAN, was to undertake to recommend a perſon to that ſituation, do you not imagine that ſomething like the following dialogue would enſue?—"What are this man's qualifications?" "He "poſſeſſes every talent which your Grace would "deſire." "But his character?" "Oh! his "mind exhibits a happy union of public ſpirit "and genius."—"But his honeſty?"—"A ſuperior and ſublime eloquence, the force of ſound "reaſoning, and the happieſt command of wit.*" "But what are his moral qualities?" "Oh! they "conſiſt in the mighty powers of his capacious "mind."—"Will thoſe powers ſecure me againſt "the danger of peculation or the diſgrace of immorality? In ſhort, what has been his paſt "life, what the management of his own concerns?"—"Why to be ſure, he has ſpent his "paternal income, is ſtill a prodigal and a ſpendthrift, never pays his debts, is irregular in his "habits, vicious in his purſuits, addicted to gaming, keeps a miſtreſs, and—" "Enough, enough, talents thus accompanied loſe their efficacy, or only remain powerful in the means "of corruption; the man who diſgracefully ſquanders away his own eſtate is not likely to be a "prudent manager of mine; I can place no reliance on the honeſty of a gameſter; and I will "not riſk the contamination of my family by the "introduction of a profligate." This evidently

* "The loving his character of *wit* is a bad reaſon for entruſting him with the *finances*." *Inſtitution of a Prince.* Vol. II. C. 17. p. 7.

would

would be the language of every man of ſenſe; and, why the ſame bad qualities which exclude an individual from the ſervice of a ſubject ſhould not operate as an excluſion from the ſervice of his Sovereign, it would be difficult to prove. It will ſcarcely be contended that, in the choice of his ſervants, the Sovereign ſhould be debarred that privilege of rejection, on the ground of immorality, which is fully exerciſed by every one of his ſubjects; nor will you, I apprehend, be diſpoſed to maintain, that a Monarch who ſets a glorious example of virtue to the nation can ſubmit with indifference to an intercourſe with vice. Diſcrimination of *character* is one of the moſt efficacious incitements to good actions; if rewards be indiſcriminately beſtowed on the good and the bad*, the cauſe of morality is eſſentially injured, and the beſt ſecurity of a ſtate materially weakened. "Every man is able to form a juſt "idea of the happineſs of a nation, where all the "ſtrength and authority are granted to virtue, and "all the threats and chaſtiſements confined to "vice †." And it is equally eaſy to appreciate the miſery of a country in which an oppoſite line of conduct is obſerved.

Theſe obſervations, Sir, are not the effuſions of party ſpirit; the ſuggeſtions of private malice; nor the dictates of perſonal envy: they reſult from

* Prodeſt bonos eſſe: *his* honores; *his* ſacerdotia; *his* provincias offers. *Paneg. Traj.* p. 128.

† "Inſtitution of a Prince." Vol. II. C. 17. p. 19.

an attentive conſideration of what appears to me to be eſtabliſhed and important truths; they apply, indeed, individually; but the occaſion which extorts juſtifies the application.

The groſs and fulſome adulation which you ſo bounteouſly beſtow on Mr. Fox, ſets the imputed ſervility of modern courtiers at defiance, and even exceeds what hiſtory records of the obſequious flattery of the attendants of Canute *! Without inveſti-

* It is an invariable practice with the advocates for republicaniſm and democracy to repreſent flattery and corruption as the excluſive offspring of monarchial eſtabliſhments, and as confined within the circumſcribed limits of a Court. But the annals of the democratic-republic, or republican-democracy, of regenerated France exhibit ſome ſpecimens of adulation which can ſcarcely be equalled; and which prove that the followers of the Gallic demagogue ſurpaſſed the courtiers of the Daniſh King.—The following letters to ROBESPIERRE, will ſuffice to demonſtrate the truth of my aſſertion.

" *23d Prairial, 2d year of the French Republic One and Indiviſible.*

" Do thou, who enlighteneſt the univerſe by thy writings, " ſtrike terror into the tyrants and encourage the hearts of all " people; thou filleſt the world with thy fame; thy principles " are thoſe of nature; thy language that of humanity; thou " reſtoreſt man to his native dignity, and, fertile creator, thou " regenerateſt the human ſpecies upon earth; thy genius and " thy wiſe policy have been the ſurvivors of liberty; thou " leadeſt the French, by the virtues of thy heart and the em- " pire of thy reaſon, to conquer or die for liberty and virtue; " and thou teacheſt France, erſt ſo proud and lofty, to adore " equality. Be careful of your health, for our happineſs and " our glory; this is the prayer of my heart, which is pure as " thine own.

" J. P. BESSON."

Another:

veſtigating the polluted ſource of this naufeous ſtream, which, in its impetuous courſe, breaks down the dykes of reaſon and the mounds of truth; without ſeeking to aſcertain whether it has its origin in that *egotiſtical* ſpirit, which praiſes the glaſs that reflects its own image, and extols in others the qualities or opinions it admires in itſelf. I ſhall ſtrip this idol of the tinſel trappings in which your prejudice or your vanity has arrayed him; hold him up in all his natural deformity, and point out the defects which lead me to arraign the wiſdom of your choice, and to impeach the ſoundneſs of your judgment.

The opinions which this gentleman announced at an early period of the French revolution, and

Another:

"Sage legiſlator,

"The country, nature, and the divinity, owe you a triple "crown, and I pay a juſt tribute in offering you the fruits "which I have reaped from the exerciſe of your principles.—

"Pxx, *Engineer.*"

"20th Floreal, 2d year."

Another:

"The eſteem which I entertained for you during the ſit-"tings of the Conſtituent Aſſembly, induced me to place you "in the heavens by the ſide of Andromeda, in the plan of a "*fideral monument*, with which I propoſed to immortalize our "revolution."

Theſe letters are extracted from an official report by Courtois, from the Committee appointed to examine the papers ſeized, after the death of *Robeſpierre*, at his houſe, and at the houſes of his accomplices. This report contains many more letters of the ſame kind.

his

his conduct on the queſtion of the war which its founders determined to wage againſt the regular eſtabliſhments of Europe, have been particularly ſelected as objects, which entitle him to the applauſe and admiration of his country; and if implicit credit were to be given to his *patriotic paraſites*, Solomon himſelf was inferior to him in wiſdom, and Iſaiah in the ſpirit of prophecy. You dwell, with ſuch enthuſiaſtic rapture, on the accompliſhment of his predictions, on the fatal conſequences of the war, as to juſtify a ſuſpicion that the contemplation of the melancholy ſcene excites in your boſom other ſenſations than thoſe of diſappointment and grief. But let us ſubmit this boaſted prophecy to the crucible of common ſenſe, and ſee whether the droſs will not prevail over the ore. The two declarations, by which the wiſdom of Mr. Fox was moſt particularly ſignalized in the eyes of his partiſans, at the period in queſtion, were theſe—that the French revolution was a ſtupendous monument of human happineſs and human wiſdom: and that the war would inevitably be productive of ruin to the Allies, and of all thoſe diſaſtrous conſequences which he and you have repreſented in ſuch ſtrong and exaggerated terms.

Theſe were the two grand points on which his claim to political foreſight and ſagacity, as applicable to the affairs of France, was founded. But, Sir, did it never occur to you, that theſe boaſted declarations were wholly incompatible with each other?

other? If Mr. Fox really foreſaw the conſequences which he predicted, he muſt alſo have foreſeen the *means* which produced them, and by which *alone* they could have been produced: he muſt have been aware, that the rulers of France would have committed thoſe horrid acts of tyranny and oppreſſion, unexampled in the annals of the civilized world! which gave them the diſpoſal of the whole property and population of the country, and enabled them, by the operation of force, and the influence of terror, to raiſe and maintain armies, unequalled in numbers ſince the days of Xerxes. If he *were not* aware of this, his prediction muſt be conſidered as the mere rant of party—as an ebullition of that ſpirit which leads the members of oppoſition *invariably* to foretell the moſt dreadful conſequences from *every* meaſure propoſed by Miniſters. If, by the effect of chance, or by any of thoſe fortuitous occurrences which frequently ariſe, to defeat even the wiſeſt of human projects, ſuch anticipation be once realized, their political foreſight is loudly proclaimed; but if, as moſt uſually happens, their predictions are falſified by the event, their temerity is ſcreened by the veil of oblivion, and the frequency of the circumſtance precludes the neceſſity of expoſure. But if Mr. Fox *were* aware of the meaſures which produced the conſequences he predicted, the "ſtupendous monument of "human happineſs and human wiſdom," which he ſo pompouſly deſcribed, muſt have been a creature of imagination—the offſpring of fraud—

the child of impoſture. One of the two pictures muſt have been a forgery. If he believed that the revolution would produce the happineſs of France, he could not foreſee thoſe effects which nothing but the *miſery* of France could have produced; and if he foreſaw the conſequences of the war, he could not believe his portrait of the revolution to be a true likeneſs.

Having already commented on the conduct of oppoſition during the war; having ſhown its tendency to relax the operations of the Executive Government of the country, and to invigorate the exertions of our enemy; a conſiderable ſhare of that cenſure which, in my opinion, attaches to it, muſt, of courſe, apply to Mr. Fox, who, neceſſarily, from the pre-eminence of his talents, and from his ſituation, bore a leading and diſtinguiſhed part in it.

If extenſive abilities formed the ſum total of the qualifications requiſite for the formation of an able and upright Miniſter, Mr. Fox would undoubtedly be a proper perſon to ſteer the veſſel of the State. But political talents unaccompanied by political integrity give no claim to promotion; and never did a public character exiſt, whoſe life exhibited ſuch a ſcene of political profligacy as that of your idol. If the annals of the country did not record the facts, poſterity would ſcarcely believe that the man whoſe public ſpirit and whoſe public virtue had been ſelected by his friends, as the theme of an adulation little ſhort of idolatry, had ſtood ſelf-convicted of the moſt ſcandalous dereliction of principle, and devoted *by himſelf* to public infamy! This, Sir, is not vain declamation;

tion; it is not the invention of malice; nor the fiction of party—but plain ſubſtantial truth, founded on documents, the authenticity of which no one will preſume to queſtion.

By a reference to the parliamentary debates, during the unfortunate period of the war between the American colonies, and the parent State, you will find, that Mr. Fox, on the 26th of October, 1775, ſtigmatized the Miniſter of that day, Lord NORTH, as *an enemy to freedom*—that on the 8th of March, 1779, he reprobated him as *a fool or a traitor*—and that, on the 13th of May following, he held him up to the contempt and indignation of the world, as *a compound of pride, vice, and folly*, and as a criminal *that demanded the axe*. Viewing his political enemy in this light, it was certainly very natural for Mr. Fox to ſhun him as a peſtilence, to avoid all kind of contact or connection with him, and alſo to make thoſe public declarations of abhorrence which he did make on various occaſions, and at different periods. On the 26th of November, 1778, Mr. Fox declared *he could never act with Lord North with juſtice to his country*. On the 22d of June, in the following year, he avowed himſelf *ſhocked* at the idea that any alliance could poſſibly ſubſiſt between him and his opponent—"*The idea was too monſtrous to be ad-*
"*mitted for a moment!* GENTLEMEN MUST HAVE
"FORGOTTEN THEIR PRINCIPLES, AND HAVE
"GIVEN UP THRIR HONOUR, *before they could*
"*have approached the threſhold of an alliance ſo*
"*abominable, ſo ſcandalous, and ſo diſgraceful!*"

Perſevering in theſe ſentiments, he again declared, on the 4th of March, 1782, when the idea of a coalition of parties had been ſuggeſted, "*That "he did not mean to have any connection with Mi-"niſters; from the moment when he ſhould make any "terms with one of them, he would reſt ſatisfied to "be called* THE MOST INFAMOUS OF MANKIND!!! "*He could not for an inſtant think of a coalition with "men, who, in every public and private tranſac-"tion, as Miniſters, had ſhown themſelves void of "every principle of honour or honeſty: in the hands "of ſuch men he would not truſt his honour for a "minute!!!*" The ſequel is known—Mr. Fox *did* coaleſce with the man whom he had declared to be an enemy to freedom, a fool, or a traitor—a compound of pride, vice, and folly, and a criminal deſerving of the axe! He *did* make terms with the man whom he ſtated to be devoid of every principle of honour and honeſty; and *therefore* he ſtands recorded by himſelf—THE MOST INFAMOUS OF MANKIND!

This, Sir, is no ſtrained inference, no forced deduction—it is a plain, natural, and unavoidable conſequence, which not only *may*, but which abſolutely *muſt*, be drawn by every man who conſiders the facts. The declarations I have noticed were not unguarded expreſſions uttered in the heat of debate—not the ebullitions of paſſion—not the effects of momentary rage; they reſulted from the deliberate conviction of a mind, able to diſcriminate and competent to judge; they were repeated at different periods, and were perfectly conſiſtent

conſiſtent with the general tenor of Mr. Fox's ſpeeches and conduct in Parliament, during a term of ſeven years. They therefore conſtitue a body of evidence the moſt ſatisfactory and deciſive, and ſuch as will enable poſterity to form a juſt eſtimate of his public character.

Theſe documents you can neither obſcure by ſophiſtry, nor invalidate by aſſertion. You may extol, you may panegyrize, you may flatter; but ſtill the force and efficacy of theſe will remain undiminiſhed—

> " Till thou canſt rail the ſeal from off my bond,
> " Thou but offend'ſt thy lungs to ſpeak ſo loud—
> " Repair thy wit————"

Farther traces of the ſame dereliction of principle, on points of great political importance, may be diſcovered by an attentive peruſal of the debates of Parliament from the year 1772 to the preſent day. This is particularly remarkable in all the diſcuſſions relative to the Eaſt India Company, in which Mr. Fox will be found at one time to have conſidered their charter as a ſanction to monopoly, which could not be too ſpeedily aboliſhed; and, at another, as private property, which ought to be holden ſacred, and the infringement of which would be little leſs than a robbery.[2] It is equally viſible in his opinion on the important queſtion, how far a repreſentative is bound to comply with the inſtructions of his conſtituents.

[2] See the debates on this ſubject in December, 1772—March, 1773—April, May, and June, 1781—and April, 1782.

On this topic he will be found at one time reminding the members of the Houſe, that they were "inſignificant in themſelves, and derived "their importance from the appointment of their "conſtituents;" that it was their "duty to con-"form to the ſentiments, and, in ſome degree, "to the prejudices, of the people;" that, "in "their legiſlative capacity, the wiſhes of the peo-"ple ought to be their grand rule of conduct;" and that it was the duty of a member to act "agreeable to the notions and inſtructions of his "conſtituents.[3]" At another time,[4] he will be found declaring that "he ſhould be compelled to ſpeak "confeſſedly againſt the opinions of a very reſpec-"table part of his conſtituents; but it was a doc-"trine he had *uniformly* held, both in Weſtmin-"ſter Hall and Covent Garden, that in that "Houſe he was to ſpeak *his own* ſentiments; if "they coincided with thoſe of his conſtituents, "he ſhould indeed be the more happy," &c.— He will be ſeen in one inſtance juſtifying the influence of the Crown,[5] as neceſſary to the exiſtence of the government of a great country, and in various others repreſenting it as the ſource of every political evil.

This is the mere outline of a picture, which might be eaſily filled up with traits of equal ſtrength and deformity; but the taſk is too diſguſting to purſue. Indeed the conduct of Mr.

[3] See the debate on the 8th of February, 1780.

[4] On the 11th of June, 1783. [5] July 4, 1783.

Fox,

Fox, ſince the war with France, has been already delineated by ſuch a maſterly hand, that it would be the heighth of preſumption in me to follow ſuch a predeceſſor on the ſame ground. Without ſeeking to diminiſh, in the ſmalleſt degree, the odium attached to the infidelity that produced the publication to which I allude, I cannot but ſay, that I conſider its production as a fortunate circumſtance for the public, who will now be enabled to appreciate ſome parts of Mr. Fox's conduct which had not before been exhibited in a proper light. One of the topics only which are there diſcuſſed ſhall I venture to touch upon.

Every body muſt recollect, that when a difference ſubſiſted, in the ſpring of 1791, between the Courts of St. James's and St. Peterſburgh, Mr. FAWKNER was ſent to the Empreſs of Ruſſia to enforce certain demands, a compliance with which the Government of this country deemed neceſſary to remove the ground of diſpute. While Mr. FAWKENER was at Peterſburgh, Mr. ADAIR, a young man related, I believe, to Mr. Fox, repaired thither; and he was ſtated, by public report, to have been ſent by Mr. Fox, in his political capacity, as leader of oppoſition, though, as it has been ſince ſaid, without the approbation or knowledge of his party, for the purpoſe of fruſtrating the authorized Miniſter of the Crown in ſome of the objects of his negotiation. If this were really the caſe, which I have not the means of aſcertaining, there cannot be a doubt, that it was a moſt daring and unconſtitutional proceeding, and

ſuch

ſuch as richly deſerved the appellation it has received of—"A HIGH TREASONABLE MISDEMEANOR." Mr. ADAIR, conceiving the charge to convey an implication on *him*, ſent a letter to a morning print, denying it in general terms, but without entering into thoſe particulars which the nature of the accuſation ſeemed ſo imperiouſly to require. By this appeal to the public, through ſuch a channel, this gentleman certainly rendered the buſineſs a fair ſubject of public diſcuſſion, even if it had not been ſo before, juſtified the comments which any individual might feel diſpoſed or qualified to offer, and, in ſome degree, bound himſelf to anſwer any obſervations which the public might conſider as important, and relevant to the charge preferred.

Mr. ADAIR's letter produced an anſwer from a political writer, who had formerly ſtated the circumſtance, in juſtification of his own conduct; and, on the 23d of February, the following letter appeared in a reſpectable morning paper:

"I have lately read, in the public papers, a "very ſingular denial, from the pen of Mr. "ADAIR, of ſeveral circumſtances, ſtated by "Mr. BURKE, with reſpect to a ſuppoſed miſſion "to St. Peterſburgh, upon the ſubject of the "Ruſſian armament. The particular ſituation in "which I was then placed gave me an opportunity "of becoming better acquainted with the circum-"ſtances of that miſſion than perhaps any other "individual, Mr. ADAIR himſelf excepted. It

"was

" was certainly not my intention to bring forward
" to public view what I know upon that ſubject.
" but the implied attack, in Mr. ADAIR's letter,
" upon the veracity of Mr. BURKE, (whoſe infor-
" mation ſeems to me to have been perfectly ac-
" curate,) has induced me to venture to ſubmit
" one or two queſtions to Mr. A. to which, if he
" cannot give ſatisfactory anſwers, neither his
" innocence, perhaps, nor that of his employer,
" may appear to be ſo pure and unſullied in the
" eyes of the public.

" Had not Mr. A. frequent private interviews
" with Baron de BUHLER, Prince POTEMKIN's
" Secretary, at the houſe of Baron STROGONOF?

" Did not the ſubjects diſcuſſed at thoſe inter-
" views relate to the negotiation with which Mr.
" FAWKENER was charged?

" Mr. ADAIR, perhaps, does not know, that what
" Baron BUHLER had to repreſent to the Prince,
" was generally committed to writing, and deli-
" vered as a *rapport*, that it might be ſent to the
" Empreſs, if neceſſary. He perhaps does not
" know, that the Prince was very negligent with
" reſpect to papers of that ſort, and that his Aid-
" de-Camps were accuſtomed to read them as
" they lay on his table; that the writer of this
" letter had acceſs to the Prince's Chancery, as
" well as his private rooms; that when the Prince
" read theſe *rapports*, he generally put them into
" the hands of his Aid-de-Camps, who were in
" waiting, to be deſtroyed; but they were often
" preſerved, from motives of curioſity. What

" would

" would Mr. A. ſay, if any of theſe were pro-
" duced ?

" Is Mr. ADAIR aware, that Prince POTEMKIN
" converſed confidentially with the writer of this
" letter upon the ſubject of what the Prince called
" his extraordinary miſſion ?

" How came it to paſs, that Mr. ADAIR was
" received by the Empreſs with ſuch uncommon
" marks of diſtinction as never were ſhown to any
" ſimple traveller who viſited her Court ?

" Did not Mr. ADAIR, on taking leave, receive
" *exactly* the ſame preſent from the Empreſs as Mi-
" niſters of the ſecond rank always receive on the
" like occaſions ?

" That Mr. A. cannot truly anſwer theſe queſ-
" tions without criminating himſelf, I am fully
" convinced. That he may ſhelter himſelf, un-
" der the pretext of not anſwering anonymous
" letters, is extremely probable. Were the matter
" brought forward more publicly, I could feel no
" objection to offer a more open teſtimony; and
" I can venture to aſſure Mr. ADAIR, that I know
" more upon this ſubject than I have yet ſtated,
" which future circumſtances may induce me
" to diſcover. It may be recollected, that the
" ſtrictures of JUNIUS were not the leſs founded,
" or the leſs true, becauſe the author did not diſ-
" cloſe his name.

" I am, &c.

" ARCTICUS."

This letter is evidently written by a perſon perfectly acquainted with moſt of the circumſtances attending this myſterious tranſaction. The queſtions it contains are appoſite and well put, and the facts which it ſtates are clear, poſitive, and direct. Mr. ADAIR, however, has not deemed it expedient to reply, and has obſerved a profound ſilence on the ſubject. This is the more extraordinary, as he himſelf ſelected a newſpaper as the channel of his communication to the public; and therefore he can have no reaſonable ground of objection to a controverſy which he has provoked, and in a field which he has choſen. It may be urged that the letter is anonymous, and therefore undeſerving of notice; but the writer profeſſes his readineſs to *give a more open teſtimony*, if the matter were brought forward more publicly. It reſts with Mr. ADAIR, then, to call for this teſtimony; and the public have an undoubted right to expect a full explanation of a fact ſo extraordinary in itſelf, and ſo dangerous in its conſequences. That gentleman ſhould recollect, too, that men, his equal in character, his ſuperiors in rank and ability, have not diſdained to enter into a newſpaper controverſy, with *anonymous* adverſaries. It is the nature of the facts themſelves, and the manner in which they are urged, and not the medium through which they are communicated, that juſtify ſilence, or give a ſanction to reply. Both the ſubſtance and ſtyle of the letter of ARCTICUS are ſuch as entitle it to notice; and the impreſſion which muſt be left on the public mind

by leaving it unnoticed, will certainly not be favourable to Mr. Fox.

Among the numerous political delinquencies of your idol, I cannot but reckon his oppoſition to thoſe ſalutary bills which were calculated to preſerve the life of our Sovereign, and the peace of Society, from the attacks of a deſperate banditti, aſſociated for the purpoſe of introducing French anarchy into the boſom of their country. The means by which that oppoſition was conducted, ſavoured more of faction than of patriotiſm. The appeal from the wiſdom of the ſenate to the paſſions of a mob, and the reduction of reſiſtance to eſtabliſhed law to a mere queſtion of *prudence*, are acts which ſignalize the demagogue, but diſgrace the patriot. Though all his aſſertions as to the tendency of thoſe acts have been completely falſified —though not one act of oppreſſion can be ſtated to have reſulted from them—and though the machinations of the diſaffected, which they have hitherto rendered impotent and innoxious, are ſtill directed to the production of diſcontent, and the ſuſcitation of revolt ;[6] Mr. Fox does not ſcruple

[6] In proof of my aſſertion I need only cite the following hand-bill, which fell into my hands the other day, while I was on a viſit to a friend in Leiceſterſhire; and which has been induſtriouſly circulated among the manufacturers, colliers, and other workmen, in that and the neighbouring counties.—Let every man who reads it decide, whether ſtrong reſtrictive *laws* are not neceſſary to keep the factious ſocieties in awe, and to preſerve the peace of the country.

" At

ſcruple to perſiſt in his dangerous attempts to effect their appeal; and thereby to give a looſe to that

" At a meeting of delegates from a number of towns in the coun-
" ties of Nottingham, Derby, and Leiceſter, held at Ilkſtone
" on Monday the 26th of December, 1796, one of the dele-
" gates from the Nottingham Correſponding Society, addreſſed
" the meeting nearly as follows.

" Friends and fellow citizens,

" I feel my mind deeply impreſſed with a confident aſſurance " that I need not make any apology for thus addreſſing you, and " at the ſame time, I am conſcious that I am not worthy the ho- " nour, nor equal to the taſk conferred upon me; I cannot call " in the aid of ability, but hope I ſhall endeavour to compenſate " for its loſs, by a diſintereſted zeal for the public good; to raiſe " the poor from ſlavery—and to ſecure the enjoyment of honeſt- " earned property, to the rich, would be our greateſt pleaſure. " *Peace* and *reform* (I believe) is our grand, our ultimate object. " War and bloodſhed we utterly abhor, and it is a great conſola- " tion to the friends of liberty that they have not dyed their ſouls " with the guilt, nor embrued their hands in the blood, of their " neighbours, nor reduced their country to the dreadful alternative " of invaſion. Hope of peace is no more,—but we may expect " to be immediately called upon, to ſheath the ſword of deſpotiſm " in the vitals of our fellow mortals, to leave our wives to mourn " and our children to periſh,—one part of the poor to be ſacrificed " for the ſafety of the great—and the other to feed their extrava- " gance: they pay no taxes, for they have raiſed their rents, and " not only that, but they are in the habit of receiving large pen- " ſions (wrung from the vitals of the poor) in proportion to their " ability, to rob and enſlave them. For has not one of the grand " cabal, the thundering dæmon of war confirmed this opinion, " when he ſays, 'Periſh commerce, but let our conſtitution live?' " Periſh manufacturers and mechanics; for our foreign commerce, " being nearly loſt by war, we have the conſolation to be told by " the exalted Pittachio, that our trade will find its own level, and " to the teeth of the ſwiniſh, the ſlaviſh multitude we pronounce " it, our places and penſions we will enjoy, for have we not a ſer- " vile army on the one hand, and an armed ariſtocracy on the other?

that ſpirit, which, even checked and controuled as it is, muſt prove a ſource of anxiety and apprehenſion

" We have the repreſentative part of government under our thumbs, " and the executive in our hands: the adminiſtration of our laws " we have put into the hands of clergy, who inſtead of preaching " the goſpel of peace and redemption, thunder out damnation on " the enemies of war and corruption, and as ſuch we are ſtigma- " tized as diſloyal to church and ſtate. Thus we are doomed to po- " verty and death by one, and anathematized to hell by the other. " But we are friends to peace and good order, we are loyal to the " true intereſt and happineſs of our country, we are anxious for " liberty, and as friends and fellow citizens I hope we conſider " ourſelves as met on an equal footing, equally open to commu- " nicate, and equally ready to receive inſtructions, and I hope we " ſeek not our own but each others good. The ſtubborn impolicy " of a corrupt adminiſtration has reduced the nation, either to real " or fictious apprehenſions—we may reaſonably expect that the lives " and fortune men do ſtill retain their zealous loyalty to their glo- " rious cauſe, and we will do them the honour not to believe, that " they will excuſe themſelves in the hour of danger, by paying " the paltry ſum of fifteen pounds, but ſtand forward manfully in " defence of their own lives and property, and ſuffer the friends " of *peace* and *reform* to live in love and unity with all men.

" *After which the following reſolutions were unanimouſly agreed to, viz.*

" I. That it is the opinion of this meeting, that the militia aug- " mentation bill, is calculated to deſtroy the Britiſh conſtitution, " and the liberty of the people.

" II. That when Miniſters of the crown have power given them " by parliament, to drag the ſubjects from their neareſt and deareſt " connections, and force them to become men of blood; we are " of opinion that our property and perſons, and even our lives are " at their diſpoſal.

" III. It is the opinion of this meeting, that the unequal repre- " ſentation of the people in parliament, is the primary cauſe of " the unparallelled powers of the preſent Miniſters; and leaves

" the

prehenſion to every reflecting mind.—Such is the object of your idolatry!

Whether I conſider the conduct of your party as it relates to France, or merely as it refers to our domeſtic policy, I find equal ſubject for animadverſion and cenſure. You maintain the policy, in the event of a peace, of living in cloſe friendſhip with France; and all the efforts of oppoſition have been calculated to impreſs the ſame *pernicious* idea. Whenever we make a treaty

" the poor man who is not worth fifteen pounds unprotected by " the conſtitution.

" IV. It is the opinion of this meeting, that all men who are " obliged to pay taxes, have a right to be repreſented in that par- " liament which lays the taxes upon them.

" V. That it is the opinion of this meeting that, that part of the " people who are not repreſented in parliament, have not any right " to be compelled to leave their families, to fight for the preſer- " vation of that conſtitution wherein they have no voice.

" VI. That we will uſe every legal and conſtitutional meaſure " in our power, to procure annual parliaments and univerſal " ſuffrage.

" VII. That it is the opinion of this meeting, that the men of " great landed property pay no taxes, for by raiſing their rents they " ſhift the evil from themſelves to the farmers, and the farmers by " doubling the price of proviſions lay it (with great intereſt) en- " tirely upon the poor, whoſe labour is the wealth and ſupport of " the nation.

" *Reſolved*, That it is the opinion of this meeting, that there is " no hope of ſaving the poor from periſhing, nor of preventing " the rich from involving the whole nation in deſtruction; but by " a general union of the people, whoſe united voice would roar " more like Thunder than cannon, and the vivid flaſhes of com- " plaint, remonſtrance and indignation, would awe their guilty " ſouls into peace, and make them relinquiſh their favourite ſyſtem " of *Murder*, *Oppreſſion*, and *Death*."

with

with the French, the known honour and integrity of the nation will be a ſure pledge for its full and faithful obſervance; but, I truſt, that the vigilance and wiſdom of the legiſlature will be actively exerted for the prevention of a TOO CLOSE intercourſe with that *infected* country, and to obſtruct that copious influx of Frenchmen into Great Britain, which will certainly be attempted, *from the moſt hoſtile motives*, as ſoon as the war ſhall be terminated.

This new attachment to France, ſo repugnant to the honeſt prejudices of our anceſtors, and conceived at a time when ſhe was become, from her treachery and crimes, an object of execration to all the virtuous part of mankind, is liable to ſuſpicions of a peculiar nature. It is even expreſsly contradictory to the avowed principles and recorded ſentiments of your party itſelf, as a reference to thoſe documents which I have before had occaſion to quote, will irrefragably prove. In the month of February, 1787, when nothing more was propoſed than to conclude a commercial treaty with France, highly favourable, in its proviſions, to our trade and manufactures, the ſcheme was reprobated by the oppoſition; and Mr. Fox himſelf endeavoured, by every argument his ingenuity could deviſe or his eloquence enforce, to confirm that rooted enmity which England had for ages maintained againſt her formidable rival. He declared, "that he never "could be brought to believe that France could be "ſincere in her profeſſions of friendſhip to Great "Britain."

" Britain." He remarked, " that, notwith-
" ſtanding the levity of French manners, not-
" withſtanding the mutability of that people, yet,
" to the aſtoniſhment of the whole world, during
" all the changes of adminiſtration, they had for
" more than a century, kept to one regular and
" conſtant idea, that of overweening pride *and*
" *national aggrandizement:* anxious to graſp at a
" more than due influence over the other powers of
" Europe, France had endeavoured, by different
" means, to obtain her object." He repreſented
" the true ſituation of England to be that of a
" great maritime power, looked up to by the other
" powers of Europe as that to which *the diſtreſſed*
" *ſhould fly for aſſiſtance, whenever France unjuſtly*
" *attacked them,* with a view to the attainment of
" her favourite object." In reply to Mr. PITT's
remarks on the treaty, he ſaid, " With regard
" to what the Right Honourable Gentleman had
" obſerved reſpecting its political tendency, to
" cement in bonds of peace and commerce the
" friendſhip of both countries, and that he con-
" ceived it not impoſſible by theſe means to de-
" ſtroy that enmity which had ſubſiſted between
" the two nations, he muſt beg entirely to diſſent.
" *France was the inveterate and* UNALTERABLE
" political enemy of Great Britain." He main-
tained that " a wiſe Miniſter ought, with re-
" ſpect to France, to procure an alliance for
" Great Britain with ſome maritime power that
" could aſſiſt her whenever France thought it a
" fit moment to attack her." He declared, " he

" had

" had lately heard, and with much true joy, that " the probability of our once again recovering " our ſituation with *Holland*, was increaſed—he " was ſincerely glad of it."—Such *was* the language of your oracle!

Mr. GREY, too, ſupported the ſame principles and maintained the ſame doctrine; he reprobated " *the boundleſs ambition of France*, our natural, ri- " val, if not our natural foe;" and he " aſked " what had lulled *our conſtitutional jealouſy* to " ſleep; and whether it evinced either policy or " prudence in Great Britain to abandon *her old* " *prejudices* and aſſume a *new feeling* towards " France?"—He was convinced—" that while " France was holding out the moſt liberal profeſ- " ſions of amity and ſincere regard towards this " country, ſhe was intent on the purſuit of her " grand object, *the annihilation of the greatneſs of* " *Britain in the ſcale of Europe, the reduction of her* " *power, and the ruin of her navigation and marine.*" And he declared that " it had been the uniform " aim of France to diminiſh Britiſh greatneſs, " and to render us as much politically inſulated " as we were inſulated in regard to our local ſitua- " tion."—This was *Britiſh* language, and theſe were *Britiſh* principles, though certainly miſapplied to the conduct of the French in 1787.[1]

[1] So ſtrong was the language uſed by your party on this occaſion, ſo pointed their declarations of eternal hoſtility to France, that they formed the ſubject of a complaint from LOUIS XVI. to the Duke of DORSET, who was, at that time, the Britiſh Ambaſſador at the Court of Verſailles.

But

But what a contraſt do they form with the language employed and the principles advanced by your party, ſince the French revolution! Whence does this change proceed? Has France *then* ſo ambitious, *now* become ſo moderate, when ſhe only requires the Alps and the Rhine as the boundaries of her territory? Has France *then* ſo contaminated, *now* become ſo purified by the blood of her beſt citizens ſhed on the ſcaffold, or in the field of civil conteſt? Has France *then* ſo vicious, *now* become ſo virtuous by the abolition of monarchy and the eſtabliſhment of a republic? Has France who *then* deſerved our enmity, *now* rendered herſelf worthy our friendſhip by extending the object of her hoſtility from our power to our conſtitution? In ſhort, what is there in her preſent ſituation, that can juſtify the abandonment of thoſe *old prejudices* and the aſſumption of that *new feeling*, the former of which your party ſo ſtrongly juſtified, and the latter of which they ſo loudly reprobated, ten years ago? Since that period ſhe has committed every act of atrociouſneſs of which human depravity was believed to be capable, and many of which it was ſuppoſed to be incapable: ſhe has murdered her own ſons; oppreſſed her friends; robbed her Allies; invaded the rights of neutral States; and trampled upon all laws, ſocial, moral, and divine. You will certainly acknowledge that *ſuch* incitements to a friendly intercourſe, required an explana-

tion, although you have prudently forborne to give one.[1]

[1] The ſentiments of a moſt amiable and ſenſible friend of mine, who enlivens every topic ſhe diſcuſſes, amuſes while ſhe inſtructs, and gives an intereſt to ſubjects apparently incapable of attracting attention, ſo perfectly correſpond with my own, and are moreover ſo appoſite to the point, that I cannot withſtand the temptation of quoting them.

"I do all poſſible juſtice to the liberality of my countrymen, "who are become ſuch paſſionate admirers of the French; and I "cannot but lament their having been ſo unfortunate in the choice "of the æra from whence they date this new friendſhip. It is, "however, a proof, that their regards are not the effect of "that kind of vanity which eſteems objects in proportion "as they are eſteemed by the reſt of the world; and the ſincerity "of an attachment cannot be better evinced than by its ſurviving "irretrievable diſgrace and univerſal abhorrence. Many will "ſwell the triumph of a hero, or add a trophy to his tomb; but "he who exhibits himſelf with a culprit at the gallows, or deco-"rates the gibbet with a wreath, is a friend indeed!

"If ever the character of a people were repugnant to amity, "or inimical to connection, it is that of the French for the laſt "three years. In this ſhort ſpace they have formed a compen-"dium of all the vices which have marked as many preceding "ages;—the cruelty and treachery of the *League*;—the ſedition, "levity, and intrigue of the *Fronde*;—with the licentiouſneſs and "political corruption of more modern epochs. Whether you "examine the conduct of the nation at large, or that of its chiefs "and leaders, your feelings revolt at the one, and your integrity "deſpiſes the other. You ſee the idols erected by folly, degraded "by caprice;—the authority obtained by intrigue, bartered by "profligacy;—and the perfidy and corruption of the one ſide ſo "balanced by the barbarity and levity of the other, that the mind, "unable to decide on the preference of contending vices, is obliged "to find repoſe, though with regret and diſguſt, in acknowledging "the general depravation."

A Reſidence in France during the Years 1792, 1793, 1794, *and* 1795.—Vol. I. p. 186, 187, 188.

You

You ſay that you are no advocate for popular exceſſes, and, *as I believe your private character to be irreproachable*, I give full credit to your aſſertion; but it becomes you to conſider whether the language you uſe is not calculated to excite them, and whether thoſe with whom you act are as ſincere in their profeſſions as yourſelf. I muſt confeſs, that I place little faith in the boaſted moderation of modern reformers; and experience has taught me to view theſe affirmations with doubt and ſuſpicion. I have not yet forgotten that, in July, 1791, one of the French reformers, the notorious *Abbé Sieyes*, who has ſince taken an active, though a *ſecret*, part in all the enormities that have been committed ſince that period, made the following declaration: "I prefer a monarchy to a "republic, becauſe it is proved that a citizen en-"joys more liberty in a monarchy than in a re-"public.—In every point of view a man is more "free in a monarchy than in a republic." Neither have I forgotten the declaration of *Lord Lauderdale's* honeſt friend BRISSOT, in the National Aſſembly, only fourteen days before the execution of his plot for the abolition of monarchy, on the 10th of Auguſt, 1792, "They tell us of a faction "that wiſhes to eſtabliſh a republic. If any ſuch "*regicide* republicans exiſt, if there are men who "ſeek to eſtabliſh a republic, the ſword of the law "ought to fall upon their heads as upon thoſe of "the active friends of two chambers.[2]" Beſides,

[2] Conſpiration D'Orleans," Tom. III. p. 135, 136, 204.

whatever may be the *intentions* of men, who endeavour to enliſt the populace on their ſide, they ought to recollect, when engaged in ſuch an hazardous enterprize, that it is much eaſier to *raiſe* the ſtorm of public diſcontent, than to *direct* it.

The preſent moment is truly critical, and the conteſt in which we are engaged requires the active unanimity of all claſſes and deſcriptions of men. But this unanimity is not to be promoted by the inflammatory language which you have choſen to employ. Your remarks with regard to Ireland, I ſhall paſs unnoticed; I have read with ſatisfaction the ſpeeches of Sir HERCULES LANGRISHE, and would adviſe you to take from that worthy Baronet a leſſon of true patriotiſm. Any blockhead may inflame the paſſions of a mob; but it requires ſome talents to convince the judgement of rational men.—To this deſcription of perſons alone I appeal for the juſtice of my aſſertion, that your language is calculated to produce the very conſequences which you ſeem to deprecate.

Speaking of the revolutions of America, and France, you aſſert, in direct oppoſition to fact, that the deſtruction of both Governments was owing to the refuſal of corrupt power "to ſubmit to cor-"rection;" they are now, you ſay, both repreſentative republics, "and," *mark the threat!* "if "corruption will not yet be corrected, let her "look to herſelf."[3] That is as much as to ſay, that

[3] Page 6.

if

if the Britiſh legiſlature will not adopt thoſe plans of reform, which your party and the ſociety of "The Friends of the People" in their wiſdom think neceſſary, the monarchy will be deſtroyed and a republic eſtabliſhed on its ruins. I truſt, however, that there are *real* ſtaunch Friends of the Conſtitution enough yet remaining, who hold ſuch threats in utter contempt, and will have courage to make thoſe, who ſhall dare attempt to put them in execution, rue their temerity. The time, thank Heaven, is not yet come for rebellion to ſtalk bare-faced and unpuniſhed through the ſtreets of London.

You afterwards tell us that the taxes, which have been impoſed for the neceſſary purpoſe of ſelf-defence, was occaſioned by corruptions,[4] and purſuing your favourite theme, you obſerve, that "corruption brutifies and debaſes; her votaries "are ſtupidly inſenſible, and, as this contagion "muſt, in the nature of things, ſtop ſhort of the "great maſs of the people, *the multitude ſeparated* "*from their ſuperiors* are of courſe *the indignant* "*reformers*; and the lazy, profligate, bloated "abuſers of rational and uſeful eminence are "knocked on the head like ſeals whom the tide "has left ſleeping on the ſhore.[5]" If this *humane*, *elegant*, and *delicate* obſervation have not a direct tendency to create a diſtinction between the different claſſes of ſociety, which is alike foreign from the principles and *practice* of our conſtitution, and,

[4] Page 126. [5] Page 131.

farther

farther, to excite discontent and revolt, I am not able to comprehend its meaning.

Speaking of the example afforded by the French revolution, you remark[6]—"It may serve as a "warning to the inhabitants of all nations not "*suddenly* to push forward the reformations of "society beyond the pitch of prudence and the "analogies of experience; to consider Govern-"ment as a practical thing, rather to build upon "the foundations laid by the united wisdom of "social man, improving upon the model *by the* "*rising lights of the world*, than to assume, *at* "*once*, the exercise and practice of their full "rights, *merely because the rights unquestionably* "*belong to them.*[7]" It is sufficiently evident what

[6] Page 186.

[7] BILLAUD DE VARENNES, whose patriotism terminated as unhappily for himself as that of the British reformers, MUIR and PALMER, whose hard fate has so frequently excited the lamentations of your party, held language very similar to this, at an early period of the French revolution:

"Precipitation rushes forwards with hasty steps, but seldom "reaches the goal. A perfect resemblance of her is exhibited in "the ingenious fiction of the fable which gives to Gyges a hundred "arms and a hundred hands. This giant only uses them for the "purpose of overthrowing and destroying every thing that comes "in his way; so that he is perpetually surrounded with ruins.— "Woe, then, to the people who shall seek to accelerate the slow "but certain progress of philosophy.—Neither the laws, the mo-"narch, the country, nor any thing else, will be respected."

Le Peintre Politique, by BILLAUD VARENNES.

It must be acknowledged, that the opinions of the British Senators on the policy of assuming an appearance of moderation in "The Reformations of Society," are not very dissimilar to those of ROBESPIERRE's colleague, the philosopher of *Guiana!*

rights

rights they are to which you allude, by your exhortation in the following page, in which you call upon the people "to come forward at this mo-"ment," with a firmneſs which reminds Government "*that it exiſts only for their benefit, and by* "*their conſent.*[8]" No language can be plainer: you tell the people, in direct terms, that they have an unqueſtionable right to deſtroy the Government whenever they pleaſe, becauſe you ſay it exiſts only by their conſent; but that it is not expedient to put thoſe rights in practice *ſuddenly* and *at once!* In the firſt place, you aſſume a fact which you are incompetent to prove, for your ideas of the origin of Government are extremely erroneous; and, ſecondly, you point to an inference which you are unable to juſtify. But admitting the juſtice both of your premiſes and your concluſions, let me aſk, Whether this be proper language to uſe at ſuch a period as the preſent? Faction, I know, will ſeek to inflame where wiſdom will ſtrive to conciliate; but, ſurely, the man who aſſumes the character of a patriot ſhould, at a time when an unprincipled enemy ſeeks to impoſe terms of pacification incompatible with the ſafety and honour of his country, invoke the unanimous aid of his fellow-citizens to reſiſt ſuch dangerous pretenſions, inſtead of calling upon them to come forward in ſupport of that very ſyſtem which muſt, if adopted, enforce a compliance with their enemy's demands. He ſhould

[8] Page 137.

alſo,

alſo, when the right of reſiſtance and inſurrection has been openly preached by the modern apoſtles of liberty, forbear to encreaſe the ſtock of *imaginary* rights, and teach his countrymen, *if he know it himſelf*, the true origin of their *real* rights, which can only reſult from the diſcharge of their *duties*.[9] And he ſhould not favour the vulgar and prepoſterous idea, that corruptions are, excluſively, the fruit of monarchical eſtabliſhments when they are known to ſubſiſt in a much greater degree under republican and democratic Governments.

"No ſooner," ſays MALLET DU PAN, "was "the throne of France overthrown, than theft "uſurped its place. Regular boards of corrup- "tion were eſtabliſhed; tributes of blood ex- "torted tributes of money; and if the citizen "eſcaped the rapacity of Government, he could "not eſcape the rapine of his accomplices. The "ferocity of the French republic has been re- "marked; but nobody has obſerved that that "ferocity was *mercenary*, and *a matter of calcula- "tion*; ſtill leſs has any one yet dared to ſtate,

9 You appear to me to be as ignorant of the origin of *right* as of the origin of Government. I have already directed your attention to a pure ſource of information on the latter ſubject, and I now refer you for inſtruction on the former, to "*The Origin of "Duty and Right in Man conſidered*;" a work which contains more ſound and *uſeful* conſtitutional knowledge than is to be found in the political writings of LOCKE and all his ſupporters, on this important topic. The author has diſplayed a *truly philoſophic* mind, actuated by the beſt principles and directed to the beſt end—the *well-being* of man.

"that

"that it was a condition vigorously insisted upon "at the establishment of a great democratic re-"public at the end of the eighteenth century![4]"

Sorry am I to say, that, in whatever point of view I consider the conduct of opposition, whether as directed to secure impunity to the promoters of internal tumult, or to prevent the Government from affording that assistance to our Ally which can alone enable him successfully to oppose the exertions of our common foe, it appears to me to be precisely such as men under the direct influence of the Executive Directory of France, would be taught to pursue. Narrow, contracted, and unprincipled, must those minds be, which, at this awful conjuncture, can act as if engaged in a contest for place and power; and, which, instead of proceeding upon the broad ground of constitutional vigilance, can descend to political squabbles, contentions, and broils, dishonourable to themselves, and disgraceful to the Senate. If, by such conduct, we should be ultimately driven, which Heaven forbid! to purchase, by a base sacrifice of our honour and our safety, a short respite from hostility, the heavy load of responsibility will crush them with its weight, and the maledictions of society will proclaim them the enemies of their country.—Firmness, vigour, and decision, have heretofore formed the characteristic features of Britons in the hour of distress.

[4] *Correspondence Politique, pour servir à L'Histoire du Republicanisme Français.*

Though the *public mind* is, I fear, in ſome degree, perverted, the national character, I truſt, is not gone; let us be true to ourſelves and we have nothing to fear; but the man who, when difficulties preſs and dangers ſurround, refuſes to lend his ſupport to the State, is a miſcreant, that deſerves to be rejected from her boſom.

Such, Sir, are the honeſt ſentiments of a mind, independent as your own, and more unſhackled, becauſe linked to no *party*.

In the courſe of theſe ſtrictures, I have exerciſed that freedom of diſcuſſion which an earneſt deſire to ſerve, excluſively, the cauſe of *truth*, will ever lead me to aſſert.—While I do juſtice to thoſe talents which have ſecured you diſtinction in the line of your profeſſion, and acknowledge, with pleaſure, the excellence of your private character, I cannot but deplore your ignorance on political matters, and reprobate the tendency of your public conduct. If, in doing this, I have ſometimes employed ſtrong language, it ſhould be remembered that the occaſion juſtifies its ſtrength.[5] I have neither the art nor the inclination

[5] You have expreſſed your apprehenſion that the promulgation of your ſentiments on the war, would expoſe you to the attacks of *calumny*. This is one of the expreſſions which your party have been accuſtomed to apply to all the attacks of their opponents, however juſt or well founded. But as the word, in its legitimate meaning, is only applicable to a *falſe* charge, a *groundleſs* accuſation, it cannot be applied to the language of *truth*, however harſh or ſevere. For example, you have called the Emperor of Germany a *conſpirator* for having waged war againſt France; I accuſe you in

tion to modify terms of reprobation, or to ſoften down expreſſions of cenſure, ſo as to give them the ſemblance of praiſe.—In ſhort, I prefer the honeſt bluntneſs of BOILEAU to the vain varniſh of ERSKINE—

" J'appelle un chat un chat et Rolet un fripon."

Dignity and decorum do not proclude ſeverity and rigour—

" The baſe degenerate age requires
" Severity and juſtice in its rigour."

and affection and hypocriſy, which the refinement of modern philoſophy has dignified with the equivocal appellations of *liberality* and *moderation*, are not the weapons of TRUTH.

You have, very MODESTLY, confeſſed that you have no talents for a ſtateſman; and your " View " of the Cauſes and Conſequences of the War," affords an incontrovertible proof of the juſtice of your acknowledgement.—A firm determination to ſuffer no impoſition to be practiſed upon the public, on a point of ſuch extreme importance to the nation, and a wiſh to diſplay the conduct of

in reply, of *ignorance* and *miſrepreſentation*;—but you adduce no proof in ſupport of your charge, and I demonſtrate its falſehood: you therefore are the *calumniator*; I the advocate of *truth*.—This is a diſtinction which it is much to be wiſhed that all political writers would keep conſtantly in view.

If you wiſh for any farther practical illuſtration of *calumny*, I refer you to the ſpeeches of your aſſociates in the Houſe of Commons, previous to the diſſolution of the *laſt* Parliament.

your party in a proper point of view, led me to ſubmit, in a ſtate of health but ill-calculated for mental exertion of any kind, to the trouble of peruſing your tract and expoſing its defects :—To *uſe your own language*—"Theſe conſiderations in-"duced me to travel through one of the moſt "dull, deſpicable, and miſerable performances, "that ever I had been doomed to read.[6]"

[6] See the debates, in the Houſe of Commons, on the 26th of November, 1795, on the ſubject of the pamphlet aſcribed to Mr. REEVES. On that occaſion, Mr. Fox obſerved, that he ſhould not act up to the feelings of a *gentleman* if he did not hold in reprobation the character of Mr. REEVES. I do not mean to inſult Mr. REEVES, either by comparing his character with that of the author of this obſervation; or the production imputed to him with the object of theſe ſtrictures; but I cannot forbear to notice the peculiar ſtructure of thoſe feelings of a *gentleman*, which prompts him to attack the character of another in a place where he has no means of defence.

POSTSCRIPT.

I Cannot commit a Second Edition of theſe ſheets to the preſs, without expreſſing my utter aſtoniſhment at the ſentiments avowed by ſome diſtinguiſhed members of your party, within the laſt week. God forbid I ſhould impute to the noble perſonages to whom I allude the baſe and treacherous *intention* of ſerving the enemies of their country; but that their conduct has a direct and immediate tendency to produce that effect, that it is preciſely ſuch conduct as the members of the Executive Directory of France would purſue, if they could, for a time, obtain the privilege of a ſeat in the Britiſh Senate, I will ever ſtrenuouſly contend. Good heavens! how muſt the true friend of his country deplore that abject and perverſe ſpirit which can lead men who ſtand high on the ſcale of ſociety, in wealth, in rank, and character, to become the advocates of democracy, the tools of faction, and the pandars of party! —to favour, by their meaſures, the ſucceſs of that cauſe, and the progreſs of thoſe principles which have laid all wealth, rank, and character, in the duſt;—which have deſtroyed all diſtinctions of opulence and poverty, order and anarchy, virtue and vice!—to render themſelves the vehicles of miſrepreſentation and the channels of impoſture!

impoſture!—and, ultimately, to ſacrifice the intereſts of monarchical England to the proſperity of republican France! Were I poſſeſſed of the powers which marked the rude but energetic ſtrains of the venerable father of Roman ſatire, I would laſh this blind infatuation, this wretched degeneracy, until the dormant embers of public ſpirit ſhould be awakened into life, and rectitude of principle be produced by the operation of ſhame—

> " Enſe velut ſtricto, quoties Lucilius ardens
> " Infremuit, rubet auditor cui frigida mens eſt
> " Criminibus, tacitâ ſudant præcordia culpâ."

Have theſe infatuated young men paid any attention to the cauſes and progreſs of the French revolution? Do they know that the young nobility of France, their equals in all reſpects, their ſuperiors in many, who early adopted the innovating principles of the day, and were anxious to promote a *reform*, which they vainly imagined they could effect without danger to the conſtitutution, are all of them proſcribed, exiled, or murdered? Let his Grace of BEDFORD remember the fate of the Duke of ORLEANS,[7] whoſe watch-

[7] I will not, for a moment, admit the ſuppoſition, that the grandſon of the patriotic peace-maker of 1763, took a leſſon of politics from this " monſter in human ſhape," during his reſidence in England; though we are told by the author of the *Conſpiration d'Orleans*, that " ORLEANS contrived to gain over to his views all " that party in England which is called the *Party of Oppoſition*. " Fox, one of the oracles of that party, was conſtantly attached " to ORLEANS: he is ſtill attached to his family; and is the " avowed

watch-words were *deſpotiſm* and *corruption*, and who ultimately fell a victim to his own arts, and by the hands of thoſe very men whom he had raiſed from obſcurity, for a very different purpoſe. The only reſemblance, I truſt, between the two characters, will be found to conſiſt in the immenſity of their fortunes, and the ſimilarity of their attempts to conciliate the favour of the mob. But thoſe were the very circumſtances which brought the Gallic demagogue to the ſcaffold, and that the ſame cauſes may not produce the ſame effects, is rather the ſubject of a ſelfiſh wiſh than a matter of rational expectation. To men of plain *common* ſenſe it will appear, that the Engliſh Duke would do more credit to himſelf, and more ſervice to his country, by appropriating ſome portion of his extenſive fortune,—great part of which he derives, through his anceſtors, from the bounty of the Crown, (a tenure which, until a French faction ſhall have overthrown all diſtinctions in England, will be conſidered as ſacred as a property obtained by purchaſe, or acquired by induſtry,)—to augment the means of reſiſting the determined enemies of all crowns, and of the political and commercial independence of the State.

" avowed protector of all the French who belonged to the faction " of that Prince." The ſame writer obſerves, that when this wretched being was examined by the Public Accuſer, he was aſked, " What were the motives of his pretended miſſion to " England ?" he anſwered—" It was known that I was intimately " connected with the Party of Oppoſition."—*Pares cum paribus.*

Let

Let the young Earls of OXFORD and SUFFOLK advert to the wretched ſituation of the AIGUILLONS, the LIANCOURS, the LAMETHS, and a long train of exiled nobles, who lately enjoyed all the comforts and luxuries which wealth can procure, but who are now reduced to a ſtate of obſcure indigence. Theſe unhappy noblemen were the credulous victims of deſigning demagogues; who, as ST. JUST obſerved, "talked of *reform* "when they durſt not talk of *revolution*;[8]" for, to quote ROBESPIERRE, "no conſpiracies could "be formed unleſs the word *reform* were to pre- "cede the word *revolution*.[9]"—"Diſguiſe is the "characteriſtic feature of conſpiracies.[1]"——The firſt of the two Earls has told us, indeed, that he learnt his principles "from the acts and writings "of our anceſtors;[2]" but, I apprehend, it would puzzle a much wiſer man than his Lordſhip appears

[8] "On parle de reforme quand on n'oſe pas parler de revolution."

[9] On ne conſpireroit jamais ſi le mot *reforme* ne precedoit le "mot de *revolution*."

[1] "La caractere des conſpirations eſt le deguiſement." ST. JUST. —See VILATE *ſur les Cauſes ſecretes de la Revolution de 9 au 10 Thermidor*.

[2] I know not from what maſter his Lordſhip learnt his *principles*, but he certainly did not learn his *grammar* from Biſhop LOWTH. Some *good-natured* friend has adviſed this young nobleman to publiſh in the newſpapers what he calls an addreſs to the nation, which contains his proteſt againſt the proceedings of the Houſe on the rejection of his motion on the 23d inſtant. This is the moſt curious paper I believe that was ever exhibited to public view. This noble *Diſſenter* cenſures Lord GRENVILLE for preſuming to quote, in ſupport of his arguments, an Addreſs of the Houſe to his Majeſty; and yet makes no ſcruple to cite, in confirmation of his

pears to be, to diſcover in either of thoſe reſpectable ſources any precedent for the extraordinary conduct obſerved by the preſent Oppoſition on the ſubject of the war. As far as I am acquainted with the character and conduct of our anceſtors, they ever conſidered an *Antigallican ſpirit* as an honourable characteriſtic of a Britiſh mind. Impreſſed with this ſentiment, they invariably reſiſted the dangerous attempts of France to deſtroy, by extenſion of territory, and augmentation of ſtrength, the balance of power in Europe; and nobly diſdained to ſacrifice the intereſts of their country to the arrogant pretenſions of an implacable foe, from the mean conſideration that reſiſtance might be productive of difficulties and dan-

his own, a Speech of his Majeſty to the Houſe. He confidently aſſumes the office of Cenſor-General, arrogantly arraigns the wiſdom of his Sovereign in the beſtowal of honours, and preſumptuouſly declares, that certain newly-created Peers are wholly deſtitute of merit. His Lordſhip aſſigns, as one reaſon for his *diſſention*, that "the arguments advanced by him have never before "been touched upon, even in debates;" and infers, that becauſe they were not anſwered, "they were perfectly unanſwerable."—Without preſuming to impeach either the accuracy of his aſſertion, the modeſty of his pretenſions, or the juſtice of his inference, I may be permitted to expreſs a hope, dictated by a regard for the credit of the Senate, that, if his arguments were never before advanced, they may never be advanced again—

"Stat contra ratio, et ſecretam gannit in aurem;
"Ne liceat facere id, quod quis vitiabit agendo:
"Publica lex hominum, naturaque continet hoc fas,
"Ut teneat vetitos inſcitia debilis actus."

The inexperienced orator was not aware, that his Philippic on the *Commanders of Boroughs* was a libel on his political aſſociates.

gers to themſelves. They would, probably, have agreed with the Noble Earl, that our preſent ſituation requires "the united energy and public ſpirit "of the whole nation;" not, indeed, to purchaſe a precarious reſpite from hoſtility by ignominious conceſſions, but to continue a juſt and neceſſary war, until peace can be concluded on a ſafe, honourable, and permanent baſis.

The Duke of NORFOLK has appealed to the authority of Lord CHATHAM in ſupport of his remarks on the conduct of the war; why then will he not abide by the opinions of that able ſtateſman on the conditions of peace? Lord CHATHAM would have rejected, with indignation and diſdain, any propoſition for the ceſſion of the Auſtrian Netherlands to the French; ſince I have ſhown, that ſo convinced was he of the danger ariſing to our trade and commerce from their preſent extenſion of coaſt, that he abſolutely made the deſtruction of the harbour of Dunkirk the *ſine quâ non* of accommodation. But, *tempora mutantur*, the French may now remain paſſive and ſecure their object without trouble or moleſtation; they find others to plead their cauſe and fight their battles for them. Lord OXFORD and you tell them, that an immediate peace is neceſſary for our exiſtence; the Duke of NORFOLK and Lord LANSDOWNE proclaim the impoſſibility of recovering Belgium; and Mr. SHERIDAN and Mr. Fox charitably endeavour to prevent our Miniſters from affording that aſſiſtance to our Ally, which can alone enable him to defeat the ſchemes of our

enemy,

enemy, and to create that diverſion of his forces which can alone ſecure our coaſts from the danger of invaſion. This conduct may be deemed *patriotic*, but, in times leſs *refined*, leſs *enlightened* than the preſent, it would certainly receive a very different appellation.

Your own efforts in the common cauſe will, no doubt, hereafter be remembered with gratitude. But, in the mean time, Sir, permit me to aſk you, whether the artifices which have been employed to provoke a *forced circulation* of your work, are ſuch as are conſiſtent with the dignity of your public character?[7] As if determined to prove the juſtice of my ſuſpicion, that you wrote for the *populace*, and not for the *people*, a *cheap edition* has been announced, men have been hired to hawk it about at the coffee-houſes, and in the ſtreets, and not a retailer of ſeditious publications in the populous ſuburbs of the metropolis but proclaims the amplitude of his ſtock by a bill at his door, calculated, by its enormous ſize, to catch the eye of the paſſenger.—In ſhort, the very ſame manœuvres have been exerted to extend the ſale of your production as were uſed to circulate the

[7] The public will be leſs ſurprized at the number of *editions* through which your work has ſo rapidly paſſed, when they are informed, that each edition conſiſted only of *a fourth part* of the number which it is uſual to print; ſo that the fourteen editions of Mr. BURKE's pamphlet would be equal to *fifty-ſix* of your own. The public taſte, therefore, in this inſtance, is not ſo depraved as it appears to be.—The preſs, too, has been kept ſtanding, in order that any number of editions might be printed, without any additional expence to the publiſher.

treaſonable

treaſonable tracts of your client—that infamous incendiary *Thomas Paine*. You may, perhaps, find, in the approbation of clubs, and the applauſe of political aſſociates, a compenſation for the effect which ſuch conduct muſt neceſſarily produce on the minds of the ſober and rational part of mankind; but you will do well to recollect, that ſelf-degradation is the forerunner of public diſgrace, and that the flames of popular rage have frequently conſumed the thoughtleſs patriot whoſe breath firſt fanned them into life.

March 29, 1797.

FINIS.